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Abstract 
This thesis discusses reward bundling as a process that enables decision makers to self-regulate 
their choice behavior. Most empirical work on intertemporal choice has focused on analyzing 
impulsive choice. Less effort has been dedicated to explanations of how individuals manage to 
overcome self-defeating behavior. This thesis evaluates the theory of reward bundling. It 
presents a set of econometric tools that can be employed to investigate whether actual choice 
behavior is consistent with the theory of bundling. It reports an experiment with human subjects. 
Reward bundling has been demonstrated in experiments with pigeons and rats. However, no 
empirical study using salient rewards and sound econometric model estimation has ever been 
carried out with humans. The present experiment is, therefore, the first that meets the 
methodological standards of experimental economics and finds evidence consistent with the 
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Suppose that people reverse their preferences as the availability of the sooner alternative 
approaches in time. If such choice behavior occurs, we can say that individuals choose 
impulsively. A pattern of impulsive choice may occur when decision makers repeatedly face 
pairs of smaller but sooner (SS) and larger but later (LL) rewards to choose from. Such 
individuals are often fully aware that the LL option is preferable as long as the decision and the 
availability of SS are far away. Nevertheless, as they approach the decision they opt for SS, only 
to regret their choice afterwards. Many researchers have claimed that such choice behavior is 
prevalent in various situations. Primary examples for such self-defeating behavior in the field are 
substance abuse, gambling problems, or other addictions. The same choice pattern seems to be 
present in behavioral phenomena that are usually less severe, such as procrastination or lapses in 
people’s diet or exercise regimens. In the laboratory, some have claimed the existence of 
“anomalies” for the standard economic model, constant or exponential discounting, which 
supposedly require alternative theoretical approaches to intertemporal choice (Loewenstein & 
Prelec 1992).    
Economists and psychologists have dedicated considerable effort to developing such 
alternatives. Several models, notably various specifications of hyperbolic discounting, have been 
proposed to explain impulsivity. Indisputable evidence for these models, however, is rare. Many 
experimental studies that seemingly explain impulsive choice behavior, e.g. Thaler (1981), base 
their findings on the use of hypothetical rewards. This practice does not meet the widely 
accepted methodological standards of experimental economics. Moreover, claims that decision 
makers are inherently impulsive face the problem of explaining how impulse control is possible. 
If the inherent preferences of people are such that they result in impulsive choice behavior, one 
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must present a plausible reason why they can usually overcome this impulsivity. Virtually 
everybody has experienced the urge to succumb to short-term temptations.  Nevertheless, most 
people obviously manage to control such urges. This suggests that choice regulation is at least as 
puzzling as self-defeating behavior. Self-control does not imply the absence of temptation. 
Instead, an individual who is said to exercise “willpower” has learned to avoid following his 
appetite “recklessly.” Sometimes people anticipate their urges and take precautions, so that they 
do not fall prey to their own desires. A classical example, as presented by Ainslie (1974) and 
Elster (1979), is Ulysses on his way home, who asks his crew to tie him to the mast, in 
anticipation of his inability to control his passion when he will be tempted by the Sirens. Ainslie 
(1975, 1992, 2001, 2012) suggests that self-control is usually exercised not by such drastic 
physical measures, but by a more common psychological operation that we often apply when we 
restrain ourselves in more mundane situations: reward bundling.   
Ainslie proposes an increase in the tendency to choose the LL reward over the SS reward 
if individuals face a series of SS/LL pairs, rather than a single SS/LL pair in isolation. He argues 
that people may bundle the rewards in the series, by regarding their current choice as a test case 
for future choices. It is the aggregation of rewards that helps them overcome the impulse to 
choose SS. Ainslie (1974, 1975) and Ainslie and Monterosso (2003) find choice patterns 
displayed by pigeons and rats that are consistent with the reward bundling hypothesis. However, 
experimental studies of reward bundling with human subjects are rare. The few available 
examples do not meet the methodological requirements of experimental economics. Hypothetical 
rewards are not sufficient to establish credible evidence. Moreover, even if real rewards are used, 
many economists feel uncomfortable with instructions, such as “the choice you make now is the 
best indication of how you will choose every time” (Kirby and Guastello 2001, 159). Such 
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phrasing could be potentially problematic, given another widely accepted guideline for economic 
experiments: the nonacceptance of subject deception.1 Given these considerations, the 
experiment presented in this thesis is the first to meet the methodological standards of 
experimental economics.  
In chapter 2 several models of time preferences are presented, which are considered in 
the subsequent econometric analysis of the experimental data. The initial focus is on exponential 
and hyperbolic discounting, since they give a good overview of the main competing views of 
discounting behavior that have been proposed. Then additional models are discussed. Chapter 3 
discusses some phenomena that are frequently raised in the literature, namely non-linear utility, 
declining discount rates, and the “magnitude effect,” that motivated the experimental design and 
the econometric analysis. Some considerations from the literature in economics and cognitive 
psychology are presented. They show how mental representations and “rounding behavior” may 
result in seemingly declining discount rates and an apparent magnitude effect. A presentation of 
the theory of reward bundling is presented in chapter 4. The thesis then presents a discussion of 
the econometric approach to the analysis of the experimental data.  Chapter 5 contains a brief 
discussion of the descriptive methods used: local polynomial regressions and descriptive probit 
estimations. The emphasis, however, is on the foundations of the structural econometric analysis, 
presented in chapter 6. Full information maximum likelihood estimation is introduced as a 
method to obtain estimates of the latent processes that generate the observable choice behavior 
and to test whether it is consistent with the reward bundling hypothesis. The thesis proceeds to 
                                               
1 There is no intended implication that Kirby and Guastello (2001) seek to deceive their subjects. This is not 
common-or-garden deception of the kind that an economist critic might usually condemn - it is 
not deliberate deception. But it reports to subjects as a fact something that is not established, and indeed likely is not 
a fact. Hence, the phrasing of their “suggested condition” is problematic from the perspective of experimental 
standards in economics.   
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present the experiment which tests for the presence of reward bundling. Chapter 7 lays out the 
experimental design and procedures. Chapter 8 reports the results and chapter 9 concludes the 
thesis.  
2. Time preferences and reward bundling 
2.1 The costs of delay and temporal weighting 
People generally prefer receiving a good now over receiving the same good at a later 
time, all else equal. This tendency is not inherently problematic. In fact, economic theory can 
well account for this observation and predicts that individuals devalue future goods in a 
consistent fashion. We can think of discount factor  as a theoretical construct that equates the 
present value of a reward with its future value for a given time horizon . The concept of value 
employed here is the economists’ notion of utility. Here is a general model that relates two 
subjective values of a reward  received at two different points in time: 
( ) = ( ),                                                             (0) 
 where ( ) is the utility of the reward , if received at time , and ( ) is the utility of the 
reward , if received at the later time + . The model is general in the sense that it does not 
assume any specific functional form, either for the instantaneous utility function or the discount 
function . Most models of time preference specify the discount factor  in a way that imposes 
costs for delaying the reward  from  to + . The rate of devaluation per time unit is 
determined by a discount rate . Depending on how the costs are specified, the implied choice 
behavior is either temporally consistent or involves preference reversals, for reasons to be made 
clear below. Two archetypical model types that describe either choice behavior are exponential 
and hyperbolic discounting.   
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The exponential discounting model has become the standard way of approaching the 
economics of time preferences. It was introduced by Samuelson (1937) as the discounted utility 
model, although he did not propose it as an empirical hypothesis. Samuelson (1937, 156) 
describes the essential characteristics of the model as follows: “(t)he individual discounts future 
utilities in some simple regular fashion which is known to us. For simplicity, we assume in the 
first instance that the rate of discount of future utilities is a constant.” 
The apparent occurrence of “anomalies” for exponential discounting has led many 
researchers to search for alternatives. The original model to explain apparent preference reversals 
and self-defeating behavior is the hyperbolic discounting model. Ainslie (1975) initially 
proposed a simple functional form to describe hyperbolic discounting, but several other 
specifications have been suggested. Subections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 discuss exponential and 
hyperbolic discounting in some detail.  
Three additional models are considered in subsection 2.2.3. The quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting model has become popular in economics (Phelps & Pollack 1968, Laibson 1997). 
Initially introduced for its analytical convenience, it has become associated with the notion that 
preference reversals result from the visceral temptation of immediately available rewards. Quasi-
hyperbolic discounting assumes that the costs of delay come in form of a fixed proportion of the 
principal, as well as a constant cost of delay that varies with the horizon as in the exponential 
discounting model. Finally, a model is considered that does not approach delay as imposing 
costs. Instead, it assumes that individuals perform temporal weighting, in the sense that their 
subjective perception of time is distorted. All models presented in this chapter are discussed in 




2.1.1 Exponential discounting  
Samuelson’s (1937) model followed a line of research that relied heavily on the 
discussion of the psychological motives behind intertemporal choice. This literature started as 
early as 1834 with the publication of John Rae’s The Sociological Theory of Capital (Rae 1834). 
Rae employed a psychological variable, the “effective desire of accumulation,” to explain why 
the propensity to delay immediate consumption differs among nations. This psychological 
reasoning was continued by others. For example, William Jevons (1888) and his son Herbert 
Jevons (1905) insisted that only the anticipation of greater consumption in the future can help 
overcome the urge for immediate consumption. Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk (1889) contributed 
another psychological explanation – one that principally allows for the possibility of self-
defeating behavior. He introduced a technical approach that treated intertemporal choice as the 
self-allocation of resources at different points in time. Irving Fisher (1930) further formalized 
this approach. He too continued the deliberation of possible psychological motives that may 
underlie the decision to delay rewards that are immediately available. Historical developments 
leading to the exponential model are reviewed by Frederick, Loewenstein, O'Donoghue (2002, 
352-355).  
Unlike his predecessors, Samuelson (1937) did not engage in detailed discussions about 
the psychology of intertemporal choice. All possible motives, which may affect if and to what 
extent future rewards are devalued, are compressed in one single parameter , the discount rate. 
In the general model in equation (0) it was shown that the discount factor  equalizes the utilities 
of a reward received at time  and the same reward received at a later time + . In the 
exponential model the discount factor is 
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                                                    ( ) = 1/(1 + ) ,                                               (1a) 
in discrete time units. The specification in continuous time illustrates why the model is called 
“exponential” 
                                            ( ) = exp(− ).                                                            (1b) 
Like most discounting models, the exponential model states that time delay is costly, i.e. the 
utility of a reward received later is diminished compared to the same reward received sooner. 
Unlike other models, however, exponential discounting assumes that the decline in utility occurs 
at a constant rate = . For example, the percentage rate by which utility is diminished between 
today and tomorrow is the same as the rate by which utility is discounted between one year and 
one year and one day from today. One can think of the discount rate as representing the variable 
costs of time delay. Accordingly, exponential discounting proposes that time delay does not 
impose any fixed costs, which would be independent of the duration of the delay. Instead, the 
costs of delaying a reward vary constantly with the time horizon. As a result, it is normal for an 
economist to view the exponential discounting model as using a constant variable utility cost of 
time delay and a zero fixed utility cost of time delay.  
Strotz (1956) demonstrated that only exponential discounting prevents inconsistent 
discounting over time. Other models, such as hyperbolic discounting discussed in the following 
subsection, raise the possibility of continuous re-evaluations and changes of choices.  
2.1.2 Hyperbolic discounting 
The apparent evidence for repeated preference reversals motivated researchers to find 
alternatives to the exponential model. The research that would eventually lead to the hyperbolic 
discounting model began with psychological experiments on the relative allocation of behavior 
to reward alternatives. Early experiments were performed with animal subjects. Herrnstein 
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(1961) conducted an experiment in which pigeons chose between two possible reward schedules 
by pecking keys in a Skinner box. He found that their relative frequency of choice approximately 
equaled the relative frequency of reinforcement of each schedule. In the psychological literature, 
Herrnstein’s finding is known as the matching law, since the relative rate of responding on a key 
matches the relative rate of reinforcement. Inspired by the original matching law, additional 
factors that affect the relative distribution of behavior were examined. Chung and Herrnstein 
(1967) studied how delay affects choices and found that the relative frequency of responses 
matches the relative immediacy of reinforcement. The introduction of delayed rewards drew 
attention to another issue: subjects prefer larger rewards over smaller ones and sooner rewards 
over later ones. Obviously, these two tendencies are in conflict when subjects have to choose 
between smaller, sooner (SS) rewards and larger, later (LL) rewards. Ainslie pointed out that the 
matching law implies reversal of preference between LL and SS rewards as a function of delay, 
which might create an incentive for early precommitment to LL alternatives. This 
precommitment was observed using both differential rates of pecking (Rachlin & Green, 1972) 
and single choices (Ainslie, 1974). 
Ainslie (1975) proposed that time preferences are best described by the hyperbolic 
discounting model. Hyperbolic discounting still assumes variable costs of delay. However, unlike 
exponential discounting, hyperbolic discounting does not assume that those variable costs are 
constant. Ainslie proposed a specification of the discount factor D  that describes this non-
constant pattern  
                                                    ( ) = 1/                                                              (2) 
 and implies the discount rate  
9 
 
                                                     ( ) = ( / ) − 1.                                                  (3) 
Other specifications of the hyperbolic model have been suggested. A commonly used 
specification is due to Mazur (1987): 
                                                   ( ) =  .                                                           (4) 
   
for some parameter , implying the discount rate 
                                                                ( ) = (1 + )( / ) − 1 .                                                    (5) 
An individual whose time preferences are described by hyperbolic discounting will show 
declining discount rates with an increasing horizon. That is, the closer the reward is in time, the 
more impatient will such an individual be. More importantly, such preferences can account for 
preference reversals, since an individual may re-evaluate the preferences order of two rewards 
and change his choices as time passes by. 
2.1.3 Other models 
Another deviation from the exponential model is quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The 
model was originally introduced by Phelps and Pollack (1968), to model intergenerational 
transfers. It was rediscovered and popularized by Laibson (1997). The quasi-hyperbolic model, 
in discrete time units, is given by 
                                                     ( ) = 1,                                                           (6a)  
at = 0 and 
                                                     ( ) = (1 + )⁄  ,                                          (6b) 
for > 0.  The quasi-hyperbolic model has a jump-discontinuity in the discount factor at = 0 
and behaves thereafter like the exponential model. The model implies the discount rate 
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                                                ( ) = [ /(1 + ) ]( ) − 1.                                (7) 
The parameter  introduces a fixed cost component that is not present in exponential 
discounting. It takes a value of 0 < < 1, which reduces the utility of the reward by a fixed 
proportion of the principal, as soon as any delay occurs. After this initial effect wears off, the 
discount rate converges towards .  
The initial reason for applying the quasi-hyperbolic model to individual time preferences 
was that it “mimics the qualitative property of the hyperbolic discount function, while 
maintaining most of the analytical tractability of the exponential discount function” (Laibson 
1997, 450). Hyperbolic specifications display declining discount rates with an increasing 
horizon. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting seeks to mimic this qualitative property with the initial 
drop in value, due to the parameter . This drop can be interpreted as representing the costs of 
delay. That is, as soon as a reward is delayed its value decreases by a proportion of the 
principal.2 Unlike hyperbolic specifications the quasi-hyperbolic model maintains the analytical 
tractability of exponential discounting, since it preserves the use of limit theorems to predict 
unique preferences from knowing an individual’s prior incentives (Ainslie 2012, 8). Since 
Laibson (1997) reintroduced the quasi-hyperbolic functional form, however, it has undergone a 
reinterpretation, which will be discussed in section 3.2.  
The final discounting model considered in this chapter deviates from the others in the 
sense that it does not propose fixed or variable costs of delay. Instead, it regards individuals as 
                                               
2 These costs do not necessarily have to come in the form of a fixed percentage of the principal. Benhabib, Bisin, 
and Schotter (2010) propose a fixed costs model that introduces present bias by assuming fixed monetary costs of 
delay. In their model, delay is costly because it decreases the value of the reward by a fixed monetary amount. For 
example, an individual may not be willing to accept delay, unless he is compensated by $1, or $5, or another specific 
amount. This model is pedagogically valuable, because it demonstrates that the popular quasi-hyperbolic model is 
only one possible way to describe present bias. However, Andersen et. al. (2014b) find no evidence for fixed 
monetary costs of delay.   
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perceiving time in a distorted way. This is comparable to probability weighting in decision 
making under risk. In an intertemporal context, people are assumed to “speed up” or “slow 
down” time in their perception. A flexible specification that describes this behavior is due to 
Read (2001, 25), based on the Weibull distribution: 
                                                ( ) = exp (− ( )⁄ ),                                                 (8)  
for > 0 and > 0.  The parameter  is responsible for the “speeding up” or “slowing down” of 
perceived time. The specification collapses to the exponential model if = 1.  
3. Motivation for design and analysis of the control treatments 
 
Theory, experimental design, and econometric analysis are deeply connected. 
Consequently, the treatments and analytical strategies presented in the subsequent chapters are 
informed by theoretical considerations. The treatment conditions, implemented in the present 
experiment, are presented in Table 1. This chapter discusses the motivation for four control 
treatments that are implemented in the present experiment.  
Table 1: Experimental design 
 
Treatment Description Date of the session Number of subjects 
T0 
The choice between a smaller amount 
"today" or a larger amount in 28 days. 8/27/2013 35 
T1 
The same as T0, but with a front-end 
delay of 1 day. 8/28/2013 29 
T2 
The same as T0, except the amounts 
are tripled. 8/29/2013 36 
T3 
The same as T0, but with a front-end 
delay of 35 days. 8/28/2013 35 
T4 
Two "free" decisions. One as in T0, 
one as in T3. 8/30/2013 37 
T5 
Two "forced" decisions. One as in T0, 
one as in T3. 9/3/2013 33 
T6 
Three "free" decisions. One as in T0, 
one as in T3, and another pair of 
options. 9/4/2013 31 
T7 
Three "forced" decisions. One as in T0, 
one as in T3, and another pair of 




Behavioral economists have claimed the existence of several empirical phenomena in 
intertemporal choice, many of which supposedly constitute anomalies for exponential 
discounting. The discussion will focus on three claims that are frequently found in the literature. 
Many previous studies have found that their subjects’ choices indicate extremely high levels of 
discounting rates.  Section 3.1 argues, following Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2008), 
that these high discount rates result from neglecting subjects’ utility function and specifically the 
evidence for diminishing marginal utility. It is explained that if the econometric analysis of 
choice data accounts for the concavity of utility functions the inferred discount rates are lowered 
drastically.  
Two other frequent findings from behavioral economics are that discount rates decline 
with time as well as with the magnitude of the rewards. Both effects have been prominently 
discussion in the literature as anomalies of the exponential discounting model (Loewenstein & 
Prelec 1992, 574-575). These phenomena would affect the probability of LL choices, which is 
why their possible prevalence is important for the main objective of the experiment: testing 
whether reward bundling is employed as a means of impulse control. Three control treatments 
T0, T1 and T3 introduce varying front end delays (FED) to test whether elicited discount rates 
decline as present decisions are made about rewards that are paid out at different times in the 
future. Section 3.2 further explains the motivation for these treatments.  An additional treatment 
T2 varies the magnitude of the reward to examine the effect on the implied interest rates. Section 
3.3 briefly summarizes the previous literature on the magnitude effect and further explains the 
motivation for treatment T2. 
Section 3.4 discusses how the similarity of SS and LL rewards may lead to rounding 
behavior that can lead to observations of all three phenomena discussed in the previous section: 
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very high discount rates, their decline with time, and an apparent magnitude effect. The 
psychological notion of similarity as the basis of rounding is explained. The design implications 
are that the stakes in the decision task must include amounts of money that are sufficiently high, 
so that the quantities that are being compared are not too similar and invite rounding.  
3.1 Non-linear utility 
Risk preferences and time preferences are two fundamental elements of individual 
decision making. However, it can be difficult to distinguish between their respective effects, 
since “the future is inherently risky.” This can be problematic if one wishes to understand the 
separate impact of time preferences on decision making (Andreoni, & Sprenger 2012, 3357). It is 
possible that what appears to be a preference for sooner rewards may, instead, be an aversion to 
the risk that is inherent in future payoffs.  
Risk aversion is described by concave curvature of instantaneous utility functions. Some 
doubt has been raised whether concave utility functions are plausible, over the stakes that are 
typically used in laboratory experiments. Following Hansson (1988), Rabin’s (2000) calibration 
theorem suggests that when subjects exhibit risk aversion over “small stake” lottery choices in 
the laboratory, it is not plausibly explained by concave utility functions. Rabin (2000) 
demonstrates that the rejection of the small scale lotteries over a wide range of wealth levels 
entails absurd levels of risk aversion at some wealth level. He argues that explaining small scale 
risk aversion with concave utility functions implies that the subjects’ marginal utility in wealth is 
declining so rapidly that even lotteries with huge possible gains are implausibly rejected. Rabin 
and Thaler (2001) interpret this as evidence against expected utility theory (EUT) and argue that 
an alternative theory is needed to explain risk aversion over small stakes. They base their 
argument on the assumption that the integration of income into “lifetime wealth” is an essential 
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characteristic of EUT. Cox and Sadiraj (2006) point out that this only applies to one specific 
version of EUT – the “EUT of terminal wealth,” where current income is completely integrated 
in lifetime wealth. However, nothing in the axiomatic structure of EUT dictates that the 
argument of utility functions is necessarily terminal wealth. At the opposite end of the theoretical 
spectrum, current income is valued in isolation and not at all integrated in lifetime wealth, as 
originally proposed by Vickrey (1945). Cox and Sandiraj (2006) call this alternative model the 
“EUT of income” (Cox & Sadiraj 2006, 47-52). To what extent people exhibit asset integration 
is ultimately an empirical question.  
Andersen, Cox, Harrison, Lau, Rutström and Sadiraj (2011) distinguish between EUT 
models with full asset integration (FAI), no asset integration (NAI), and partial asset integration 
(PAI), with FAI and NAI as extreme cases. They show that only FAI models are affected by 
Rabin’s (2000) critique. They make use of a unique data policy in Denmark, which allows 
matching personal wealth data with choice data from a risk preference task. The latter were 
collected in an artefactual field experiment, according to the terminology proposed by Harrison 
and List (2004, 1014). Andersen et.al. (2011) find no support for the terminal wealth model. 
However, there is evidence for partial asset integration. A fraction of the experimental gains is 
integrated into total wealth. This supports the PAI model and suggests that subjects can show 
low-level risk aversion, while simultaneously not being absurdly risk averse in the large. This 
shows that risk aversion in experimental choice data can be plausibly described by concave 
utility functions. This finding does not only apply to EUT, but also to alternative models, such as 
rank-dependent utility (RDU) or cumulative prospect theory (CPT), which attribute some of the 
observed risk preferences to concave utility.  
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Consider the general form of a discounted utility model, as presented in (0). If the utility 
function (∙) is concave in , it follows from Jensen’s inequality that the implied discount rate, 
for given observed choices over SS and LL options, decreases. This formalizes the intuition that 
both diminishing marginal utility and discount rates lower the influence of future payoffs on 
present utility. This has important implications for the elicitation and estimation of individual 
discount rates. Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2008) show that the commonly 
performed isolated elicitation and estimation of discount rates is problematic. They elicit risk and 
time preferences from the same subjects in their artefactual field experiment in Denmark. They 
combine data from a risk aversion and a time preference task, before performing joint estimation 
of utility functions and discount rates, using full-information maximum likelihood (FIML).  
Previous studies on intertemporal choice usually assume linear utility functions, with the 
result that inferred discount rates were often extremely high.3 As one allows for concave utility 
functions, the implied discount rates decrease. Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2008, 
600-603) find annual discount rates of 10.1 percent. This value is implied by an EUT 
specification. However, the main argument is more general: all concave utility specifications, not 
only those implied by EUT, result in lower implied discount rates. Moreover, discount rates 
cannot be estimated based on time preference experiments alone. Ideally, one should conduct 
separate tasks to elicit the utility functions.4 
If, for budgetary or efficiency reasons, a risk aversion task cannot be performed in the 
same experiment, an alternative strategy is available. One can then elicit time preferences 
                                               
3 A compact overview of the literature is given in Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2014b, Table 6). 
4 In principle, one can attempt to elicit risk and time preferences in one single task. Recent attempts to accomplish 
this have been proposed by Andreoni & Sprenger (2012) and Laury, McInnes, & Swarthout (2012). If successful, 
such a combined elicitation may have desirable budgetary and implementation advantages. However, there are 
disadvantages that are perhaps less obvious. For example, such a combined elicitation will almost certainly result in 
a task that is cognitively more demanding for subjects than separate elicitation. The desire to avoid “noisy” 
estimates of both risk and time preferences is, therefore, and additional reason to conduct separate tasks. 
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separately provided that estimates of risk attitudes from the same population are available. In this 
case, inferences about time preferences can still be appropriately conditioned on those risk 
estimates. The latter strategy is used in the experiment reported in this chapter. Various 
experiments on risk attitudes, with Georgia State University (GSU) students as subjects, had 
been performed before the present experiment took place. These data are readily available and 
are combined with the elicited data on time preferences. Hence, joint estimation of risk and time 
preferences is possible, even though the budget of the experiment could be completely allocated 
to the various discounting treatments.  
3.2 Declining discount rates 
The previous section discussed the need to control for a-temporal risk preferences, in 
order to infer utilities correctly, and implied design requirements. This section focuses on time 
preferences. Although one must control for a-temporal risk attitudes to correctly infer discount 
rates, time preferences and risk preferences are different concepts. Nevertheless, both concepts 
are related in the following sense: When intertemporal choice is over time-dated lotteries, rather 
than certain payouts, people often display correlation aversion, which is also called 
intertemporal risk aversion by some. This concept and its implications are discussed by 
Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2011). The following example illustrates the notion of 
intertemporal utility: suppose subjects face two lotteries, with two time-dated payouts, where the 
first payout is realized with probabilities  and the second payout is realized with probability 1−
. The payouts involve a set of sooner payouts { , }, where < , and a set of later payouts 
{ , }, where < . Suppose, subjects face a choice between  
= {0.5[ , (1 − ) ]; 0.5 [ , (1 − ) ]} and = {0.5[ , (1− ) ]; 0.5 [ , (1 − ) ]}. 
So lottery  offers a 50 percent chance of the “bad” outcome sooner and the “good” outcome 
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later and a 50 percent chance of a “good” outcome sooner and a “bad” outcome later. Lottery   
offers a 50 percent chance of the “good” outcome sooner and the “good” outcome later and the 
50 percent chance of a “bad” outcome at both times. Only when subjects are indifferent between 
and  is the intertemporal utility characterized by an additive specification. An additive 
intertemporal utility function ( , ) = ( ) + ( ) defines intertemporal utility as the 
weighted sum of the discounted instantaneous utility of the sooner and later outcomes. The 
components  and  are typical sooner and later outcomes, and and are their respective 
discount factors. When subjects’ choices imply ≽  they display correlation aversion, and 
when ≼ , then they are correlation loving. Such intertemporal preferences are not correctly 
characterized by an additive intertemporal utility function. However, a simple extension of the 
intertemporal model, such as ( , ) = ( ) ( )
( )
( )
, introduces intertemporal risk 
attitudes and accounts for non-additivity. It is important to be aware that intertemporal 
correlation aversion does not imply instantaneous risk aversion or vice versa. A correlation 
averse decision maker may be a-temporally risk averse, risk loving, or risk neutral. Intertemporal 
and instaneous risk aversion are distinct concept, although they are theoretically related.5 
Various discounting models have been proposed to describe time preferences. Some 
specifications, notably hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounting, predict that discount rates 
decline with the time horizon. Several treatments were introduced to test this prediction. Varying 
the front-end delay (FED) – the delay until the sooner reward will be paid out – allows testing 
some of the discounting models presented in section 2.1. Different discounting models imply 
                                               
5 This theoretical connection has important econometric implications. Just as controlling for risk attitudes is 
necessary to correctly infer discount rates, correlation attitudes must be estimated conditional on risk and time 
preferences. This requires full-information maximum likelihood estimation.  
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different discount rates, as SS rewards are delayed. This is why the experimental design 
implemented treatments with varying FED.  
The basic treatment condition T0 did not use a FED and the subjects received the selected 
payouts on the day of the experimental session. This procedure came with the potential problem 
that subjects could perceive immediate payouts as different from future ones. In this case, the 
elicited time preferences may be confounded by other factors that affect choice behavior.  
A practical problem with time-dated rewards is that subjects may perceive immediate 
rewards as more credible than future rewards. If there are doubts that future rewards will actually 
be paid out, choosing the sooner option might reflect this uncertainty, rather than time 
references. To mitigate this issue subjects in our experiments were given a written confirmation, 
signed by the principal investigator, which guaranteed that they would receive future payment on 
a specified date. They were also provided with contact information that would enable them to 
direct questions regarding payments to the experimenters.  
Another related problem is that the transaction costs between immediate and later 
rewards may differ. Immediate rewards can be paid out effortlessly as soon as the experimental 
session is complete. Obtaining future rewards may come at greater costs. The design employed 
in the present experiment addresses these concerns by using the same payment method for 
immediate payouts as for future payouts. Immediate payouts as well as future payouts were 
transferred using the online payment service PayPal. However, immediate payouts were sent 
later on the same day the experimental session took place (see detailed explanations below). 
When transaction costs, credibility issues, and general uncertainty are accounted for, 
discount rates varying with FED may still indicate deviations from exponential discounting, such 
as hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic time preferences. Coller and Williams (1999) estimate the 
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effect of a one month FED and find that it reduced the elicited discount rates drastically. To test 
the effect under comparable conditions, a 35 day FED was implemented in treatment T3. 
Subjects were informed that if they chose the sooner option and the payout is selected, the 
payout would be sent 35 days after the session via PayPal.  
If declining discount rates are observed, this may be regarded as evidence for both 
hyperbolic ( and ) and quasi-hyperbolic ( ) specifications. However, the difference 
between these alternative models is rather important. There is a school in behavioral economics 
that insists that the quasi-hyperbolic model is more than just a convenient approximation of 
hyperbolic discounting. Researchers from this tradition assert that the quasi-hyperbolic 
specification reflects actual cognitive processes in intertemporal choice. This position claims that 
more deliberate reasoning, represented by , is often overwhelmed by visceral factors, 
represented by . Accordingly, the viscerality of an imminent reward causes the impatience or 
“passion for the present” (Loewenstein 1996). This “present bias” takes the form of a decline in 
value for any delay. Such fixed costs of delay can be described by a fixed absolute decline in 
value, as proposed by Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter (2010), or as a fixed proportional decline, as 
described by quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Following the quasi-hyperbolic school of thought, 
McClure et.al. (2004) even attempted to locate visceral -discounting and deliberate -
discounting in different discounting types in different brain areas, using functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI).  
However, these results could not be replicated by another fMRI study, conducted by 
Glimcher et.al. (2007). The neuroeconomic results are not the only claims associated with the 
model that are fiercely contested.  The relevance of viscerality in time preferences and the 
validity of the  parameter have been called into question. Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and 
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Rutström (2014b, 26-30) do not find support for the model in the adult Danish population. 
Ainslie (2012, 10-11) discusses empirical phenomena which seem to result from declining 
discount rates and preference reversal, but are difficult to explain by visceral arousal. A primary 
example is procrastination, a behavioral pattern that can be well explained by preference reversal 
but does not involve visceral arousal. The  model is also the basis for several models of 
impulse control, which assume that what must be overcome is “visceral arousal” and “passion 
for the present.” If the  model is not supported, these models lack theoretical plausibility 
(Ainslie 2012, 21-28).  
The quasi-hyperbolic model makes two distinct predictions that offer an opportunity to 
decide whether it describes discounting accurately, or whether the observed choices are better 
described by hyperbolic discounting: 
- The  model predicts an immediate decline in utility by a fixed proportion, as soon as 
there is a delay of the payout. If this decline is interpreted as the effect of visceral arousal 
it is only plausible to assume its effect can only last as long as such arousal can be 
plausibly maintained. Suppose that the utility of rewards becoming available soon after 
this period (e.g. one day after the decision is made) does not differ significantly from the 
diminished utility that could be explained by visceral arousal. In this case, choice 
behavior is better explained by hyperbolic discounting.  
- the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model  also predicts that after the initial impatience 
wears off, the model approaches exponential discounting. Suppose the discount rate is 
found to be variable, as a function of delay, even after an extended FED of several days. 
This observation would also be better explained by hyperbolic discounting.  
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Two experimental conditions, which were initially introduced to serve as control 
treatments when the presence of reward bundling is investigated, also enable the analysis to 
investigate the underlying discounting behavior. Treatment T1 adds a FED of 1 day. If 
discounting behavior in treatment T1 did not differ significantly from discounting in treatment 
T0, this would support hyperbolic discounting instead of the visceral interpretation of the quasi-
hyperbolic specification.  If visceral arousal was an important factor, the elicited discount rate 
should be significantly different to the discount rate from treatment T0.6  
Moreover, suppose choices in treatment T3 were more patient than choices in T1. This 
would be the case if there were significantly more LL choices in T3 than in treatment T1. Such 
choice behavior would lend additional support for hyperbolic discounting and provide evidence 
against the proposed role of visceral arousal.   
3.3 The magnitude effect 
The magnitude effect is the observation that subjects tend to display lower discount rates 
when payoffs are larger. A significant magnitude effect would be an anomaly for exponential 
discounting and would indicate that discounting functions, and their implied discount rates, 
cannot be used independent of the scale of the quantities involved (Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and 
Rutström, 2013).  
Many behavioral economists consider the magnitude effect a well established result. 
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992, 557) claim that “[e]mpirical studies of time preferences have also 
                                               
6 McClure et.al. (2007, 5796-5797) suggest a modification of the specification introducing an additional horizon 
parameter  that determines after what delay the jump discontinuity occurs and that differs for each individual. One 
could argue that the analysis in the present experiment performs pooled estimation and that such an individual 
parameter remains undetected. However, even the existence of such an individually varying parameter  could not 
invalidate evidence against the in the present design. The reason is that the 1 day FED in treatment T1 lasts 
longer than visceral arousal can plausibly be maintained.   
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found that large dollar amounts suffer less proportional discounting than do small ones.” 
Scholten and Read (2010, 929) even describe the magnitude effect as “probably the most robust 
anomaly in intertemporal choice.” Many of the studies that supposedly establish the magnitude 
effect use hypothetical payoffs. Thaler (1981, 205), for example, uses hypothetical payoffs and 
concludes that “[a]s the size of the reward increases, the implicit discount rate falls.” He also 
provides a possible explanation for the magnitude effect, suggesting that the mental effort that 
the postponement of a reward requires is only worthwhile for rewards that are high enough. In 
other words, the stakes must be worth the wait. The use of hypothetical payoffs is commonly not 
considered sufficient to meet the requirements of experimental economics. However, Thaler’s 
(1981) results are widely cited and have influenced numerous studies in behavioral economics. A 
detailed literature review is offered by Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2013, 671-681). 
Andersen et.al. (2013) perform a test for the presence of a magnitude effect in an 
artefactual field experiment with real payouts. The subjects are a representative sample of the 
adult Danish population. The estimation of discount rates assumes the  specification and 
accounts for non-linear utility functions, as explained in subsection 2.1.1. The exponential 
discounting function is used in a descriptive, rather than a structural way. The main objective is 
to test the effect that varying principals have on the implied discount rates. If higher principals 
generated lower implied discount rates than lower principals, it would suggest the presence of a 
magnitude effect. Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2013, 20-21) find only a minuscule 
magnitude effect: the difference between high and low stakes is only a difference of 0.3 
percentage points, significant with a p-value of 0.004. That is, the slight magnitude effect they 




These results indicate that the magnitude effect is not as robust a phenomenon as 
previous studies suggest. The experimental design discussed in this thesis introduced a control 
treatment T2 that tripled the principal compared to the baseline treatment T0. The main purpose 
of this treatment is to control for the fact that bundling treatments, which are described below, 
effectively yield payouts that are two or three times the amount of the control treatments T0, T1, 
or T3. However, the introduction of treatment T2 also enables the analysis to test for a magnitude 
effect. If the elicited discount rates from treatment T2 were lower than the discount rates from 
treatment T0, this would suggest the presence of a magnitude effect.  
3.4 Similarity and Rounding 
Declining discount rates and the magnitude effect, as found by previous studies, can be 
produced by subjects’ attempt to handle the cognitive burden of evaluating similar quantities. 
Decision makers often perform mental operations seeking to simplify choice problems, in order 
to reduce the deliberation cost of optimizing. One possible operation of this kind is rounding 
behavior, which may result in the apparent occurrence of anomalies from the perspective of 
exponential discounting.  This can be illustrated by a simple example, following Andersen, 
Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2013, 682-683). Suppose discount rates are elicited using an open 
ended “fill-in-the-blank procedure,” as employed by Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter (2010). This 
method requires that subjects state the amount of money paid in the future that would make them 
indifferent to a given amount of money paid today.  Column (1) of Table 2 includes principals 
ranging from $5 to $30 in $5 increments.  Assume that a representative subject has a discount 
rate of 10%, which is listed as the annualized effective rate (AER) in column (4). The varying 
horizons, four multiples of a 28 days horizon, are listed in column (3). The LL amounts that 
would make a subject, with the given discount rate, indifferent to the principal are presented in 
24 
 
column (2).  The monetary premia are listed in column (5). Now suppose the subject faces the 
same decision, but rounds the filled-in LL amounts to the next whole dollar. These LL amounts 
are in listed in column (6). Column (7) displays the discount rates that are implied by these 
choices. 
















$5 $5.04  28 10% $0.04  $6 260.71% 
$5 $5.08  56 10% $0.08  $6 130.36% 
$5 $5.12  84 10% $0.12  $6 86.90% 
$5 $5.15  112 10% $0.15  $6 65.18% 
$10  $10.08  28 10% $0.08  $11 130.36% 
$10  $10.15  56 10% $0.15  $11 65.18% 
$10  $10.23  84 10% $0.23  $11 43.45% 
$10  $10.31  112 10% $0.31  $11 32.59% 
$15  $15.12  28 10% $0.12  $16 86.90% 
$15  $15.23  56 10% $0.23  $16 43.45% 
$15  $15.35  84 10% $0.35  $16 28.97% 
$15  $15.46  112 10% $0.46  $16 21.73% 
$20  $20.15  28 10% $0.15  $21 65.18% 
$20  $20.31  56 10% $0.31  $21 32.59% 
$20  $20.46  84 10% $0.46  $21 21.73% 
$20  $20.61  112 10% $0.61  $21 16.29% 
$25  $25.19  28 10% $0.19  $26 52.14% 
$25  $25.38  56 10% $0.38  $26 26.07% 
$25  $25.58  84 10% $0.58  $26 17.38% 
$25  $25.77  112 10% $0.77  $26 13.04% 
$30  $30.23  28 10% $0.23  $31 43.45% 
$30  $30.46  56 10% $0.46  $31 21.73% 
$30  $30.69  84 10% $0.69  $31 14.48% 
$30  $30.92  112 10% $0.92  $31 10.86% 
 
As one compares the implied discount rates after rounding for choices with a given principal and 
varying horizons, it becomes apparent that they decline with the horizon. For example, with a 
principal of $5, choices with rounding imply discount rates that fall from 260.71% to 65.18%, as 
the horizon increases from 28 days to 112 days. Without their proper attribution to rounding 
behavior, the declining discount rates would appear to be due to hyperbolic time preferences. 
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Furthermore, the implied discount rates, after rounding and for a given horizon, exhibit what 
appears to be a “magnitude effect.” For example, a comparison of the LL amounts across options 
with a 28 day horizon reveals that the implied discount rate decreases from 260.71% to 43.45% 
as the principal increases from $5 to $30.  
Rounding behavior may occur when people compare similar quantities. The concept of 
similarity is of central importance in cognitive psychology. Various cognitive processes, such as 
categorization, problem solving, norm foundation and skill transfer, are based on similarity 
perception. A particularly influential approach to similarity is Tversky’s (1977) feature-based 
approach.  This approach represents objects by assuming sets of features associated with them. 
The similarity of two objects is defined as a metric that depends on three arguments: the 
intersection of the respective feature sets of both objects, and the two relative complement sets. 
Tversky’s model expresses similarity relations between objects as a linear combination of the 
measures of their common distinctive features. The weights associated with the components of 
this combination reflect the salience or prominence of the various features (Tversky 1977, 329-
333).  
Tversky’s work influenced Rubinstein’s approach (1988), which emphasizes the role of 
similarity in decision making under risk. Rubinstein (1988) suggests that individuals comparing 
two lotteries first look for dominance relations. In case no lottery dominates the other, they go on 
to assess the similarity or dissimilarity of the features of the lotteries, i.e. prizes and their 
associated probabilities. If the lotteries are similar with respect to one feature but dissimilar to 
the other one, then the dissimilar feature is the decisive factor. For example, consider the lotteries  
= ($4000, = 0.2; $0, = 0.8) and = ($3000, = 0.25; $0, = 0.75). The expected 
value (EV) of  is greater. However, even if we observe a choice of , it would not necessarily 
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have to be due to its higher EV. Standard economic theory could explain this choice with a high 
level of risk aversion or probability pessimism or a combination of both. A similarity based 
approach offers a different account. The probabilities of winning a positive amount may arguably 
be perceived as similar, whereas most people would regard the positive dollar amounts as 
dissimilar. In this case the dollar amounts become the decisive feature and most people will 
prefer .  
Leland (1994, 151-153) follows Rubinstein’s (1988) approach, but proposes some 
modifications. First, he suggests that people initially attempt to decide according their true 
preferences. Leland (1994) assumes that preferences are assessed in accordance with the axioms 
of EUT. Only if differences in expected utility are sufficiently large can individuals determine a 
clear preference relation and the decision making process is complete. Otherwise, Leland (1994) 
proposes a second stage in which prizes and probabilities are compared in terms of equality. If this 
step remains inconclusive, a comparison of prizes and probabilities in terms of similarity is 
performed.   
Leland’s (1994) approach emphasizes that the purpose of resorting to equality or 
similarity assessments is to reach a decision in situations in which optimization behavior 
according to EUT would be associated with costs in terms of cognitive effort. The notion that the 
subjective utilities of similar rewards are difficult to discriminate may be illustrated by an 
analogy to the early work in psychophysics. Early researchers in this area, notably Weber (1834) 
and Fechner (1860), were interested in the perception of physical stimuli and the ability of 
people to discriminate between similar stimuli. For example, suppose the stimulus of interest is 
weight and that two light objects, weighing 15 oz and 20 oz, are being compared. Due to the 
relatively small weight difference of 5 oz, people will find it difficult to judge which object is 
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heavier and are likely to make mistakes. However, if the weight of the heavier object is increased 
to 25 oz, the probability of making errors will decrease. If the weights of both objects are 
increased by one pound, judging which object is heavier, the object weighing 1 lb and 15 oz or 
the object weighing 1 lb and 25 oz, will likely become even more difficult and the error rate is 
likely to increase (Loomes 2005, 302-303). It seems plausible that comparing similar risky 
payoffs is even more cognitively demanding than comparing similar physical stimuli.  
The difficulties of forming unambiguous preference relations have long been 
acknowledged by stochastic choice models. An early example from the economic literature is 
Georgescu-Roegen’s (1958) “threshold model.” The analogy to psychophysics illuminates how 
the cognitive effort of reward evaluation may prevent optimizing choice behavior: the difficulty 
lies in judging how desirable receiving a monetary amount is compared to receiving a similar, 
only slightly larger amount, in the future. In order to reduce the cognitive burden of finding the 
optimal choice in time preference tasks, subjects may perform the mental operation of rounding 
LL amounts to the nearest whole dollar. This has concrete design implications.  
The LL amounts are similar when AER of a typical magnitude are applied to small 
amounts. Column (5) of Table 2 displays monetary premia that remain tiny as long the principals 
are small. This illustrates that rounding is more likely to occur when the principals are small. 
Therefore, the stakes of the present experiment are not limited to small amounts. Small principals 
of $10 and $30 are supplemented by a moderate principle of $60 and rather sizeable principals of 
$100 and $300. Budgetary constraints make it necessary to use only a 10% chance that the two 
large amounts and their corresponding LL amounts are paid. The other amounts are paid with 
certainty, if selected at the end of the time preference task.  
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4. Reward bundling  
 
Impulse control has been a topic of great interest among scholars and clinical 
practitioners. Ainslie (1992, 130-144; 2001, 74-85) summarizes this literature and identifies four 
general strategies frequently recommended to make people self-commit to advantageous future 
choices. Those suggested strategies are the use of extrapsychic mechanisms that make impulsive 
choice physically impossible, the manipulation of attention so that the source of temptation is 
ignored, and the preparation of emotion that cultivates adverse responses to temptations. The 
fourth tactic, which is probably most often recommended, is the exercise of willpower. Referring 
to this human faculty is intuitively appealing. After all, most people have some notion of making 
resolutions and trying to resist temptations. However, the exact nature of the will is often left 
vague and attempts to give precise definitions are rare.  
Ainslie (1992, 143-144; 2001, 78-84) relates the notion of the will to the application of 
personal rules. People often experience the belief that they exercise willpower when their current 
decision is approached as if it was guided by a universal principle. Ainslie (2001, 80-81) points 
out that many authors from different backgrounds have related impulse-control to choosing in 
broad categories or choice guided by universal rules. If people actually choose following this 
guideline, present decisions are approached as one instance in a series of related decisions. 
Consistent patterns of choice emerge, which are even observed in experiments with animal 
subjects. Human subjects often experience such consistent choice behavior as a “matter of 
principle,” the result of “character” or “resolve,” or the application of a personal rule. 
The effect of personal rules on behavior is not derived from consistency per se, but from 
the mechanism of reward bundling. Suppose that an individual prefers the SS option in an 
isolated SS/LL decisions. However, when this decision is only the first of a whole series of 
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decisions, the choices may be added together and then evaluated, rather than being evaluated in 
isolation. In other words, the individual bundles the rewards. The aggregated LL rewards may 
yield a higher utility than the aggregated SS rewards. In this case the subject will choose LL, 
even if SS rewards are preferred when the decision is made in isolation.  
Ainslie (1992, 145; 2001, 81) assumes additivity, such that the aggregate utility of a 
series of rewards equals the sum of their individual utilities. Moreover, his argument hinges on 
the hyperbolic form of the underlying discount functions. Hyperbolic discounting implies a steep 
slope as rewards are delayed, and a shape that flattens as the time horizon increases. Hyperbolic 
discount curves are steeper than exponential discount functions ( ) when delays are short, but 
flatter than both exponential and quasi-hyperbolic ( ) discount functions, when delays are 
long. The high tails of hyperbolic curves suggest greater effects from aggregation than one 
would expect from the model (Ainslie 2012, 12-17).  
A simple example, based on the discussion in Ainslie (2012, 13) is illustrated in Table 3.  
Table 3 displays a hypothetical situation in which an individual faces ten decisions that involve a 
series of SS rewards of $100 and LL rewards of $103. All ten LL rewards are available thirty 
days after the corresponding SS rewards. The first SS is available immediately and every 
subsequent SS reward is available forty days after the previous one. Three models are 
considered, for illustrative purposes: the exponential, the quasi-hyperbolic, and the hyperbolic 
model. As a simplification linear utility functions are assumed. As the discussion in subsection 
2.2.1 showed, this assumption is not realistic and can lead to seriously biased estimates of 
discount rates when it is imposed on actual choice data. However, assuming risk neutrality for 
simplification does not affect the argument in the present example, which merely serves 
illustrative purposes.  The exponential model in panel A uses the specification from (1a) and 
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assumes = 0.5. Also considered is the quasi-hyperbolic model, with the specifications from 
(6a) and (6b) and = 0.7 and = 0.5. Finally, the hyperbolic model is considered. The 
specification from (4) is used, with = 0.4.7 
Table 3: Three Discounting Models and the Effects of Reward Bundling 
 
A. Exponential Model      
SS Delay (days) SS (amount) SS (discounted) LL Delay (days) LL (amount) LL (discounted) 
0 $100.00 $100.00 30 $103.00 $99.62 
40 $100.00 $95.65 70 $103.00 $95.29 
80 $100.00 $91.50 110 $103.00 $91.15 
120 $100.00 $87.52 150 $103.00 $87.19 
160 $100.00 $83.72 190 $103.00 $83.40 
200 $100.00 $80.08 230 $103.00 $79.78 
240 $100.00 $76.60 270 $103.00 $76.31 
280 $100.00 $73.27 310 $103.00 $72.99 
320 $100.00 $70.08 350 $103.00 $69.82 
360 $100.00 $67.04 390 $103.00 $66.79 
Sum:  $825.45   $822.35 
B. Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting      
SS Delay (days) SS (amount) SS (discounted) LL Delay (days) LL (amount) LL (discounted) 
0 $100.00 $100.00 30 $103.00 $69.74 
40 $100.00 $66.96 70 $103.00 $66.71 
80 $100.00 $64.05 110 $103.00 $63.81 
120 $100.00 $61.26 150 $103.00 $61.03 
160 $100.00 $58.60 190 $103.00 $58.38 
200 $100.00 $56.05 230 $103.00 $55.84 
240 $100.00 $53.62 270 $103.00 $53.42 
280 $100.00 $51.29 310 $103.00 $51.09 
320 $100.00 $49.06 350 $103.00 $48.87 
360 $100.00 $46.93 390 $103.00 $46.75 
Sum:  $607.82   $575.64 
C. Hyperbolic Discounting      
SS Delay (days) SS (amount) SS (discounted) LL Delay (days) LL (amount) LL (discounted) 
0 $100.00 $100.00 30 $103.00 $99.72 
40 $100.00 $95.80 70 $103.00 $95.66 
80 $100.00 $91.94 110 $103.00 $91.92 
120 $100.00 $88.38 150 $103.00 $88.46 
160 $100.00 $85.08 190 $103.00 $85.25 
200 $100.00 $82.02 230 $103.00 $82.26 
240 $100.00 $79.18 270 $103.00 $79.48 
280 $100.00 $76.52 310 $103.00 $76.88 
320 $100.00 $74.04 350 $103.00 $74.45 
360 $100.00 $71.71 390 $103.00 $72.16 
Sum:   $844.66     $846.24 
                                               
7 Note that those values are merely hypothetical. They were chosen to illustrate the logic of the reward bundling 




All three models suggest that the SS option would be preferred to the LL option if the 
first decision was presented in isolation. The exponential model in Panel A does not predict any 
change in this preference pattern when the sum of all ten rewards in the series is evaluated. For 
the exponential model the discount rate is constant. Hence, the preference order of the 
subsequent decisions is the same as in the first decision, and so is the preference order of the 
aggregated rewards. The quasi-hyperbolic model in Panel B does also not predict a reversal of 
preferences from SS to LL, as a consequence of reward aggregation. Ainslie (2012, 12)  
acknowledges that it is in principle possible that with a specification, for some parameter 
values, the aggregate discounted LL rewards of a series could be greater than the aggregate 
rewards of the SS alternatives. However, Ainslie (2012) points out that this can only happen 
when the individual already has low discount rates. Only the hyperbolic model in Panel C 
predicts that a person with relatively high discount rates may overcome his initial preference for 
the SS reward when he perceives his choices as being between whole series of LL versus SS 
rewards. The difference between the two sums of rewards decreases with the length of the series, 
and the aggregated LL rewards become ultimately more attractive.   
An obvious threat for reward bundling as a strategy for impulse control comes from the 
possibility of “exceptions.” Personal rules can be defined and re-defined in various ways, so that 
many or even most situations are exceptions from the rule. An example is the alcoholic, who 
vows not to drink but then declares every possible occasion an exception, such as a social event, 
the holiday season, a new brand of liquor, the cold weather, or the tough day he had. Indeed, any 
possible explanation is employed, but the acceptance of being an alcoholic is avoided. The 
incentive to find exception is apparent from Panel C in Table 3. It is obvious that the total payoff 
could be increased by choosing SS in the first decision and then committing to choose LL in 
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subsequent decisions. Of course, the same incentive is present when the remaining decisions are 
approached. Obviously, such exceptions from the general commitment to choose LL threaten to 
make impulse control collapse completely. One can envision this as a situation in which short-
term interests constantly threaten to undermine long-term interests.  
Ainslie (1992, 155-173; 2001, 90-100) conceptualizes such “limited warfare” among 
successive motivational states as a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. An individual’s successive 
motivational states can either cooperate or defect, by choosing in favor of the commonly shared 
long-term interest or giving in to the temptation of peculiar short-term interest, respectively. 
Each individual decision may come with the threat of defection. However, once a series of such 
defections has occurred, cooperation may collapse and each motivational state will only choose 
SS. On the other hand, if several subsequent motivational states choose to cooperate, the result 
may be a tacit agreement to cooperate, which the individual experiences as a personal rule. Such 
a personal rule may emerge when the current choice is perceived as predictive for future choices. 
This precedence function of the current choice may provide sufficient incentive for the current 
motivational state to cooperate. Clear guidelines that clarify what constitutes cooperation in this 
intrapsychic bargaining situation serve to limit the availability of exceptions, thus supporting the 
adherence to personal rules. A well-known example is the Alcoholics Anonymous policy to 
discourage attempts at “controlled drinking.” Instead, they promote strict abstinence for their 
members, a rule which provides a bright line and leaves no room for exceptions.  
The literature in economics has produced several comparable models of strategic 
interaction among motivational states. A notable example that can be related to Ainslie’s 
bundling approach is Fudenberg’s and Levine’s (2006) model. Their dual-self approach models 
intertemporal choice as the result of the interaction among a patient long-run self and a sequence 
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of short-run selves. The long-run self exercises costly impulse-control by constraining the 
choices of the myopic short-run selves. In Fudenberg’s and Levine’s (2012) updated model, the 
short-run selves are not completely myopic and the long-run selves impose their constraints to 
maximize the discounted utilities of the short-run selves. The notion of a dual self can be 
interpreted in psychological terms, with a dual cognitive process informing the individual’s 
decision making process.  
Psychologists have contributed a rich literature on dual process models. The notion of 
dual cognitive processes has been applied to several areas in reasoning, social cognition, as well 
as judgment and decision making. The various models have in common that they assume that 
manifest behavior is determined by two modes of processing: an automatic process that is often 
associated with fast, unconscious, heuristic-driven, and impulsive cognition and a controlled 
process that is often associated with slow, conscious, deliberate, and sophisticated processing 
(Barrett et.al. 2004, Evans 2008).  
These different processes do not necessarily have to be reduced to a one-dimensional 
utility index, as most economic models suggest. An alternative strategy is exemplified by Lopes’ 
(1987) SP/A model – a psychological dual criterion approach to decision making under risk. The 
model proposes two criteria that people consult, when evaluating lotteries. The security-potential 
(SP) criterion, implies a decumulative probability weighing model, much like rank-dependent 
utility (RDU) in economics (Quiggin 1982). The aspiration (A) criterion, on the other hand, 
introduces a reference point (Lopes & Oden 1995, 291). Both criteria are employed 
independently but simultaneously.  
The principles that guide the analysis of such a dual criteria model are instructive for the 
experiment that is reported in this thesis. Economic models do in principle allow for multiple 
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decision processes. However, traditional economic models usually integrate those latent 
processes into a one-dimensional criterion. This is why they do not necessarily help understand 
how observed choices can result from the interplay of impulsive and controlled processes. By 
contrast, dual criteria models provide such a guideline. They allow for the possibility of multiple 
criteria for multiple decision processes (Andersen, Harrison, Lau, & Rutström 2014a). The 
relative contribution of each process to the observable outcome can be estimated by a finite 
mixture model using maximum likelihood. This approach estimates the grand likelihood of the 
dual criteria model as the probability weighted average of the conditional likelihood estimates of 
each criterion being correct (Harrison & Rutström 2009; Andersen, Harrison, Lau, & Rutström 
2014a).  
Ainslie (2012, 11) argues that “[w]e are born with steep discount curves, and continue to 
show them when the reward is an increase in our immediate comfort …We must acquire by 
learning whatever devices let us achieve the banker-like preferences we sometimes show." 
Ainslie (2012) claims, in other words, that people are born with hyperbolic preferences but learn 
to overcome them. When they bundle rewards their behavior appears more patient, to the extent 
that their observable choices are actually better described by exponential discounting (Ainslie 
2001, 100-104). This is consistent with empirical results that show that the prevalence of 
exponential discounting is much higher than often assumed (Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and 
Rutström 2014b). Ainslie (2012) acknowledges this evidence but regards it as the result of the 
bargaining process, rather than evidence against it. 
These theoretical considerations have important implications for experimental design and 
analysis. If two latent processes determine intertemporal choice, one impulsive and one 
controlled, the analysis can be approached in a way that is equivalent to the estimation of dual 
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criteria models. A finite mixture model can then be used to estimate the conditional likelihood of 
each process (Coller, Harrison, and Rutström 2012).  
Earlier experimental work on reward bundling includes a study by Kirby and Guastello 
(2001). Their experiment 1 uses salient monetary rewards and “pseudo-volunteers.” That is, their 
subject pool includes students, whose participation was rewarded with extra-credit for an 
introductory psychology class. They implement different treatments by informing subjects that 
they will be contacted again to choose and that their current choice imposes varying constraints 
on future choices. The experiment reported in this thesis uses a simpler design. The theory of 
reward bundling is concerned with behavior that involves decisions about the future. This does 
not necessarily mean that those decisions have to be made in the future. Nevertheless, Kirby’s 
and Guastello’s (2001) work is relevant for the present design, since it inspired treatment 
conditions that are implemented.  
Four experimental treatments T4 to T7 are added, which are, henceforth, referred to as 
bundling treatments. Reward bundling predicts that subjects are more likely to choose the LL 
options when they are presented with a series of choices. This may be the case, even if the 
subjects would have preferred the SS options, had they been presented in isolation. Treatment T5 
was introduced to test this prediction. Participants were presented with two pairs of SS/LL 
rewards. Their choice in one pair determines the choice in the other pair. It is not possible to 
choose the SS option in one pair and the LL option in the other pair. That is, if a subject chooses 
one option, the experimental design forces him to “choose” the equivalent option in the other 
pair. This forced condition is equivalent to the “imposed condition” that Kirby and Guastello 
(2001) used in their design.  
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As explained above, a subject who is not “forced” to choose in a way that is consistent 
with the other decisions in a series may seek to maximize his payoff by choosing SS in the first 
decision and trying to commit to choosing LL in the remaining decision. In this case, the first 
choice would be regarded as an exception, with the intent to apply self-control in the remaining 
decisions. The obvious problem is that the same reasoning may apply to subsequent choices as 
well, with the effect that impulse-control collapses. Ainslie (2012, 17-19) predicts that human 
subjects will show a behavioral tendency to perceive a current choice between SS and LL 
rewards in a series of decisions as a test case for their remaining choices. Consequently, they will 
be more apt to prefer the LL reward when they face a series of SS/LL decisions, rather than 
when they see the pair of alternatives as an isolated choice. Kirby and Guastello (2001) call this 
the “precedent effect.” It is not possible to decide whether such subjects apply this strategy if 
subjects are “forced” to choose consistently in all choice pairs. This is why another treatment T4 
is introduced. This treatment also includes two decisions. However, treatment T4 implements a 
free condition, in which no choice constraints are imposed.  
Whether subjects bundle rewards and choose the LL option in both pairs depends only on 
their perceived linkage between options. An increased tendency to choose LL is only one 
indicator for the presence of reward bundling. In addition, the perceived linkage of decisions, 
which is implied by the “precedent effect,” should be reflected by a seemingly increased payoff 
scale. The scale indicates the effective magnitude of the payoffs. It equals 1 in most control 
treatments. Only in treatment T2, where the payoffs are tripled, does the scale equal 3. The 
forced condition in treatments T5 implies a scale of 2. These scale values are due to the fact that 
every choice in the forced condition leads to twice the nominal payoff value in T5. If reward 
bundling is effective as a mechanism of impulse control, one should see similar tendencies in the 
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free condition. That is, subjects who bundled rewards would display choice behavior that looks 
like the scale of the payoffs was multiplied by the number of decisions. For example, there are 
two free decisions in treatment T4. Reward bundling implies choice behavior that makes the 
payoff scale appear as if it has a value of 2.  
Similarly, reward bundling suggests that immediately available payoffs resemble choices 
with a FED, since the temptation of immediacy is successfully overcome. This is why one would 
expect that first choices in bundling treatments look like choices from treatments where a FED 
was present.  
On a structural level, the analysis will focus on the effects of treatments T4 and T5 on the 
mixture probability of the latent decision processes. The control treatments, T0 to T3, make it 
possible to infer the likelihood of the choice parameters, conditional on the choice discount 
specification being true. Ainslie’s theory (2012) predicts the presence of exponential as well as 
hyperbolic discounting. However, if reward bundling is effective, one would expect to see an 
increase in the mixture probability of exponential discounting in treatments T4 and T5. 
To restate the theory, reward bundling involves the integration of a series of future 
rewards by summing their separate present values. Impulse-control is successful if the sum of the 
series of LL rewards exceeds the sum of the series of SS rewards, even when the SS rewards are 
preferred in the first pair of the series. One would expect that extending the series of decisions 
should increase the tendency to bundle choices. To test the effect of an additional decision, two 
additional treatments are added. Treatment T6 is again a free condition. It is equivalent to 
treatment T4, in the sense that no constraints are imposed on the choices. However, treatment T6 
adds a third decision, so that subjects face a decision triple.  
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Finally, treatment T7 implements another forced condition. It is equivalent to treatment 
T5, since subjects must choose consistently and cannot choose SS in some and LL in other 
decisions. Treatment T7 presents subjects with three decisions that are linked in this way. The 
descriptive and structural evidence for reward bundling in the three-decision treatments T6 and 
T7 should be at least as strong as in the two-decision treatments T4 and T5.  
5. Descriptive Methods  
 
This chapter provides a brief discussion of the descriptive econometric methods used for 
a first exploration of some basic hypotheses derived from the theory of reward bundling. For this 
purpose it will be useful to restate some fundamental predictions that follow from Ainslie’s 
theory (1975, 1992, 2001, 2012):  
- When presented with isolated SS/LL decisions, subjects will exhibit choice behavior that 
is best described by hyperbolic discounting, as specified by and .  
- When subjects choose between a series of SS/LL decisions at once, they will display a 
greater tendency to choose the LL rewards than subjects who face the same decisions one 
at a time.  
An in-depth analysis of underlying choice behavior will be accomplished by structural 
estimation. Until then, a descriptive examination is intended to shed light on general tendencies 
that can be found in the choice data. The two methods discussed in this chapter explain the 




5.1 Local polynomial regression  
The bundling predictions imply that subjects must face decisions that involve isolated 
SS/LL pairs and decisions that involve series of SS/LL pairs. This suggests that the whole 
sample must be divided into several subsets, where each subset is subjected to different treatment 
conditions. One can broadly distinguish between control treatments, in which subjects have to 
choose between isolated SS/LL pairs, and bundling treatments, in which the choice task requires 
that subjects choose between whole series of SS/LL pairs.  One can then investigate whether the 
fraction of LL choices in bundling treatments was greater than in the control treatment groups. 
Such general choice tendencies would constitute credible first evidence consistent with the 
presence of reward bundling.   
Until the observed choice behavior is linked to structural models, the analysis remains 
agnostic, regarding the functional form of the data generating process. It is appropriate that the 
initial analysis relies on only a minimum of parametric assumptions. Econometricians have 
developed a rich set of nonparametric estimation techniques for such situations.  
Consider the simple case of an outcome variable  that, for the sake of implicitly, is 
explained terms of a single explanatory variable  (the general logic can easily be extended to 
multiple explanatory variables).  A sample is drawn that consist of a set of bivariate data 
{( , ), ( , ), … , ( , )}. The goal is to estimate the conditional expectation function 
( ) = ( | = ), without assumptions about the functional form (∙). Nonparametric 
estimation rests on the assumptions that data points in the neighborhood of a given  carry more 
information about ( ) than data points far from . Thus, it seems intuitive to approximate 
the function ( ) by obtaining the local average within a predefined neighborhood of . The 
performance of this hypothetical estimator can often be improved by using a weighted average. 
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These weights are assigned by a function , called a Kernel function. Kernel functions are 
usually symmetric probability densities, such as the normal or a symmetric beta distribution.8 
Moreover, let ℎ denote a non-negative number, the bandwidth, which defines the size of the 
neighborhood of . The function ( ) is estimated by 
                                               = ∑ ( )
∑ ( )
.                                                      (9) 
This is the Nadaraya-Watson estimator, an early contribution to non-parametric estimation that 
has influenced comparable estimators, such as the Gasser-Müller estimator (Nadaraya 1964, 
Watson 1964, Gasser & Müller 1979).  However, these estimators often exhibit undesirable 
statistical properties, such as bias or large variances under specific circumstances (Fan & Gijbels 
1996, 13-18).  Local polynomial regression retains the logic of local smoothing, while avoiding 
many of these problems. 
Local polynomial regression involves fitting the response to a polynomial form of the 
regressor via locally weighted least squares. The result is a smooth function over the support of 
the data, which approximates the conditional expectation function ( ). Suppose the ( + 1)  
derivative of ( ) at the point   exists. The unknown conditional expectation function is then 
approximated by a polynomial of order . A Taylor expansion gives for  in the neighborhood of 
 gives 
( ) ≈ ( ) + ( )( − ) + ( )
!
( − ) + ⋯+ ( )
!
( − ) .        (10) 
This polynomial is fitted locally by the weighted least square problem 
                                     min∑ { −∑ ( − ) } ( − ),                                 (11) 
                                               
8 Since these are basically parametric assumptions, we often refer to semi-parametric modeling.  
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where  is again a Kernel function assigning weights to each data point and ℎ is the bandwidth 
parameter determining the size of the local neighborhood. Specific applications require the 
choice of the degree of the polynomial, the type of the Kernel function, and especially the size of 
the bandwidth. If the latter is too large the model will contain large bias, whereas the estimates 
will be noisy if the bandwidth is too small. The solution vector of this least square problem is 
given by 
                                                       = ( )  ,                                                      (12) 
where  is the matrix of weights. The statistical properties of the local polynomial regression 
estimator are discussed by Fan and Gijebels (1996, 57-107). In the software package Stata this 
technique is implemented by the lpoly command. 
 
5.2 Descriptive probit models 
A second descriptive technique is the use of probit models, which examine the effects of 
the treatments on the probability of choosing LL. The focus on choice probabilities offers a 
quantitative measure and takes the analysis beyond the mere examination the fraction of LL 
choices that is accomplished by local polynomial regression. However, the exploration remains 
at the descriptive level and cannot replace the thorough structural analysis that addresses the 
underlying choice processes in detail.  
A few general remarks about discrete choice models are in order, since such models are 
used in both the descriptive and the structural analysis.  A generic form of discrete choice models 
is given by 
                                           = ℎ( , ),                                                                          (13) 
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where  denotes some discrete outcome, in the present experiment the binary SS/LL choice. The 
process leading from the explanatory variables to the outcome is described by the function ℎ(∙). 
The decision maker’s choice is completely determined by the observable covariates  and 
unobservable factors . Although the underlying process is assumed to be deterministic,  is 
unobserved and the outcomes cannot be predicted exactly. Instead, a distribution ( ) is 
assumed and the choice probability ( | ) is derived (Train 2009, 3).  
The indicator function 
                                                          [ℎ | ) = ]                                                       (14) 
takes a value of 1 when the statement specified in brackets is true and a value of 0, otherwise. In 
the present experiment, the indicator function takes a value of 1 if LL is chosen and a value 0 if 
SS is chosen. Using the language of indicator functions, the choice probability can be restated as 
the expected value of the indicator function, where the expectation is over all possible values of 
the unobserved factors, i.e. 
( | ) = ( [ℎ( | ) = ] = 1) 
                                                                 = ∫ [ℎ( | ) = ] ( ) .                                        (15) 
Various types of discrete choice models can be distinguished by how the density ( ), the 
distribution of the unobserved portion of utility, is specified and how the integration in (15) is 
performed (Train 2009, 3-7). The probit model is derived from the assumption that ( ) is 
univariate normal and the integration is performed numerically through simulation.  
Specifications of ℎ(∙) formalize decision models that describe the process of converting 
explanatory variables into observable choice behavior. Specific discounting processes are 
considered in the following chapter. The probit model can also be used to relate personal and 
choice characteristics to behavior, without explaining how exactly the decision is made. This 
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approach is explained in this section, which is why the probit models are called descriptive. 
Descriptive probit models extend the analysis beyond polynomial regressions from the previous 
section, since they make it possible to condition choice probabilities on observable 
characteristics of the individual decision maker or the choice situation.  
Once the observable covariates are included in the probit model, the issue of 
understanding its results arises. The interpretation of the coefficients in linear regression models 
is straightforward. Given a linear model = + ⋯+ + , the marginal effect of each 
explanatory variable is constant and given by its coefficient, i.e. = . Determining the 
marginal effects of explanatory variables in probit models is more involved (Cameron & Trivedi 
2005, 465-474). The effect of a particular explanatory variable  is not constant, but dependent 
on the value of the other covariates. The probability that a particular outcome  takes a value of 
1, conditional on the covariates x is given by  
                                           ( = 1| ) = Φ( ),                                                        (16) 
Where Φ(∙) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (cdf). The marginal effect of 
change of -th regressor  on the probability of the -th decision  being 1 given by 
                                                     ( | ) = ( ) .                                                         (17) 
When the marginal effect of a particular independent variable  is estimated, one must control 
for the other covariates in the model. There are several ways to accomplish this. The following 
explanations assume, for the sake of simplicity, that  is a discrete binary variable. One popular 
technique is setting all other covariates to their mean values and assessing the difference in 
choice probability for both values of . This method estimates the marginal effect at the means 
(MEM). However, this may result in mean values that cannot represent any actual subjects. For 
example, in the dataset from the present experiment, the variable BLACK has a mean value of 
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0.57 and the mean value of FEMALE is 0.58. A more intuitive approach, which is employed in 
this section, is calculating the average marginal effect (AME). This approach considers each 
individual record, leaves all other covariate values as they are, and only varies the variable , 
whose marginal effect is evaluated. The probit model is then used to estimate the choice 
probabilities for both values of . The difference in choice probabilities is the marginal effect 
for this particular case. This process is repeated for each observation so that, when all individual 
marginal effects are found, the AME can be calculated. The statistical package Stata estimates 
the AME using the margins command.  
6. Structural Estimation 
This chapter presents the principles of structural data analysis. Structural models relate 
theories of choice, which are often deterministic, with actual observable choice behavior. A 
challenge is posed by the fact that decision models specify processes that involve theoretical 
constructs that are not directly observable. Key parameters of each theory are usually unobserved 
and “latent,” and must be inferred from behavior. Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is 
performed to assess which parameter values best explain the observed choices, conditional on the 
structural model of the latent decision process under consideration. The latent parameters that are 
of central interest are those that determine discounting behavior.  
In order to infer discount parameters, one must perform joint estimation. As discussed in 
section 3.1, it follows from Jensen’s inequality that estimating a more concave curvature of the 
instantaneous utility function results in lower inferred discount rates for the same observed 
choice data  (Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström 2008). This theoretical insight has 
important design and econometric implications. With respect to experimental design, it suggests 
the use of separate tasks for the elicitation of risk attitudes and time preferences. 
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Econometrically, the interrelation of risk and time preferences implies their joint estimation via 
full-information maximum likelihood (FIML). Discounting parameters must be estimated, 
conditional on risk parameters. A consequence is that errors from the risk estimates propagate 
into the discounting estimates. In other words, whenever the estimates of the risk coefficients are 
imprecise, one cannot expect to obtain precisely estimated discounting parameters.   
For the moment, it is assumed that subjects in the risk aversion experiment chose 
consistent with expected utility theory (EUT). This means that the probabilities of the occurrence 
of the outcomes enter the evaluation of the lotteries, exactly as they are induced by the 
experimental design, and are not transformed by decision weights. The latter option is considered 
below, when choice behavior consistent with rank-dependent utility (RDU) theory is assumed. 
The EUT model employs the following constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) specification: 
                                           ( ) = ( ) (1− )⁄ ,                                                       (18) 
where  is the lottery prize and  represents a coefficient that indicates the level of constant 
relative risk aversion. With this specification = 0 describes risk-neutrality, < 0 corresponds 
to risk-loving preferences, and > 0 corresponds to risk-averse preferences.9   
A detailed discussion of the structural estimation of risk attitudes is presented by 
Harrison and Rutström (2008). When an estimate of   is considered in the ML iteration process, 
one can calculate the expected utility of a typical lottery . If lottery  has  possible outcomes, its 
EU is given by 
                                               
9 The CRRA specification is only one possible way to parameterize risk preferences. Some alternatives, such as the 
expo-power function, are more flexible (Saha 1993). However, this added flexibility comes at the cost of having 
additional parameters to estimate. This is considered a distraction in the present chapter, which focuses on time 
preferences and impulse control.  
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                                            = ∑  ( ).                                                        (19) 
Then, for each decision pair an index is calculated that indicates the difference in the expected 
utility of both lotteries in a decision pair. Formally, 
                                            ∆ = − ,                                                            (20) 
Where  is the “left” lottery and  is the “right” lottery in a decision pair, as they were 
presented to subjects. As mentioned earlier, structural estimation seeks to link theoretical 
constructs, which are not directly observable, to observed choice behavior. The index in (20) is 
such a latent variable. The connection between the latent index and the observed choices is 
accomplished by a link function. In the present case, this link function is the cumulative 
distribution function (cdf) of the univariate normal distribution Φ(⋅), resulting in a probit model. 
Unlike the descriptive probit models in section 4.2, the structural probit models in this chapter 
make statements about how exactly the assumed decision process leads to the observed 
outcomes. The probability of choosing the “right” lottery can be written 
                                                        ( ℎ  ) = Φ(∆ ).                                             (21) 
Thus, the latent index in (20) is linked to the observed choices by making the statement that 
lottery R is chosen, when the ∆ > 0.5.  
This basic approach can be extended in several ways. An important addition is 
accounting for behavioral errors. The structural probit model cannot predict individual decision 
making with certainty. Decision makers may deviate from their true underlying preferences for a 
variety of reasons. Behavioral error specifications can account for various error sources, ranging 
from random deviations, due to attention lapses, to systematic violations, related to the 
psychology of perception and judgment. In section 3.4, in the context of the discussion of 
rounding and similarity, the early work in classical psychophysics was briefly mentioned. It was 
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explained that people have difficulties discriminating between physical stimuli when they are 
very similar. A particularly influential behavioral error specification, due to Fechner (1860), 
emanates from this tradition. Its application to the evaluation of risky prospects was later 
popularized by Hey and Orme (1994). The inclusion of the Fechner error specification expands 
the latent index in (16) to 
                                            ∆ = ( − )/                                                        (22) 
where the new parameter  allows the, otherwise deterministic, EUT model to account for 
deviations from the underlying preference structure.  
Wilcox (2008) (2011) suggests an additional expansion. The intuition behind contextual 
utility originates from psychological experiments on signal detection and stimulus 
discrimination. These studies discovered that errors became more likely as the range of possible 
stimuli increased. Contextual utility follows this observation, by assuming that evaluative errors 
increase with the perceived range of outcomes. Econometrically, this implies that the standard 
deviation of the behavioral error is proportional to the range of utilities of the outcomes in a 
lottery pair. The contextual error specification is given by 
                                           Δ = ( − )⁄ / ,                                                 (23) 
where the new parameter  is defined as the maximum utility over all outcomes minus the 
minimum utility over all outcomes in the lottery pair, i.e. over the context of that pair. This 
specification has a normalizing effect on the latent index, which remains in the unit interval. The 
contextual error specification is particularly parsimonious, since the parameter  is defined, so 
that no additional parameter estimation is required. The specification also allows inferences, 
regarding “stochastically more risk averse” relationships. The latter refers to a stochastic notion 
of the familiar Arrow-Pratt metric of risk aversion. A stochastically risk averse subject is “on 
48 
 
average” risk averse, but the metric is flexible enough to deal with choices that deviate from the 
subject’s general risk aversion. With the latent index remaining within the bounds of the unit 
interval, one can compare the stochastic risk aversion of subjects who choose in dramatically 
different decision contexts (i.e. who face lotteries with very different prizes).  
Once the parameters of interest are defined, structural estimation can be undertaken. The 
log-likelihood function is  
( , ; , ) = ∑
Φ(ΔEU) × I( = 1) +
ln 1 − Φ(Δ ) × ( = −1)
,                                     (24) 
where the indicator function (∙) signifies whether the right ( = 1) or the left ( = −1) 
lottery is chosen. The parameters  and  indicate the CRRA coefficient and the Fechner error 
term, respectively. The parameters can in principle be conditioned on a vector  of demographic 
characteristics. It is useful to constrain the parameter  to be greater than zero. 
People may not necessarily behave as if given probabilities affect their lottery evaluation 
with objective values. Instead, they may distort these probabilities in their perception – a process 
that can be described by attaching subjective weights to probabilities. Subjective weights are 
already discussed by Edwards (1962) and play an important role in the original version of 
prospect theory (PT), due to Kahneman & Tversky (1979). However, early treatments of 
subjective decision weights result in implausible violations of first-order stochastic dominance 
(FOSD).  These difficulties are avoided by rank-dependent utility theory (RDU), which derives 
probability weights from the entire distribution over ranked outcomes, not from individual 
probabilities (Quiggin (1982)). The resulting decision weights reflect the subjective distortion of 
objective probabilities. The RDU model, which nests the previous EUT model, is considered as 
49 
 
an alternative DGP for the risk preference data.10 This requires the introduction of a probability 
weighting function. A variety of weighting functions have been proposed in the literature. The 
simplest specification is a power function 
                                                        ( ) = ,                                                             (25) 
which introduces one additional parameter . The log-likelihood function is then                
                ( , , ; , ) = ∑
Φ(ΔRDU) × I( = 1) +
ln 1 −Φ(Δ ) × ( = −1)
.                (26)  
Two other probability weighting functions are frequently used in applied research. One 
popular specification, the inverse-S shaped function, is proposed by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992): 
                                                 ( ) = [ + (1− ) ]⁄ .                                    (27) 
The probability weighting function in (27) is more flexible than the power function in 
(22) and has additional behavioral implications. The inverse-S specification allows for a concave 
and a convex portion of the weighting function with a fixed point, where ( ) = . If  < 1, 
this specification reflects the often asserted empirical regularity that people overweight small 
probabilities and underweight large probabilities. The reverse is implied by > 1. 
Another specification of probability weighting is contributed by Prelec (1998):  
                                                      ( ) = exp[− (− ln ) ].                                     (28) 
                                               
10 There are, of course, a wealth of other models of choice under risk that could have been considered. A popular 
alternative that does not nest EUT is PT, but several other models have been proposed by behavioral economists 
(Starmer 2000). Contributions from cognitive psychologists have sought to improve our understanding of the mental 
operations involved in the decision making process. An overview of the literature from a psychological perspective 
is provided by Johnson & Busemeyer (2010).   
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This weighting function is derived from several axioms that reflect apparent regularities 
of probability weighting. The specification is more flexible than the previous two, but requires 
the estimation of two parameters  and . There is no probability weighting when = = 1.  
For the remainder of this chapter, it will be assumed that the risk preference data were 
generated by a process that is consistent with the RDU model with Prelec probability weighting. 
Results from a structural analysis of the actual choice data will be presented in the next chapter.  
The estimation of discounting behavior, however, requires joint estimation of risk and 
time preferences. Suppose the monetary amount SS is available at time , whereas the amount 
LL is delivered at time + . If exponential discounting holds, the present value of option SS is 
given by  
                             = (1 (1 + ) ) ( )
( )
+ (1 (1 + ) )
( )
,              (29) 
where  is the discount rate and  denotes some measure of background consumption. 
Expression (29) says that the present value of option SS is the discounted utility of receiving the 
amount SS (integrated with the background consumption  at time  and the discounted utility of 
receiving nothing beyond the utility of background consumption at time + . Utility is 
described using the CRRA specification from (14). Similarly, conditional on exponential 
discounting being the true latent process, the present value of option LL is given by 









                            (30) 
A latent index, formally equivalent to the index considered in the risk aversion model, is defined 
as follows: 
                                                               Δ = ,                                                       (31)              
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where the parameter  denotes the behavioral error specification, comparable to the Fechner 
parameter  in (20) and (21).11 
The estimation maximizes the following conditional log-likelihood function:  
       ( , , , , , ; , , ) = ∑
Φ(Δ ) × ( = 1) +
(ln (1− Φ(Δ )) × ( = −1))
 ,              (32) 
where = 1 and = −1 denote the choice of LL and SS, respectively. The vector includes 
observable demographic characteristics. The joint log-likelihood function, denoted _  , can 
then be written as  
                                   _ ( , , , , , ; , , ) = +                                      (33) 
where  is the aggregate log-likelihood for risk preference choices, assuming RDU with a 
Prelec probability weighting function , and  is the aggregate log-likelihood for time 
preference choices, assuming exponential discounting.  
Structural estimation is performed in a similar fashion when alternative discounting 
models are studied. Consider, for example, hyperbolic discounting as specified in (4). The 
present value of SS is then  






.                              (34) 
Similarly, the present value of LL is given by 





 ( )( )
( )
                              (35) 
The latent index is then  
                                   Δ = .                                                                    (36) 
The log-likelihood function of the hyperbolic discounting model is given by 
                                               
11 In the standard time preference task employed here, there is no range of uncertain outcomes involved. Hence, 
there is no need for contextual utility correction when behavioral errors are specified.  
52 
 
   ( , , , , , ; , , ) = ∑
Φ(Δ ) × ( = 1) +
ln 1 − Φ(Δ ) × ( = −1)
  .              (37) 
The joint log-likelihood function is  
                                   _ ( , , , , , ; , , ) = + .                     (38) 
One can expect that impulsive and controlled processes are both present in the 
population. Such process heterogeneity is intuitively plausible. Moreover, it is central to the 
testing of the hypothesis of reward bundling, according to which deliberate processes become 
more prevalent when several intertemporal decisions are presented together. This coexistence of 
multiple decision processes implies challenges for conventional methods of data analysis, which 
typically incorporate the presupposition of a single data generating process (DGP). 
Econometrically, one can meet this challenge by employing structural mixture models, which 
explicitly allow for more than one latent DGP. Mixture models are derived from a long pedigree 
in the statistical literature on non-nested hypothesis testing (Harrison & Rutström (2009, 153-
155), Andersen, Harrison, Lau, & Rutström (2010, 563-565), Coller, Harrison & Rutström 
(2012, 386-387)).    
Fortunately, accounting for multiple processes requires only a straightforward extension 
of the structural models considered so far. The basic logic of the approach is laid out by Harrison 
& Rutström (2009), who apply it to decision making under risk, with EUT and prospect theory 
(PT) as latent DGPs. The application to structural modeling of intertemporal choice follows the 
same logic. Suppose there are only two DGPs. Each individual process can be estimated as 
outlined above, where the likelihood of each outcome is the probability of its occurrence 
conditional on the assumed DGP being true. To assess the contribution of each process, a 
comprehensive overarching model is then constructed. With two individual models included, this 
involves the estimation of only one additional mixture parameter.   
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Allowing for the coexistence of multiple DGPs raises questions regarding the 
interpretation of the results. A categorical approach to mixture models might associate each 
process with types of decision makers. This interpretation suggests that an individual employs 
only one specific decision process in all task domains. For instance, Harrison and Rutström 
(2009, 143-144) point out that they could use the mixture model to categorize each subject as 
being better described by EUT or PT. Similarly, one could associate each process with a specific 
task type (e.g. lottery choices over 2 or 3 prizes as better characterized by EUT, and lottery 
choices over 4 or more prizes as better characterized by PT). They reject both categorical 
interpretations and adopt a point of view that is shared in this thesis: people may apply multiple 
decision processes that are not necessarily reduced to a single decision criterion in any task (see 
section 2.3). The mixture probability of a specific process, for instance EUT, is then interpreted 
as the chance that the choice of a subject is consistent with this process. This psychological 
interpretation has direct implications for the present experimental results: if reward bundling is 
effective, one can expect the mixture probability of controlled choice behavior, as described by 
exponential discounting, to be higher in bundling treatments. 
Suppose the choice data are generated by exponential and hyperbolic discounting 
behavior. Again, the specifications  and are used. The discounting parameter  and  are 
jointly estimated with the risk parameter  from the CRRA specification in (18). Using 
contextual utility, the behavioral error parameter  is added. Similarly behavioral errors in each 
discounting model are captured by the parameter .12 All those steps are identical to the ones that 
                                               
12 It is principally possible, and not uncommon, to use only one behavioral error term for all assumed discounting 
process in a mixture model. However, all mixture models reported in this chapter allowed for a separate behavioral 
error term for each discounting process. One reason for this approach is the expectation that separate error terms 
might facilitate the ML estimation by enhancing numerical stability. Moreover, there were also theoretical reasons 
for this approach: mixture models propose two or more data generating processes and it is perfectly possible that 
each of these processes is influenced by different behavioral errors. For the sake of simplicity, only one error term is 
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one would perform if each discounting model was estimated separately. However, a mixture 
model requires the additional step of writing a grand log-likelihood function, which is simply the 
sum of the probability weighted conditional likelihoods: 
              _ ( , , , , , , ; , , ) = ∑
ln [ _ × _ +
(1− _ ) × _ ]
        (39) 
 The grand log-likelihood function _   assumes that the latent discounting 
process is characterized in part by exponential and in part by hyperbolic discounting, and that 
risk preferences are consistent with RDU with a Prelec probability weighting function. It 
includes the new parameter  which is the probability of exponential discounting (with RDU 
consistent risk preferences) being the true model. Since only two latent processes are considered, 
the probability of hyperbolic discounting (with RDU consistent risk preferences) is necessarily 
(1- ). 
Mixture models emerged from the statistical literature on non-nested hypothesis testing. 
Exponential and hyperbolic discounting are not in a nesting, in the sense that specific parameter 
values can transform one model into the other.13 The quasi-hyperbolic and the Weibull models 
collapse to exponential discounting, if specific parameter estimates do not significantly differ 
from specific values. By contrast, a comparison of exponential and hyperbolic discounting 
cannot be accomplished by testing specific parameters. The selection between non-nested models 
is more complicated. The naïve comparison of log-likelihoods is generally inadequate, since log-
likelihoods are influenced by the number of parameters. Some statistical selection criteria, such 
                                               
mentioned during the introduction and theoretical discussion of mixture models, until the actual estimation results 
are reported.  
13 The extent to which two competing models are “non-nested” can be derived from the Kullback-Leibler 
information criterion (KLIC) (Kullback 1959). This allows classifying competing models as nested, partially non-
nested, or strictly non-nested. Both non-nested hypothesis tests considered in this chapter are based on the KLIC. 
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as Akaike’s (1973) information criterion (AIC) or Schwarz’s (1978) Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC), do often not provide probabilistic statements regarding the model selection. For 
example, it is impossible to decide whether the difference in two AIC values is large or small. 
Nor do these measures include information about the competing model. The latter is a desirable 
quality for non-nested hypothesis testing.  
The two non-nested hypothesis tests used in this chapter are the Vuong and the Clarke 
test. A common testing approach for the comparison of two nested models are likelihood-ratio 
tests. The strategy is to estimate the log-likelihoods of each observation in both models and to 
compare the ratio of both aggregate log-likelihoods (i.e. the ratio of the added log-likelihoods of 
all observations in one model to the added log-likelihoods of all observations in the competing 
model). Non-nested hypothesis tests do not use the aggregate log-likelihoods, but perform 
comparisons of the individual log-likelihoods of both observations. Vuong’s (1989) test is 
derived from the Kullback-Leibler information criterion (KLIC) and proposes that one model 
should be selected over another if its average log-likelihood is greater. The following null-
hypothesis states that both models explain the data equally well:  
                                              : ( | ,
∗)
( | , ∗)
= 0                                            (40) 
 where ( | , ∗) and ( | , ∗) are the likelihoods of the competing non-nested models   
and  and ∗ and ∗ are their respective pseudo-true parameters. If the expectation in expression 
(36) is significantly different from zero, then one of the two models is declared preferable by this 
test. If ( | ,
∗)
( | , ∗)
> 0  then model  is better. If ( | ,
∗)
( | , ∗)
< 0   , then model  
explains the data better. The expectation in (40) is not actually known. However, Vuong proves 
that under general conditions, 
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                                                    ,
. , ∗
, ∗  ,                                      (41) 
where  and are the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters. Expression (41) states that 
1⁄  times the likelihood ratio statistic almost surely converges to (36) as the sample size gets large. 
The test under  then becomes 
                                                              : ( , )
(√ )
→ (0,1) ,                                              (42) 
where the numerator is the difference in summed log-likelihoods and  is the standard error of 
the log-likelihood ratio. The test statistic states that if   is true, and both models explain the 
data equally well, the average value of the log-likelihood ratio should be zero. If model  
explains the data better, then the average value of the log-likelihood ratio should be significantly 
greater than zero. The reverse is the case if the competing model  is better. In this case, the 
average log-likelihood ratio should be significantly less than zero. 
The Vuong test is based on the fact that, given a set of conditions, the log-likelihood 
ratios are asymptotically normally distributed. Clarke (2003, 2007) points out that the conditions 
for this asymptotic result are frequently not given. Not only are researchers often confronted with 
small sample sizes, the canonical correlation between competing models may also be high. This 
may result in distributions of log-likelihood ratios, whose distributions exhibit sharp peaks 
compared to a normal distribution. Clarke (2003, 2007) demonstrates that under these 
circumstances, the Vuong test may often fail to select the true model. He proposes a non-
parametric alternative. 
Clarke’s (2003, 2007) test is essentially a paired sign test, applied to the differences in 
log-likelihoods. This nonparametric test determines whether the median log-likelihood ratio is 
statistically different from zero. If both models explain the data equally well, half of the 
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individual log-likelihood ratios should be greater than zero and half should be less than zero. 
This suggests the following null-hypothesis: 
                                          : ( | ,
∗)
( | , ∗)
> 0 = 0.5.                                           (43) 
This states that under the null hypothesis the log-likelihood ratios should be distributed around 
zero. If model  is better, then more than half of the log-likelihood ratios should be greater than 
zero. If the competing model  explains the data better, then half of the log-likelihood ratios 
should be less than zero. If = ln − ln ( | ), the actual test statistic can be 
denoted 
                                                        = ∑ ( |0 ≤ ≤ +∞) ,                                (44) 
where the indicator function (∙)signifies the condition that the log-likelihood differences are 
positive. The test statistic is distributed Binomial, with the parameters n and p=0.5. 
The Vuong and the Clarke test may lead to contradictory results. Moreover, both may 
result in the rejection of models that are performing only slightly worse than competing models, 
but otherwise explain much of the observed choice behavior. However, it is not the case that only 
one model has to win the comparison and be considered the sole DGP. For example, various 
alternatives to the exponential discounting model were introduced to explain intertemporal 
choice behavior that appeared to be impulsive. Controlled and impulsive preferences may co-
exist in a given sample, and indeed for the same subject over different choices. Hence, mixture 
models offer a superior testing strategy, compared to the two non-nested hypothesis tests 
discussed above. They reveal the extent to which the data are supported by each hypothesized 
DGP. Moreover, the extreme case, of one model clearly winning the comparison and explaining 
all data better than the competing model, can also be detected by hypothesis tests on the mixture 
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parameter. In general, a mixture model approach will usually lead to more informative results 
than frequently used non-nested hypothesis tests. 
7. Experimental Design and Procedure 
7.1 Basic Design 
The experiment consisted of eight separate sessions. In each session, a different 
experimental treatment was conducted. In each treatment the subjects faced decision problems 
where they had to choose between smaller amounts of money which would be paid sooner (SS), 
or larger amounts which would be paid later (LL). The task presentation followed a multiple-
price list (MPL) format for the elicitation of time preferences, initially introduced for time 
preference elicitation by Coller and Williams (1999). User-written software, created in Visual 
Basic.NET by Professor J. Todd Swarthout, was used to present the task to the participants and 
to record their choices. In each treatment, the subjects were presented with ten decision screens, 
generally with different SS amounts on each screen. Moreover, every decision screen contained 
seven decision rows, with different implied interest rates per row. Those interest rates were not 
displayed to subjects. The design is summarized in Table 1.  
Treatment T0 was the baseline treatment. All subsequent treatments modified specific 
aspects of this basic task. The SS amounts presented to subjects in different decision sheets were 
principals of $10, $30, $60, $100, and $300. The amounts were presented in random order. A 
specific smaller amount was to be paid on the day of the experimental session, on August, 27th 
2013. The LL amounts were to be paid 28 days after the session, i.e. on September, 24th 2013. 
The LL amounts were calculated by applying an annual interest rate from the day of the session 
to the day of the delayed payout. The annual interest rates ranged from 5 percent to 500 percent. 
It will be assumed that these are significant amounts which incentivized most subjects to 
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carefully consider and truthfully report their preferences. A typical decision screen from T0 is 
presented in Figure 1.
 
Figure 1: Decision task from treatment T0 
 
The SS amount, $100 in Figure 1, remained constant across all decision rows on the same 
screen. The LL amount increased with each decision row within a given decision screen, since a 
higher interest rate was applied to each subsequent row. The payout dates were highlighted in the 
calendar on the screen, in order to provide a visual aid for the subjects’ decisions. A subject 
faced seven decision rows on a screen and had to decide whether she preferred the SS or the LL 
option in each binary choice. She chose by clicking a button under the option she preferred, 
marked “Select.” A subject who understands the task would arguably switch from SS to LL 
options when the LL amount was considered large enough to compensate for the delayed payout, 
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and not switch back in subsequent rows. The hypothetical subject in Figure 1 chose the SS 
amount in the first four decisions and preferred the LL options from row 5 on.  
 Treatment T1 follows the basic design of T0, but introduced a front-end delay of one 
day. That is, although the session took place on August, 28th 2013, the SS amount was not paid 
before August, 29th. The horizon of 28 days remained constant, which resulted in September, 26th 
2013 being the date when the selected LL amounts had to be paid. Figure 2 shows a typical 
decision screen in treatment T1. 
 
Figure 2: Decision task from treatment T1 
 
Treatment T2 also departed from the design of T0, with the SS amounts being tripled 
before the usual interest rates were applied to calculate the LL amounts. Consequently, the T2 
specific SS amounts ranged from $30 to $900 – a considerable increase in magnitude. Similar to 
treatment T0, the payout date for SS amounts was the day when the session took place – August, 
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29th 2013 – while the selected LL amounts were paid after 28 days – on September, 26th 2013. 
Figure 3 displays a typical decision screen for treatment T2. 
 
Figure 3: Decision task from treatment T2 
 
Treatment T3 modified the baseline treatment T0 by introducing an extended FED. While 
the FED in treatment T1 was limited to one day, in treatment T3 it was 35 days. That is, while 
the session took place on August, 28th 2013 the payout date for the SS amount was October, 2nd 
2013. In accordance with the constant horizon of 28 days, the payout date for LL amounts was 




Figure 4: Decision task from treatment T3 
  
The experimental conditions discussed so far varied the payout date or the monetary 
amounts involved. They are all control treatments that allow testing the effects of front-end 
delays and reward magnitudes on the inferred discount rates. However, since they involved only 
one decision per row, they do not offer evidence for bundling behavior. The central hypothesis of 
this thesis is that subjects, when presented simultaneously with a series of choices over time 
dated rewards, will have a higher tendency to choose LL options and to behave according to the 
exponential discounting model. The sessions that followed continued the use of ten decision 
screens with seven decision rows each. 
Treatment T4 presented subjects with a pair of two decisions per row. Each pair involved 
an SS option and an LL option. The two SS amounts are identical, as are the two LL amounts in 
a row. However, the payout dates differ. As in treatment T0, a selected SS amount from the first 
decision was to be paid on the day of the experimental session, in this case on August, 30th 2013.  
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The payment of an LL amount from the first decision was due 28 days later, i.e. on September, 
27th 2013. Just as in treatment T3, the selected SS amount from the second decision was to be 
paid 35 days after the session, on October, 4th 2013. As in all treatments, the horizon was 
constantly set to 28 days, which made November, 1st 2013 the due date for the payment of the 
second LL amount. A typical decision screen for subjects in treatment T4 is presented in Figure 
5. 
 
Figure 5: Decision task from treatment T4 
 
An essential attribute of treatment T4 was that it implemented a free choice condition. 
This means that subjects were free to choose the different SS/LL options in one row across the 
two decisions. For example, a subject could choose the SS in the first decision and the SS 
amount in the second decision. Indeed, the hypothetical subject, whose choices are displayed in 
Figure 5, made these choices in the first row. However, she could have also chosen SS (LL) in 
the first decision and LL (SS) in the second decision of the first row. In other words, in the free 
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condition of treatment T4, nothing restricted choice behavior across the two decisions so that 
only the same options could be chosen within a row. The freedom to choose different options 
was emphasized in the experimental instructions for treatment T4. The colors in Figure 5 do not 
suggest any specific choice behavior either. Different colors merely indicated different decisions 
in a row – they were not used to highlight the identity of amounts.   
The freedom to choose different options is exactly what was constrained in treatment T5, 
which implemented a forced choice condition. Again, there were two decisions in a row. As in 
treatment T4, the SS amount of the first decision was to be paid on the day of the session, in this 
case September, 3rd 2013, whereas the corresponding LL amount was due on October, 1st 2013. 
In the second decision the due dates for SS and LL were October, 8th and November, 5th 2013, 
respectively. Once more, the two decisions in a row implemented the payment delays from 
treatments T0 and T3.  Figure 6 shows a typical treatment T5 decision screen.  
 




In the forced choice condition the decisions in each pair were “tied together.” It was not 
possible for a subject to choose SS in the first decision and LL in the second decision within a 
given row, or vice versa. Choosing in any one decision, by clicking the button under the option, 
automatically activated the choice of the corresponding decision in the same row. However, 
choosing options in one row did not constrain the freedom to choose different options in other 
rows, as long as the choices within a row are consistent. The experimental instructions laid out 
these constraints in detail.  
Treatment T6 presents another free condition. However, this time a third decision is 
added to each decision row. The first decision in a triple offered the choice between an SS 
option, where payment was due on the date of the session and an LL option that was due 28 days 
later. The dates in this case were September, 4th and October, 2nd 2013, respectively. The due 
dates for SS and LL in the second decision were October, 9th and November, 6th, respectively. 
What distinguished treatment T6 from treatment T4 is the addition of a third decision. The SS 
amount for the third decision was due 70 days after the session, on November, 13th, and its LL 





Figure 7: Decision task from treatment T6 
 
The decisions in treatment T6 were free. As in treatment T4, subjects could choose 
different options in a decision row. The instructions emphasized this freedom of choice. 
Different colors merely indicated different decisions within a triple.  
A final treatment T7 implemented a forced condition compared to treatment T6, with 
three decisions in a row. Again, the SS date of the first decision is the day of the session, 
September, 5th and its LL date is October, 3rd 2013. In the second and third decisions of the triple 
the two SS dates were October, 10th and November, 14th, whereas the two LL dates were 
November, 7th and December, 12th 2013, respectively. A typical screen for treatment T7 is 




Figure 8: Decision task from treatment T7 
 
Subjects in treatment T7 had to choose the same options in each decision within a single 
row. The options between rows could differ, as long as they were consistent within one row.  
 
7.2 Recruitment and payment procedures 
The subjects were undergraduate students at Georgia State University (GSU). They were 
recruited by email, after they had previously been addressed in several class sessions across 
campus where they had been encouraged to sign up and enter the subject pool of the 
Experimental Economics Center at GSU.14 The turnout for the eight treatments was as shown in 
Table 1. 
The subjects arrived at the laboratory, without knowing the exact nature of the 
experimental task. They drew a random number and were seated at a computer station with the 
                                               
14 In detail, the recruitment procedure works as follows: a random sample is draw from the students, who have 
registered in the web-based recruitment system. Then, an invitation to participate in the experiment is sent via email 
to each student in the random sample. When students logged into the system and confirmed their availability they 
were selected, until all available seats for the treatment in question were assigned. 
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corresponding number. Then, detailed instructions were handed to them to review before they 
were read aloud. The subjects were invited to ask questions to clarify the decision task. In 
practice, very few questions were ever asked. After the subjects had any questions answered the 
choice task began. Once the task was completed, the subjects were prompted to answer a 
demographic survey. The payout selection procedure concluded each experimental session.  
A show-up fee of $5 was paid to all subjects, regardless of their performance in the 
decision tasks. The payouts from the choice task were selected as follows. After completing the 
task and the subsequent demographic survey, each subject was approached by a research 
assistant. The subjects were asked to roll a 10-sided die to select one of the ten decision screens 
from the task. After the screen was selected, the subjects were asked to roll the 10-sided die 
again, until a number between 1 and 7 came up, to select one of the seven decision rows on that 
screen. Their preferred option in the selected row was considered for payout. 
To limit experimental costs an additional stochastic procedure determined whether high 
amounts would be paid out. In treatments T0, T1, and T3, if the preferred option in the selected 
decision row was less than $100, the amount would be paid for certain.  If the selected option 
was $100 or more, the subjects were asked to roll the 10-sided die one more time. If the outcome 
was 1, the subjects would be paid this high amount on the date indicated by their choice. If any 
other number came up, the subject would not be paid for the task. These procedures were 
explained to subjects in the instructions.  
The payment procedure for treatments T4, T5, T6, and T7 was similar. However, if one 
chosen option was less than $100, the whole decision row (i.e. all preferred options of the 
selected pair or triple) would be paid to the subject on the chosen dates. If any amount in the 
selected row was $100 or more, the subjects would have to roll a 10-sided die again. If the 
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outcome was 1, the subjects were paid for all decision made in this row. Otherwise, they would 
not be paid for the task.  
In treatment T2, where the amounts were tripled, a selected amount was considered low if 
it was less than $300. The payment of high amounts, of $300 or more, was again determined by 
the same stochastic mechanism.   
Only the show-up fee of $5 was paid in cash, at the end of the experimental session. All 
payouts from the decision tasks were paid using the online payment service PayPal. Even if a 
selected payment was due on the day of the experimental session, the amount was paid via 
PayPal later that day. This common payment procedure is how the transaction costs were kept 
constant across treatment and choices of SS/LL, so that they would not confound the inferred 
time preferences.   
Whenever first payments were due, the subjects received an email notification one day in 
advance. No such notification was sent when second or third payments were due, since it was 
assumed that the subjects had become sufficiently familiar with the procedure. The initiation of 
each transfer led to another email notification, automatically sent by PayPal, which informed the 
subject that the amount was available and could be claimed. In a few rare cases subjects failed to 
claim their payments. In these situations, they again received an email notification that explained 
that they had failed to claim their payments and that PayPal would return the fund to the 
experimenters if the amount remained unclaimed after a period of 30 days. It was pointed out to 
these subjects that in this case the money would be sent again for a second 30 day period. The 
PayPal transfers would be terminated only if the subjects failed to claim their money a second 
time. In this case, the subject would have to contact the experimenter, using a previously given 
email address, to arrange payment. The vast majority of transfers went as planned. Only eight 
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payments were left unclaimed by five different subjects, after the period for all payments had 
passed. One participant left three payments, another left two payments, and three participants left 
one payment unclaimed.   
8. Results 
8.1 Local polynomial regression results 
This chapter begins the statistical analysis of the experimental data. This sections 
presents the results from several local polynomial regression models. The Figures below do 
usually not contain any confidence intervals (CI) bands. Deviations from general tendencies are 
more carefully examined in the two following sections. Only when the similarity of choices from 
different treatment conditions serves as justification for the pooling of choice data is the 95% CI 
included.  
The first local polynomial regression, which concentrates on the choices from treatment 
T0, is presented in Figure 9. It presents for each magnitude of the principal how the fraction of 
LL choices varies with the nominal annualized interest rate. The horizontal line at the 50 percent 
mark indicates where the observed choices are evenly split between SS and LL. Figure 9 
illustrates that the fraction of LL choices increases with the nominal annual interest rate. In other 
words, more people are choosing LL as the interest rate increases. One can also observe the 
general tendency that the fraction of LL choices increases with the magnitude of the principal. 
That is, the observed behavior is consistent with a “magnitude effect,” since more subjects are 
choosing LL when the magnitude of SS is higher. Only for very low and very high annual 
interest rates, can we see some exceptions from this general tendency. The observed choices in 
treatment T0 suggest that the descriptive analysis should proceed by examining how the fraction 
of LL choices varies with nominal annual interest rates for each of the different principal 
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amounts. Moreover, the other Figures in this section will present the local polynomial regression 
graphs by grouping low principals ($10, $30, and $60) and high principals ($100 and $300) 
separately.  
 




A possible explanation for the apparent “magnitude effect” in Figure 9 is rounding 
behavior, as discussed in section 3.4. 
Such rounding error problems may be particularly pronounced for the lower payoffs, $10 
and $30. Moreover, an apparent magnitude effect is also implied by fixed costs discounting, as 
proposed by Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter (2010). Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström 
(2013, 684) demonstrate that a fixed monetary premium implies not only variable discount rates 
that decline with the horizon, but also a “magnitude effect.” It will not be possible to parse the 
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Before the descriptive analysis attempts to find evidence for the presence of reward 
bundling, it will be useful to establish that the experimental design managed to ensure that the 
LL option is chosen at all. If subjects never chose LL in the control treatments, T0 to T3, it 
would not be possible to find any evidence for reward bundling in the bundling treatments, T4 to 
T7. Low annualized interest rates result in relatively low LL rewards. If discount rates are high, 
the attractiveness of LL rewards is further diminished. In this case, the present utility of even a 
whole series of LL rewards may not exceed the present utility of a series of SS rewards. 
Consequently, no reward bundling would be observable. Figures 10a and 10b demonstrate that 
this is not the case.  
 
Figure 10a: Fraction of LL choices and interest rate – Control treatments (Low Principals) 
 
Even for low amounts, some patient choice behavior, in which LL is chosen more than 50 
percent of the time, is observable in all treatments, although the fraction remains very low with a 
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Figure 10b: Fraction of LL choices and interest rate – Control treatments (High Principals) 
 
With the high principals in Figure 10b, even comparatively low interest rates are sufficient to 
lead to a noteworthy fraction of LL choices in excess of 50 percent.   
The choice behavior in the control treatments in Figure 10a and 10b also reveals some 
tentative evidence for a variable discount rate. Subjects in treatment T1, with the 1 day FED, 
chose more patiently than subjects in T0. A few exceptions are visible with the two high 
principals in Figure 10b, when the interest rates are very high. The choice behavior in treatment 
T1 implies a lower discount rate after a FED of 1 day. The descriptive probit analysis in the next 
section examines whether this possible effect is statistically significant. This behavior is 
consistent with hyperbolic ( and ) as well as quasi-hyperbolic  specifications. 
However, the visceral interpretation of quasi-hyperbolic discounting predicts that, after the initial 
drop in utility, the choice behavior will approximate exponential discounting. The observable 

















0 100 200 300 400 500























0 100 200 300 400 500








Control Treatments: High Principals
74 
 
for high principals the fraction of LL choices increases for treatment T3, relative to treatment T1. 
This suggests that subjects chose more patiently when the FED was increased from 1 day to 35 
days. This behavior is more consistent with hyperbolic, rather than quasi-hyperbolic discounting. 
A more rigorous investigation of the underlying choice behavior will have to be accomplished by 
a structural estimation of the choice models that were introduced in section 2.1.  
The next step is to decide whether there are significant differences between the data from the free 
conditions of the bundling treatments T4 and T6. If no difference can be found data from the four 
bundling treatments (i.e. T4, T5, T6, and T7) can be pooled, when tests for the effects of 
bundling treatments are performed. Figures 11a and 11b focus on the similarity of the first and 
second choices in treatment T4 and assess whether the pooling of choice data is justified. To aid 
the assessment of similarity, the 95 percent CI of the first choices is included. Figures 11a and 
11b show no significant difference between the first and second choices for low and high 
principals, respectively.  
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Figure 11b: Comparison between first and second choices in Treatment T4 (High 
Principals) 
 
The shaded area highlights the 95 percent confidence interval (CI) of the first choices. For all 
three principal amounts, the second choices lie well within this area interval.  
A similar picture emerges for the first, second, and third choices in the other free 
condition, treatment T6. Again to visualize the similarity of choices that are subsequently pooled, 
the 95 percent CI is added. Figures 12a and 12b suggest the absence of significant differences 
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 First, Second, and Third Choices - Treatment T6: High Principals
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Again, the shaded area highlights the 95 percent interval of the first choice. It is apparent from 
Figures 12a and 12b that the other choice data are mostly within this interval. Slight deviations 
from this general tendency disappear as the nominal annual interest rate increases. There are no 
significant differences between the first and later choices in the free bundling conditions. Hence, 
all choices from the free treatments T4 and T6 can probably be pooled with choices from the 
forced treatments T5 and T7 when the effects of bundling treatments are investigated.  
A first glance at the effect of presenting a series of SS/LL decisions is obtained by 
comparing the choices from the baseline treatment T0 with all bundling choices that are pooled 
across treatments T4, T5, T6, and T7. Since the focus switches back to general tendencies in choice 
behavior, the CI bands are omitted. Figures 13a and 13b reveal that the observed choice behavior 
is consistent with the reward bundling hypothesis for low and high payouts, respectively. 
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Figure 13b: Comparison of T0 choices and all bundling choices (High Principals) 
 
Choices in treatment T0, which only involves single SS/LL decisions without a FED, exhibit a 
higher discounting behavior for all interest rates than bundling choices in Figure 13a and most 
interest rates in Figure13b. The only minor exceptions occur for very high interest rates with a 
$300 principal in the left panel of Figure 13b. This result strongly supports the reward bundling 
hypothesis. Subjects appear more patient when facing a series of SS/LL decisions, than when 
being presented with an isolated decision. 
Whether reward bundling is present can be further investigated by having a closer look at 
what choices are affected by the bundling treatments. Reward bundling is a mechanism of 
impulse control. If it is effective, then it should help overcome the temptation of the immediately 
available SS reward. Therefore, it is informative to see the effect of bundling treatments on the 
first choices. Figures 14a and 14b reveal that the fraction of LL choices is indeed higher among 
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Figure 14a: Comparison of T0 choices and first bundling choices (Low Principals) 
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Treatment T0 and First Bundling Choices: High Principals
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That first bundling choices exhibit higher discount rates than single T0 choices is consistently the 
case, with all principals. Again, a minor deviation can only be seen in case of the $300 principal, 
when the interest rates are very high.  
Another informative comparison involves the choices with a 35 day FED from treatment 
T3 and the second choices from the bundling treatments. Reward bundling predicts in this case 
that the choice behavior in treatment T3 should display more patience than second choices from 
the bundling treatments. The reason is that with reward bundling the choices are associated, in 
treatments T5 and T7 by design and in treatment T4 and T6 by the perceived linkage of the 
decisions. If subjects bundle second choices, where the reward will be available after a FED of 
35 days, with first choices, which do not involve a FED, then this should make choices appear 
less patient than a situation where they make decision with a 35 day FED in isolation. 
Consequently, one should expect a higher fraction of LL choice in treatment T3 than in the 
second choices in the bundling treatments. Figures 15a and 15b confirm that this is generally the 
case.  
 

















0 100 200 300 400 500




















0 100 200 300 400 500




















0 100 200 300 400 500









Figure 15b: Comparison of T3 choices and second bundling choices (High Principals) 
 
When the principal amounts are high the comparison of the choices from treatment T3 and the 
second choices from the bundling treatments is less clear. There are some deviations from the 
predicted behavior that the choices from T3 should display a higher fraction of LL choices. 
However, in these cases the choices are close together and the discrepancies are not very 
pronounced.  
Another interesting comparison is between the choices in control treatment T2, where the 
rewards are tripled, and the first choices in treatments T6 and T7, which involve three sequential 
payouts. If subjects bundled rewards, their first choices in those bundling treatments should be 
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Figures 16a and 16b show that the choices are indeed very similar which provides additional 
support for the presence of reward bundling. 
The final prediction that is explored in this section is that the fraction of LL choices will 
increase if the series of SS/LL decisions is extended. The differing effects of bundling on first 
(Figure 14a and 14b) and second choices (Figure 15a and 15b) suggests a similar distinction 
when the effects of an additional decision in the series are explored. Figure 17a and 17b compare 
the first choices in the bundling treatments with two decision (T4 and T5) and three decisions 
(T6 and T7) for low and high principal amounts, respectively.   
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Figure 17b: Comparison of treatment T0 choices and the first choices in T4/T5 and T6/T7 
(High Principals) 
 
For most interest rates, there are more LL choices in the bundling treatments with three 
decisions. This is completely consistent with the reward bundling hypothesis. However, there are 
some minor deviations from this general tendency, especially for low interest rates with low 
principals in Figure 17a, but also with a $100 principal in Figure 17b. Moreover, when the 
principals are low, the choices from T4/T5 and T6/T7 are close together, suggesting that the 
effect of an additional decision in this series is rather weak.  
A final comparison involves the second choices from treatments T4/T5 and T6/T7 and 
the choices from treatment T3. The behavior for low and high principals is presented in Figures 
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Figure18a: Comparison of treatment T3 choices and the second choices in T4/T5 and 




Figure 18b: Comparison of treatment T3 choices and the second choices in T4/T5 and 
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Except for the low principal of $10, adding a third decision leads to slightly more patient choice 
behavior. For all other interest rates the fraction of LL choices is generally greater in the 
bundling choices with three treatments. This is consistent with the reward bundling hypothesis, 
since an additional choice with a longer FED should make the subjects more patient. However, 
the second choices in both bundling conditions should be less patient than in the single choice 
with a 35 day FED in treatment T3. The reason is that all bundling treatments involve making 
second choices in conjunction with the zero FED condition of the first choices, if reward 
bundling is applied. This effect is only clearly visible with the low principals of $30 and $60.  
Overall, the descriptive explorations in this section provide solid support for the presence 
of reward bundling. The local polynomial regression analyses reveal tendencies that are clearly 
in agreement with the predictions stated above, in spite of some slight deviations. However, such 
broad tendencies in the choice data can only give preliminary evidence that justifies a more 
thorough investigation. The next section takes the analysis one step further, by running several 
descriptive probit models.   
8.2 Descriptive probit models 
In this section several probit models are presented that examine the effects of the 
treatments on the probability of choosing LL. Like other discrete choice models, probit models 
make it possible to condition choice probabilities on observable characteristics of the individual 
decision maker or the choice situation.   
Of central importance for the choice situation is the variable BUNDLED, which equals 1 
for the bundling treatments and 0 for the control treatments. Additional binary variables are 
FIRST, SECOND, and THIRD, which indicate the order of choices in the bundling treatments. 
87 
 
The value of the variable FORCED equals 1 if the treatment is T5 or T7 and 0 otherwise. The 
variable SCALE indicates the effective magnitude of the payoffs. Its value equals 1 in most 
control treatments. Only in treatment T2, where the payoffs are tripled, does SCALE equal 3. In 
the forced treatment condition T5, SCALE takes a value of 2 since every choice effectively leads 
to twice the chosen payout.  Similarly, SCALE equals 3 in the forced treatment T7. The variable 
FED indicates the days of front-end delay that were in effect when each choice was made. Its 
value equals 0 in treatment T0, 1 in treatment T1, 35 in treatment T3 and the second decisions in 
the bundling treatments, and 70 in the third decision of the bundling treatments T6 and T7. 
A series of standard socio-demographic questions concluded each of the eight treatment 
sessions. Among the collected variables is FEMALE, a binary variable that indicates gender. It 
takes a value of 1 if the subject was female and a value of 0 of the subject was male. The variable 
BLACK takes a value of 1, if the subject was African American or identified himself as 
“African” and a value of 0 otherwise. Similarly, the variable ASIAN indicates whether the 
subject identified his or her race as Asian. Not only the subjects’ gender and ethnic background 
were recorded, their academic performance and ability were also considered relevant. The 
variable GPAHI indicates a subject that has a grade point average between 3.75 and 4.0, i.e. a 
“good student,” who mostly received A’s for letter-graded academic work.  Training in the 
quantitative analysis of decision making was approximated by the variable BUSINESS, which 
indicated whether the subjects majored in business administration, accounting, finance, or 
economics.  
A first set of probit models analyzes the choice probabilities in the control treatments.  Of 
particular interest are the effects of two variables that vary across all control treatments, FED and 
SCALE. The first marginal effect concerns the front-end delay variable FED. Recall that 
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treatments T0, T1, and T3, introduced FEDs of 0 days, 1 day, and 35 days, respectively. The 
hyperbolic ( and ) and the quasi-hyperbolic( ) specifications predict that the 
probability of choosing LL increases with the FED. Unlike visceral interpretation of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting, the hyperbolic specifications predict no significant difference in the 
probability of choosing LL between treatments T0 and T1. Hyperbolic specifications also predict 
that the probability of choosing LL should be higher in treatment T1 than in treatment T3. The 
polynomial regressions in Figures 10a and 10b, involving all the control treatments, suggest that 
FED interacts with the magnitude of the principal. Hence, the first probit model includes this 
interaction term as independent variable. In addition, the probit model also includes interactions 
of FED with the annualized nominal interest rate, and the monetary premium, i.e. the difference 
between SS and LL amounts. Stata allows the convenient creation of interaction terms by using 
factor variables. Factor variables are extensions of existing variables, which create indicator 
variables for each value. The remaining independent variables consist of the set of socio-
demographic covariates mentioned above. 
The average marginal effects (AME) of the 1 and the 35 day FED in treatments T1 and 




Figure19: Average Marginal Effects of a 1-day FED and a 35-day FED at all Magnitudes 
of the Principal 
 
One can see a positive AME of the 35 day FED, displayed by the grey line in Figure 19, on 
probability of choosing LL at all magnitude values of the principal. This positive AME is most 
pronounced for the highest principal of $300. The 95 percent confidence intervals (CI) of the 
AME lie mostly above the dashed line at the value of zero that indicates the absence of any 
AME. One exception occurs with the lowest principal of $10. The AME of the 1-day FED, 
displayed by the black line in Figure 9, is also above the zero-effect line for all principals. 
However, the 95 percent CI of the 1-day FED lies partly below zero, even for the highest 
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Table 4: AME of FED at all Magnitudes of the Principal 
Variable AME Standard Error p-value 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
      
1 day FED interacted with        
Magnitude of Principal      
$10 0.009 0.068 0.898 -0.125 0.143 
$30 0.049 0.071 0.494 -0.090 0.187 
$60 0.046 0.070 0.511 -0.092 0.184 
$100 0.107 0.063 0.088 -0.016 0.231 
$300 0.130 0.070 0.064 -0.007 0.268 
      
35 day FED interacted with        
Magnitude of Principal      
$10 0.110 0.075 0.144 -0.037 0.257 
$30 0.176 0.070 0.012 0.039 0.312 
$60 0.184 0.069 0.008 0.049 0.319 
$100 0.165 0.062 0.007 0.044 0.286 
$300 0.295 0.073 0.000 0.152 0.438 
            
 
Panel A of Table 4 reveals that all AME estimates for a 1-day FED are positive. Their values 
grow with the magnitude of the principal and reach a sizeable point estimate of approximately 
10.7 and 13 percentage points for the largest principals of $100 and $300, respectively. However, 
as the p-values indicate, most AME estimates are insignificant at conventional significance 
levels.  Only at the 10 percent level are the AME of a 1-day FED significant, if the principals are 
$100 or $300. The lack of a significant difference between a FED of 0 days and a FED of 1 day 
suggests that there is no solid support for the visceral interpretation of quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting. An alternative quasi-hyperbolic specification, proposed by McClure et.al. (2007), 
does not restore the plausibility of visceral arousal as the source of impulsive behavior. An 
additional parameter may be able to describe individually varying impatience as a function of 
delay. However, visceral arousal cannot be a credible explanation for impulsivity after a FED of 
1 day, since such arousal can only be maintained for a short time.  
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Panel B of Table 4 exhibits considerable values for AME point estimates for a FED of 35 
days, ranging from approximately 11 percentage points at the lowest principal of $10 to 
approximately 30 percentage points at the highest principal of $ 300. The p-values suggest that 
the AME estimate of the 35-day FED is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level of 
significance with the lowest principal of $10. With a principal of $30 the AME is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. With all other principal magnitudes, the AME estimates of the 
35-day FED are statistically significant at all conventional significance levels. These results 
indicate that subjects’ inferred discount rate decreases with a 35-day FED in treatment T3, 
compared to a 0-day FED in treatment T0. Such choice behavior suggests the presence of 
hyperbolic discounting, since subjects seem to become more patient when the reward is not 
imminent. The results also provide further evidence against the visceral interpretation of quasi-
hyperbolic specification, since the AME of a FED of 35 days differs significantly from the AME 
with no FED or a FED of 1 day. That people become more patient the more their payouts are 
delayed is not consistent with the hypothesis of visceral arousal as the sole source of impatience.   
The principals in treatment T2 are three times the principals in treatment T0. The variable 
SCALE indicates the effective magnitude of the payouts. Its value equals 1 in all control 
treatments, with the exception of treatment T2. In treatment T2, the value of SCALE equals 3. 
This setup allows testing for the presence of an apparent “magnitude effect,” by assessing the 
average marginal effect (AME) of a SCALE of 3. An AME of SCALE=3 on the probability of 
choosing LL that differs in treatment T2, compared to treatment T0, would be consistent with the 
presence of a magnitude effect. To investigate whether this is the case is the goal of the second 
descriptive probit model. As in the first model, the outcome variable is the choice of SS or LL in 
treatments T0 and T2. The independent variables include the aforementioned demographic 
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variables as well as interactions of SCALE with the annualized nominal interest rate, the 
monetary premium, and the magnitude of the principal.  
The average marginal effects (AME) of SCALE with a value of 3 at all principal 
magnitudes, compared to SCALE with a value of 1, is displayed in Figure 20.  
 
Figure 20: Average Marginal Effects of SCALE=3 at all Magnitudes of the Principal  
 
The point estimate of the AME of a SCALE of 3 is positive at all principals, except for 
the lowest of $10. However, only in the case of the highest principal of $300 is the 95 percent CI 
completely above the dashed line in Figure 20, which indicates an AME of 0. This suggests that 
a significant magnitude effect can only be found for choices that involve the $300 principal. This 
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Table 5: AME of SCALE=3 at all Magnitudes of the Principal 
 
Variable AME Standard Error p-value 
   
   95% Confidence Interval 
  
      
SCALE=3 at a      
Principal of      
$10 -0.016 0.068 0.812 -0.150 0.118 
$30 0.030 0.069 0.663 -0.105 0.165 
$60 0.031 0.069 0.655 -0.104 0.166 
$100 0.103 0.059 0.082 -0.013 0.219 
$300 0.282 0.078 <0.001 0.129 0.435 
            
 
The p-values in Table 5 reveal that only at a principal of $300 is the AME of SCALE=3 
statistically significant at all customary significance levels. The AME is also statistically 
significant at a 10 percent significance level, when the principal magnitude is $100.  The 
polynomial regression in Figure 9 suggested the presence of the apparent “magnitude effect” for 
lower principal magnitudes. However, the results presented in Table 5 reveal that those are not 
statistically significant. This finding casts some doubt on the hypothesis that the observed effect 
is due to rounding behavior. The discussion in subsection 2.2.4 proposes that what appears to be 
a genuine response to the magnitude of rewards, may actually be the result of rounding to 
facilitate the comparison of similar amounts. However, the only statistically significant effect 
occurs with the highest principals, which do not produce similar LL amounts when the 
annualized interest rates are applied. A final discussion whether the observed behavior 
constitutes a genuine magnitude effect or is more plausibly explained by rounding is postponed 
until the structural analysis in the next section.  
The analysis can now proceed to the bundling treatments. A first tentative test for the 
presence of reward bundling is accomplished by a simple probit model that focuses on the AME 
of BUNDLED, which indicates all bundling treatments. This model includes the interaction 
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terms of BUNDLED with the magnitude of the principal, the annualized interest rate, and the 
monetary premium. It also controls for other factors that affect the probability of choosing LL. 
The preceding analysis revealed that under certain circumstances SCALE and FED can have this 
effect. They are, therefore, included. Other covariates are SECOND, THIRD, FORCED, and the 
demographic characteristics mentioned above. Figure 21 reveals the resulting AME of 
BUNDLED at all principals.  
 
Figure 21: Average Marginal Effects of BUNDLED at all Magnitudes of the Principal  
 
Figure 21 illustrates a positive AME of BUNDLED at all principals, which increases with 
the magnitude of the principal. One can see that the 95 percent CI is above the dashed line that 
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Table 6: AME of BUNDLED at all Principals 
 
Variable AME Standard Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval 
      
BUNDLED  at       
a Principal of      
$10 0.037 0.014 0.009 0.009 0.066 
$30 0.042 0.016 0.007 0.012 0.073 
$60 0.050 0.018 0.006 0.014 0.086 
$100 0.061 0.023 0.008 0.016 0.106 
$300 0.121 0.057 0.033 0.010 0.232 
            
 
Table 6 confirms that the AME of BUNDLED is significant at all conventional significance 
levels. It ranges from a rather modest value of approximately 4 percentage points at a principal 
of $10 to a sizeable effect of 12 percentage points at a principal of $300. These results can be 
interpreted as tentative support for reward bundling.  
The polynomial regression presented in Figures 14a and 14b focused on the first choices 
in the bundling treatments. Likewise, it is interesting to examine how BUNDLED affects the 
probability of the first choices in bundling treatments being LL. For this purpose, another probit 
model is estimated. It includes interactions of BUNDLED with the magnitude of the principal, 
the annualized interest rate, and the monetary premium. Furthermore, the model includes the 
variables SCALE, signifying the effective payout magnitude and FORCED, whether the choices 
were made in treatment T5 or T7. The model focuses only on the first choices. The resulting 




Figure 22: Average Marginal Effects of BUNDLED on first Choices at all Magnitudes of 
the Principal 
 
Figure 22 shows that BUNDLED has a positive AME on first bundling choices at all 
magnitudes of the principal. The AME increases with the magnitude and the 95 percent CI lies, 
in all cases, well above the dashed line that indicates an AME of zero. Table 7 presents the exact 
values.  







      
BUNDLED  at      
a Principal of      
$10 0.048 0.017 0.004 0.015 0.081 
$30 0.055 0.018 0.002 0.020 0.091 
$60 0.067 0.021 0.002 0.025 0.108 
$100 0.082 0.027 0.002 0.030 0.134 
$300 0.172 0.067 0.011 0.040 0.304 
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The AME range from 5 to 17 percentage points at the lowest and the highest principals, 
respectively. A look at the p-values in Table 7 reveals that all AME estimates are statistically 
significant at all conventional levels of significance. These results are consistent with the reward 
bundling hypothesis. 
The descriptive probit models in this section offered further evidence for the reward 
bundling hypothesis. The next section proceeds to the most advanced level of the econometric 
investigation and present a comprehensive structural analysis of the experimental data. The 
structural analysis constitutes the most rigorous test for the presence of reward bundling.  
8.3 Structural estimation results 
This section presents the results from a comprehensive structural estimation of the 
experimental data. Unlike descriptive probit models, structural models address how the 
underlying processes determine the observed choices. Various theoretical models of 
intertemporal choice were presented in section 2.1. If the prevalence of particular discounting 
processes differs across treatment conditions, one can infer whether specific treatments facilitate 
impulse control. In particular, an increased probability of exponential discounting in the bundling 
treatments supports the central hypothesis of reward bundling. Therefore, it is crucial to assess 
which model is supported by observable choice behavior. If more than one process is at work in 
a specific treatment, an assumption that seems plausible, it is possible to estimate the relative 
contribution of each process using a mixture model. 
As discussed in section 3.1 and chapter 6, discounting parameters must be estimated, 
conditional on risk parameters, since errors from the risk estimates propagate into the 
discounting estimates. Consequently, one must collect both, risk and time preference data. The 
risk preference data for this experiment were not collected by performing a separate task in the 
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same experimental session. Instead, they had been previously collected from samples drawn 
from the population of GSU undergraduate students. Since the subjects are drawn from the same 
population one may assume that they are comparable and condition the discounting parameter 
estimates from one sample on the risk coefficient estimates from the other sample.15 This 
procedure is also used by Coller, Harrison, and Rutström (2012, 383-384).The experimental 
session, producing the risk attitude data, took place in July 2013 and involved a set of binary 
lottery decisions. The subjects were 171 GSU students, whose recruitment was equivalent to the 
procedure described in section 7.2. This experiment took place in six sessions over a period of 
three days.  
The structural estimation of risk preference data is discussed in chapter 6. Harrison and 
Rutström (2008, Appendix F) outline how such models can be estimated using the syntax of 
Stata. Assuming the CRRA specification from (18), this approach is applied to the GSU risk 
aversion data. Demographic variables are ignored for the moment. The estimation constrained 
the parameter  to take a value between 0 and 1 and constrained  to take a positive value. The 






                                               
15 When the likelihood of the discounting parameter is evaluated, conditional on risk parameters, nothing informs 
the statistical package that the choices over risky lotteries and the choices over SS/LL pairs were made by the same 
person. One can establish a connection in standard errors, by clustering by the subjects’ ID number. However, the 
clustering over risky choices does not have to match the clustering over time-dated options. So, these choices do not 
have to come from the same sample, although they should ideally come from the same population (Coller, Harrison, 
& Rutström 2012, 383-384).  
99 
 






Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval 
A . EUT      
Log-Likelihood -8340.471     
r 0.826 0.010 <0.001 0.806 0.846 
μ 0.141 0.006 <0.001 0.129 0.153 
      
B. RDU with power function      
Log-Likelihood -8329.190     
r 0.814 0.011 <0.001 0.792 0.835 
γ 1.143 0.075 <0.001 0.996 1.289 
μ 0.147 0.007 <0.001 0.133 0.160 
      
C. RDU with inverse-S function      
Log-Likelihood -8167.272     
r 0.683 0.014 <0.001 0.655 0.710 
γ 0.719 0.019 <0.001 0.683 0.756 
μ 0.141 0.007 <0.001 0.129 0.154 
      
D. RDU with Prelec function      
Log-Likelihood -8142.502     
r 0.662 0.014 <0.001 0.634 0.690 
η 0.913 0.030 <0.001 0.854 0.971 
 0.623 0.026 <0.001 0.572 0.675 
μ 0.140 0.006 <0.001 0.127 0.152 
            
 
The ML estimation of an EUT model, with CRRA specification and contextual utility, 
yields the results presented in panel A of Table 8.Both parameters  and  are statistically highly 
significant, in the sense of being different from zero.   
The estimation results of an RDU model with a power probability weighting function 
(pwf) are presented in panel B of Table 8. The parameters were again constrained to yield results 
that are theoretically meaningful. All estimates are statistically different from zero.  The 
parameter  has an estimated value of 0.81, which is only slightly lower than the estimate from 
the EUT analysis in panel A. This suggest that the concave curvature of the utility function is 
almost to an equal extent responsible for the implied risk premium as suggested by EUT. In 
addition, panel B exhibits a value of 1.14 for the parameter . Using the power specification for 
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the weighting function, a value greater than 1 suggests that subjects overweight the probabilities 
of comparatively “bad” outcomes occurring, which can be described as “probability pessimism.” 
In this case, both concave utility and probability pessimism produce the observable risk averse 
choice behavior. The concepts of probability weights and the implied decision weights are 
illustrated in Figure 23.  
 
Figure 23: Probability weighting with parameter estimate of the power function and 
implied decision weights 
 
The left panel displays the probability weighting function, where the objective probabilities on 
the bottom axis are transformed by ( ) = . . The straight diagonal line represents the 
identity function, where objective probabilities  are not distorted, as in EUT. One can see that 
( ) lies slightly below this 45º line, especially as one moves away from the extremes of 0 and 
1. The decision weights implied by this probability weighting behavior are illustrated in the right 
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which occur with uniform probability to pedagogically show the pure effect of probability 
weighting (i.e. when there are 2 prizes, each prize occurs with = 1 2⁄ , when there are 3 prizes 
each prize occurs with probability = 1 3⁄  and so on). Three scenarios are illustrated, with 2, 3, 
and 4 prizes. In each case, relatively more weight is attached to the worse outcome, than to the 
subsequent better outcomes. This is a clear case of probability pessimism.  
However, one must still examine whether  is significantly different from 1 in a 
statistical sense, the case where the specification collapses to EUT. Otherwise, one cannot 
conclude that probability weighting significantly affects the choice behavior from the risk 
preference data.  A formal hypothesis test reveals that the hypothesis = 1 cannot be rejected. 
Its p-value falls slightly short of the 0.05 level of significance (p-value = 0.056). This result is 
already suggested by a closer look at the 95 percent CI of  in panel B of Table 8.  
To check the robustness of this result, two additional probability weighting functions are 
considered. Each is frequently used in applied research. 
Panel C of Table 8 presents the result from an RDU estimation of the risk choice data 
with an inverse-S specification of the probability weighting function. The estimate of is now 
0.68, lower than with EUT or RDU with a power specification. The parameter  is estimated to 
be 0.72, which does suggest overweighting of small and underweighting of large probabilities. 





Figure 24: Probability weighting with parameter estimate of the inverse-S function and 
implied decision weights 
 
The probability weighting function ( ) with = 0.72, follows the proposed pattern of 
overweighting small and underweighting large probabilities. One must then assess whether the 
estimated value of  is significantly different from 1. Otherwise, the choice behavior would still 
be consistent with EUT.  However, a formal test shows that the hypothesis = 1 can clearly be 
rejected (p-value <0.001). Unlike the estimation of the power specification, the estimation of the 
inverse-S function does indeed produce statistically significant evidence of probability 
weighting. 
The results from the estimation of the Prelec function are presented in panel D of Table 8. 
The estimate  is 0.66, lower than with the previous specifications. The estimates of  and  
equal 0.91 and 0.62, respectively. Figure 25 illustrates the probability weights, resulting from 
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Figure 25: Probability weighting with parameter estimates of the Prelec function and 
implied decision weights 
 
The patterns of probability and decision weighting resemble those that were implied by the 
inverse-S specification. It is once again particularly important to assess whether the specification 
reduces to EUT. A formal test shows that the joint hypothesis = = 1 can be rejected with 
high confidence (p-value <0.001). The estimation of the Prelec specification does, therefore, 
yield additional evidence for probability weighting.   
Of all weighting functions estimated, only the power specification failed to reveal any 
significant probability weighting. The estimation of the inverse-S and of the Prelec functions 
produced statistically significant evidence for probability weighting. This suggests that some of 
the implied risk premium can be attributed to probability pessimism, rather than solely attributed 
to the curvature of the utility function. This becomes obvious when one regards the lower levels 
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particular importance for the estimation of time preferences, since the curvature of utility 
function directly influences inferred discount rates. Based on the statistical significance of the 
estimates of core parameters and the log-likelihood, the RDU specification with Prelec 
probability weighting appears to be the most convincing of all models considered. Therefore, for 
the remainder of this chapter it will be the risk attitude model used for the joint estimation of all 
time preference models examined.  
The decision to use previously collected risk attitude data, instead of presenting the same 
sample of subjects with a risk and a time preference task, has additional implications for the data 
analysis. The sample of GSU students that were given the risk attitude task produced a 
considerably smaller number of choice observations than the separate sample that was presented 
with the eight bundling treatments. The risk preference data consisted of 13,018 choices, 28.88 
percent of all data points, whereas the bundling data set contained 32,060 choices, or 71.12 
percent of all data points. To give the risk attitude data sufficient influence when the joint 
estimation of time preferences is performed, they should be weighted. A simulation that 
evaluated the effect of different weight values was performed. The goal was to find a value that 
would allow a significant effect on estimated discount rates without drastically altering the 
estimated risk parameters when the discounting choices are added. Based on these simulation 
results, a weight of 30 was attached to the risk attitude choices.   
The principles of performing structural estimation of time preferences are now 
demonstrated by analyzing the data from treatment T0. Assume the choices are generated by 
exponential discounting, with RDU consistent risk preferences with a Prelec probability 




Table 9 – Treatment T0: Structural Estimation of the  






Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval 
      
r 0.666 0.014 <0.001 0.638 0.693 
η 0.913 0.030 <0.001 0.854 0.971 
φ 0.625 0.026 <0.001 0.574 0.677 
δ 2.120 0.335 <0.001 1.464 2.777 
μ 0.140 0.006 <0.001 0.127 0.152 
ν 0.808 0.116 <0.001 0.580 1.036 
            
 
All estimates are statistically significantly different from zero at all conventional levels of 
significance. The value of the parameter  is very similar to the estimate presented in Panel D of 
Table 8, as one would expect. This suggests that subjects exhibit a significant risk aversion 
compared to individuals with risk neutral preferences. The parameter  indicates an annualized 
discount rate of 212 %.  
A slight econometric extension makes it possible to see how key parameters are 
determined by individual characteristics. Various demographic variables were collected at the 
end of the experimental sessions. Table 10 illustrates the estimated marginal effects of various 










Table 10: Treatment T0 – Marginal Effects of Demographic Covariates on Parameter in 
the Exponential Discounting Model  
 
Parameter Variable Point Estimate Standard Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval 
       
r FEMALE 0.015 0.034 0.660 -0.051 0.081 
 BLACK 0.004 0.034 0.910 -0.063 0.071 
 ASIAN 0.002 0.057 0.975 -0.110 0.114 
 GPAHI -0.011 0.035 0.762 -0.080 0.058 
 BUSINESS -0.001 0.050 0.988 -0.099 0.097 
η FEMALE 0.099 0.071 0.166 -0.041 0.238 
 BLACK -0.096 0.086 0.259 -0.264 0.071 
 ASIAN -0.127 0.097 0.191 -0.316 0.063 
 GPAHI -0.055 0.065 0.396 -0.182 0.072 
 BUSINESS -0.067 0.077 0.385 -0.219 0.085 
 FEMALE -0.045 0.049 0.354 -0.141 0.051 
 BLACK 0.098 0.067 0.148 -0.035 0.230 
 ASIAN 0.166 0.099 0.093 -0.028 0.360 
 GPAHI -0.015 0.054 0.780 -0.120 0.090 
 BUSINESS -0.058 0.069 0.401 -0.193 0.077 
δ FEMALE 0.032 1.019 0.975 -1.966 2.030 
 BLACK 0.439 0.967 0.650 -1.456 2.334 
 ASIAN -0.884 0.945 0.350 -2.737 0.969 
 GPAHI -0.390 0.628 0.534 -1.621 0.840 
 BUSINESS -0.048 1.025 0.962 -2.058 1.961 
              
 
The definitions of the demographic variables, all of which are binary, are presented in section 
4.2. No individual marginal effect parameters are significantly different from zero at the 5 
percent level. One can test the joint significance of the demographic covariates on the model 
parameters by performing Wald tests of non-linear restrictions.16 Three tests are performed to 
test the joint influence of the demographic covariates on the risk parameters , , , the 
discounting parameter , as well as on the risk and discounting parameters together. The 
resulting p-values are 0.51, 0.66 and 0.61, respectively. Therefore, one cannot conclude that the 
joint influence of the demographics is significantly different from zero.  
                                               
16 Depending how the tests is set up they can be implemented with either the test or the testnl command in Stata. 
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Task characteristics, as well as personal covariates, may affect parameter values. Figure 9 
suggest that the magnitude of the principal has an important effect on the inferred discount rates. 
Table 11 presents the marginal effects of different magnitudes of the principal in the discounting 
tasks. All effects are relative to the highest principal of $300. 
Table 11: Treatment T0 – Marginal Effects of the Magnitude of the Principal on the 














        
δ 
$300.00 (base 
category) 1.160 0.206 <0.001 0.755 1.564 116% 
 $100.00 1.391 0.369 <0.001 0.667 2.115 255% 
 $60.00 1.405 0.500 0.005 0.424 2.385 256% 
 $30.00 4.155 1.426 0.004 1.360 6.951 531% 
 $10.00 11.588 5.088 0.023 1.616 21.559 1275% 
                
 
Table 11 shows that the estimated annualized discount rate of the base category, the 
highest principal of $300, is 116%. This estimate is clearly significantly different from zero (p-
value <0.001). The point estimates, standard errors, p-values, and confidence intervals of the 
other principal amounts refer to effects on the discount rate , relative to the highest principal of 
$300. The implied discount rates are, of course, constant for all horizons and are reported in the 
last column. All point estimates of the marginal effects are significantly different from zero. All 
marginal effects are positive, meaning that discount rates increase, and subjects become more 
impatient, if the magnitude of the principal is lowered.  The marginal effect ranges from 
approximately 139 percentage points with a principal of $100 to 1159 percentage points with the 
lowest principal of $10. The resulting annualized discount rates range from 255% to 1275%. 
A hyperbolic discounting model is presented in Table 12. Demographic covariates are 
ignored at this time.  
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Table 12: Treatment T0 – Structural Estimation of the  






Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval 
      
r 0.666 0.014 <0.001 0.638 0.693 
η 0.913 0.030 <0.001 0.854 0.971 
 0.625 0.026 <0.001 0.574 0.677 
K 1.189 0.117 <0.001 0.960 1.419 
μ 0.140 0.006 <0.001 0.127 0.152 
ν 0.808 0.116 <0.001 0.579 1.036 
            
 
The results in Table 12 show that the estimate of K  is 1.19. Hyperbolic discounting implies non-
constant discount rates that decline with the horizon. The discount rate that is implied by the  
specification is derived in (5). Table 13 exhibits this implied discount for several horizons: 
Table 13: Treatment T0 –  Discount Rates for Several Horizons Implied  
by Hyperbolic Discounting 
 
Horizon Point Estimate Standard Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval 
1 day 2.278 0.382 <0.001 1.528 3.027 
2 days 2.272 0.381 <0.001 1.526 3.017 
3 days 2.265 0.379 <0.001 1.523 3.007 
4 days 2.259 0.377 <0.001 1.521 2.997 
5 days 2.253 0.375 <0.001 1.518 2.987 
6 days 2.247 0.373 <0.001 1.516 2.977 
7 days 2.241 0.371 <0.001 1.514 2.968 
2 weeks 2.192 0.356 <0.001 1.494 2.890 
1 month 2.107 0.331 <0.001 1.459 2.756 
2 months 1.959 0.289 <0.001 1.392 2.526 
3 months 1.832 0.256 <0.001 1.331 2.333 
6 months 1.543 0.187 <0.001 1.177 1.908 
1 year  1.189 0.117 <0.001 0.960 1.419 
2 years 0.838 0.064 <0.001 0.713 0.963 
5 years 0.473 0.025 <0.001 0.425 0.522 
            
 
Table 13 shows that the implied annualized discount rate declines from 228% with a horizon of 1 
day to 47% when the horizon is extended to 5 years. A notable decrease in the value of the 
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discount rate can be observed from a horizon of 1 month on. Between a horizon of 1 month and a 
horizon of 6 months, the discount rate drops drastically from 211% to 154%.   
One can also allow the key parameters of the hyperbolic discounting model to be 
determined by demographic characteristics. This is illustrated in Table 14:  
Table 14: Treatment T0 – Marginal Effects of Demographic Covariates on Parameters in 
the Hyperbolic Discounting Model 
  
Parameter Variable Point Estimate Standard Error p-value 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
       
r FEMALE 0.014 0.034 0.670 -0.052 0.081 
 BLACK 0.004 0.034 0.912 -0.064 0.071 
 ASIAN 0.002 0.057 0.965 -0.109 0.114 
 GPAHI -0.010 0.035 0.779 -0.079 0.059 
 BUSINESS -0.001 0.050 0.979 -0.099 0.096 
η FEMALE 0.099 0.071 0.166 -0.041 0.238 
 BLACK -0.097 0.086 0.259 -0.264 0.071 
 ASIAN -0.127 0.097 0.190 -0.316 0.063 
 GPAHI -0.055 0.065 0.396 -0.182 0.072 
 BUSINESS -0.067 0.077 0.385 -0.219 0.085 
 FEMALE -0.046 0.049 0.352 -0.141 0.050 
 BLACK 0.098 0.067 0.148 -0.035 0.230 
 ASIAN 0.166 0.099 0.093 -0.028 0.360 
 GPAHI -0.015 0.054 0.784 -0.120 0.090 
 BUSINESS -0.058 0.069 0.399 -0.193 0.077 
K FEMALE 0.087 0.376 0.816 -0.649 0.823 
 BLACK 0.123 0.313 0.694 -0.491 0.737 
 ASIAN -0.351 0.367 0.339 -1.069 0.368 
 GPAHI -0.156 0.239 0.513 -0.625 0.312 
 BUSINESS -0.021 0.370 0.956 -0.745 0.704 
              
 
Again, none of the demographic variables is individually significantly different from zero. This 
resembles the pattern that emerged when the exponential discounting model was estimated. It is 
tested whether the demographic variables jointly affect the risk parameters , , ,  the 
discounting parameter , as well as on the risk and discounting parameters together. However, 
no joint significance can be found (the p-values are 0.52, 0.72, and 0.63, respectively). 
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 The marginal effect of the magnitude of the principal on the hyperbolic discounting 
parameter  is presented in Table 15.  
Table 15: Treatment T0 – Marginal Effects of the Magnitude of the Principal on the 



















         
K 
$300.00 (base 
category) 0.793 0.101 <0.001 0.594 0.992 121% 38% 
 $100.00 0.538 0.087 <0.001 0.367 0.709 277% 50% 
 $60.00 0.542 0.152 <0.001 0.243 0.841 279% 50% 
 $30.00 1.186 0.239 <0.001 0.717 1.655 620% 61% 
 $10.00 2.110 0.425 <0.001 1.277 2.942 1702% 73% 
                  
 
The estimated value of  for the highest principal of $300 is 0.79, resulting in annualized 
discount rates that range from 121% with a horizon of 1 day to 38% with a horizon of 5 years. 
The remaining rows in Table 15 refer to the estimated marginal effects on  of the other 
principal amounts. All estimates are significantly different from zero at all conventional levels of 
significance. The marginal effect on  with a principal of $100 is 0.54, resulting in a value of 
= 1.33. The annualized discount rates implied by this new value range from 277% with a 
horizon of only 1 day to 50% when the horizon is extended to 5 years. Similar to the estimation 
of the exponential discounting, the hyperbolic model results in marginal effects on the treatment 
parameter  that increase as the magnitude of the principal deceases. With the lowest principal 
of $10, the estimated marginal effect on  has reached a sizeable increase of 211 percentage 
points. The new value of = 2.9 implies annualized discount rates of 1702% with a horizon of 
1 day, which decrease to 73% with a horizon of 5 years. 
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A mixture model, assuming that exponential and hyperbolic discounting (with 
specifications  and ) are two latent DGPs, is estimated using the choice data from 
treatment T0. The estimation for now ignores demographic characteristics.  
Table 16: Treatment T0 – Structural Estimation of  
Mixture Model of Exponential and Hyperbolic Discounting  
 
Parameter Point Estimate Standard Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval 
 0.651 0.069 <0.001 0.517 0.786 
 0.349 0.069 <0.001 0.214 0.483 
r 0.662 0.014 <0.001 0.634 0.690 
η 0.913 0.030 <0.001 0.854 0.971 
 0.623 0.026 <0.001 0.572 0.675 
δ 3.209 0.252 <0.001 2.714 3.703 
K 0.382 0.081 <0.001 0.223 0.541 
μ 0.140 0.006 <0.001 0.127 0.152 
ν_E 0.063 0.021 0.002 0.023 0.104 
ν_H2 0.518 0.141 <0.001 0.242 0.794 
            
 
The p-values show that all estimates are significantly different from zero. The parameter  
denotes the probability of exponential discounting. A Wald test clearly reveals, with < 0.001, 
that is significantly different from 0.5.  Since only hyperbolic discounting is considered as an 
alternative DGP, the probability of this process  equals 1− . The results in Table 16 show 
that 65% of the choices in treatment T0 are consistent with exponential discounting and 35% are 
better explained by hyperbolic discounting. Separate error terms are assumed, one for each 
discounting process considered. The behavioral error term for exponential discounting is 
denoted _ , whereas the behavioral error term for hyperbolic discounting is given by _ 2. 
The analysis of the T0 data has illustrated some interesting methodological points. In 
particular, two approaches to dealing with the challenge of heterogeneous time preferences were 
demonstrated. A straightforward way to handle heterogeneity is to show how observable 
covariates affect time preferences parameters. This was implemented by conditioning choice 
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parameters on personal and task characteristics. Another approach to heterogeneity is to account 
for the possibility that multiple DGPs may be present. This can be accomplished by estimating 
finite mixture models using MLE. Both strategies are complementary: one can have personal 
characteristics and mixture specifications.   
Now that these methodological points have been established, the discussion can move on 
to the remaining control treatments. It is time to examine whether the discounting models that 
were introduced in section 2.1 are supported by the data. The initial focus will be on treatments 
T0, T1, and T3. The variation in the FED across these treatments makes it possible to examine 
whether the subjects’ responses are consistent with the various discounting models. The MLE 






















Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval 
      
A. Exponential      
r 0.669 0.014 <0.001 0.642 0.697 
η 0.912 0.030 <0.001 0.854 0.971 
 0.627 0.026 <0.001 0.576 0.679 
δ 1.533 0.201 <0.001 1.140 1.926 
μ 0.140 0.006 <0.001 0.127 0.152 
ν 0.852 0.089 <0.001 0.677 1.027 
      
B. Hyperbolic      
r 0.669 0.014 <0.001 0.642 0.697 
η 0.912 0.030 <0.001 0.854 0.971 
 0.627 0.026 <0.001 0.576 0.678 
K 0.998 0.090 <0.001 0.822 1.174 
μ 0.140 0.006 <0.001 0.127 0.152 
ν 0.846 0.089 <0.001 0.672 1.019 
      
C. Quasi-Hyperbolic      
r 0.670 0.014 <0.001 0.642 0.697 
η 0.912 0.030 <0.001 0.854 0.971 
 0.627 0.026 <0.001 0.576 0.679 
β 0.979 0.011 <0.001 0.958 1.001 
δ 1.074 0.240 <0.001 0.604 1.545 
μ 0.140 0.006 <0.001 0.127 0.152 
ν 0.838 0.090 <0.001 0.662 1.014 
      
D. Weibull      
r 0.670 0.014 <0.001 0.642 0.697 
η 0.912 0.030 <0.001 0.854 0.971 
 0.627 0.026 <0.001 0.576 0.679 
δ 0.570 0.143 <0.001 0.289 0.851 
s 1.313 0.198 <0.001 0.925 1.701 
μ 0.140 0.006 <0.001 0.127 0.152 
ν 0.828 0.088 <0.001 0.655 1.002 
            
 
All parameters are significantly different from zero, at all conventional levels of significance. 
The estimates of the parameters of the exponential and hyperbolic models are presented in Panels 
A and B. The estimated values of the discounting parameters  and are 1.53 and approximately 
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1.00, respectively. These estimates are lower than those obtained from treatment T0 alone. The 
estimated annualized discount rate for the exponential model is, of course, 153%. The discount 
rates implied by the hyperbolic discounting model are presented in Table 18. 
Table 18: Treatments T0, T1, & T3 – Discount Rates for Several Horizons Implied  









1 day 1.709 0.243 <0.001 1.234 2.185 
2 days 1.706 0.242 <0.001 1.232 2.179 
3 days 1.702 0.241 <0.001 1.231 2.174 
4 days 1.699 0.240 <0.001 1.229 2.168 
5 days 1.695 0.239 <0.001 1.227 2.163 
6 days 1.691 0.238 <0.001 1.225 2.157 
7 days 1.688 0.237 <0.001 1.224 2.152 
2 weeks 1.659 0.229 <0.001 1.210 2.108 
1 month 1.608 0.216 <0.001 1.185 2.032 
2 months 1.518 0.194 <0.001 1.138 1.897 
3 months 1.438 0.175 <0.001 1.094 1.781 
6 months 1.247 0.135 <0.001 0.983 1.511 
1 year  0.998 0.090 <0.001 0.822 1.174 
2 years 0.731 0.052 <0.001 0.629 0.833 
5 years 0.431 0.021 <0.001 0.388 0.473 
            
 
Table 18 exhibits an annualized discount rate that declines from 171% with a horizon of 1 day to 
43 % when the horizon is extended to 5 years.  
The estimates of the parameters from the quasi-hyperbolic model are presented in Panel 
C of Table 17.  The quasi-hyperbolic estimate of  is 1.07, with a 95 % CI between 0.6 and 1.55. 
Hence, the model proposes that the annualized discount rate, after initially imposing high fixed 
costs for the delayed reward, will eventually converge to 107 percent, as the horizon increases. 
Whether there are initial fixed costs, in form of a fixed proportion of the principal, depends on 
the value of the parameter . If the estimated value of  equals 1, the model collapses to the 
exponential model. Indeed, the value is not significantly different from 1, as the 95 percent CI 
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shows. This result is confirmed by a formal hypothesis test, which reveals that  falls short of 
being statistically different from 1 at the 5 percent level of significance (two-sided p-value = 
0.057). This means that no significance “present bias” in the quasi-hyperbolic sense can be found 
in the control treatments. This becomes strikingly obvious when the discount rates, implied by 
the quasi-hyperbolic model for several horizons, ranging from 1 day to 5 years, are considered. 
These discount rates are constant, which makes the quasi-hyperbolic indistinguishable from 
exponential discounting.  
The results from the Weibull specification are presented in Panel D of Table 17. The 
Weibull model also nests exponential discounting, in the sense that it collapses to the exponential 
specification when the parameter  takes a value of 1. A formal hypothesis test reveals that  is 
not significantly different from 1 at the 5 percent levels of significance (p-value = 0.11).  
When the discounting models from section 2.1 are considered individually it appears that 
only exponential and hyperbolic discounting are well supported by the data. This demonstrates 
the need for some metric that can help us decide which of these two models is better. 
positive. 
Chapter 6 presented to popular nonparametric hypothesis tests. The Vuong and the 
Clarke tests can now be applied to decide which model explains the choices in treatments T0, T1, 
and T3 better.17  These results can then be compared with the mixture model approach. The 
Vuong statistic equals -7.037. The test was set up so that a positive value would support the 
exponential model and a negative value supports the hyperbolic model. Hence, the Vuong test 
                                               
17 Stata has not integrated the two non-nested hypothesis test considered in version: Stata 13.1. The only exception 
is that the “vuong” option, available for zero-inflated negative binomial models. This option induces the Vuong test 
in this special case. Therefore, user-written tests have to be implemented, where the coding follows the test 




favors the hyperbolic model. However, a look at the distribution of log-likelihoods in Figure 26 
reveals that the log-likelihood ratios are multi-modal and sharply peaked, compared to the 
normal distribution.  
  
Figure 26: Distribution of Log-Likelihood Ratios, compared to a Standard Normal 
Distribution 
 
Under these conditions, the Clarke test may perform better. The Clarke test is set up so that it 
favors the exponential model if the test statistic takes a greater value than  22539, i.e. more than 
half of the log-likelihood differences are positive. The actual value is 34209, so the Clarke test 
suggests that the exponential model explains the data better. However, this result is not 
statistically significant. The null-hypothesis of exponential discounting not being the better 
model cannot be rejected (p-value =1).  
This situation would not be very conclusive if one and only one model had to win the 
comparison and be regarded as the sole DGP. However, as the discussion of mixture 
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specifications and the application to the choices in treatment T0 demonstrated, this is not the 
case. Table 19 presents the estimations of four mixture models of exponential discounting and 























Table 19: Treatments T0, T1, & T3 – Structural Estimation of Mixtures of Exponential and 






Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval 
      
A. Exponential_Hyperbolic      
Log-Likelihood -247967.120     
E  0.395 0.045 <0.001 0.307 0.482 
2H  0.605 0.045 <0.001 0.518 0.693 
r 0.662 0.014 <0.001 0.634 0.690 
η 0.913 0.030 <0.001 0.854 0.971 
 0.623 0.026 <0.001 0.572 0.675 
δ 0.220 0.054 <0.001 0.114 0.326 
K 1.545 0.083 <0.001 1.383 1.708 
μ 0.140 0.006 <0.001 0.127 0.152 
ν_E 0.523 0.093 <0.001 0.341 0.705 
ν_H2 0.241 0.026 <0.001 0.190 0.292 
      
B. Exponential_Quasi-
Hyperbolic      
Log-Likelihood -247961.9     
E  0.458 0.054 <0.001 0.352 0.564 
QH  0.542 0.054 <0.001 0.436 0.648 
r 0.662 0.014 <0.001 0.634 0.690 
η 0.913 0.030 <0.001 0.854 0.971 
 0.624 0.026 <0.001 0.572 0.675 
δ 0.339 0.067 <0.001 0.209 0.470 
δ_QH 2.452 0.659 <0.001 1.160 3.744 
β 0.797 0.074 <0.001 0.652 0.942 
μ 0.140 0.006 <0.001 0.127 0.152 
ν_E 0.539 0.068 <0.001 0.406 0.672 
ν_QH 0.285 0.108 0.008 0.074 0.496 
      
C.  Exponential_Weibull      
Log-Likelihood -261760.740     
E  0.506 0.026 <0.001 0.456 0.557 
W  0.494 0.026 <0.001 0.443 0.544 
r 0.662 0.014 <0.001 0.634 0.690 
η 0.913 0.030 <0.001 0.854 0.971 
 0.624 0.026 <0.001 0.572 0.675 
δ 0.326 0.032 <0.001 0.264 0.388 
δ_wei 1.269 0.098 <0.001 1.077 1.461 
s 1.191 0.100 <0.001 0.994 1.387 
μ 0.140 0.006 <0.001 0.127 0.152 
ν_E 0.520 0.051 <0.001 0.420 0.620 
ν_Wei 
 0.151 0.034 <0.001 0.084 0.219 






Only in the mixture model that includes exponential and hyperbolic discounting is the 
probability  of exponential discounting significantly different from 0.5 (p-value<0.02). With 
the mixtures of exponential discounting with quasi-hyperbolic and Weibull discounting, one 
cannot reject the hypothesis that = 0.5 (p-values of 0.44 and 0.81, respectively). The finding 
that the proportion of exponential discounting choices is higher in these models than in the 
mixture with hyperbolic discounting deserves further attention, since it is quite possible that what 
appears to be the mixture of exponential and other discounting models is in fact a mixture of two 
exponential processes. A look at the other parameters may reveal that the alternative non-
exponential specification is not significantly different from exponential discounting. 
Regarding the mixture model of exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting, one can 
reject the hypothesis. The value of  is significantly less than 1. It may seem puzzling at first that 
the model with quasi-hyperbolic discounting as a single process collapses to an exponential 
model, whereas this is not the case for the quasi-hyperbolic component in the mixture model, 
applied to the same control data. However, it is perfectly possible that this occurs when two 
processes generate the data, but the selected model assumes the presence of only one process. 
For example, if the data are in fact generated by a mixture of exponential and quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting, but a single process quasi-hyperbolic model is estimated, the presence of choices 
that are consistent with exponential discounting will affect the parameter estimates. In particular, 
the standard errors in the single process model will be larger. This may lead to the result that  is 
not significantly different from 1 and, therefore, that the quasi-hyperbolic model collapses to an 
exponential specification. A mixture model can capture the actual process heterogeneity in the 
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sample and prevent wrong conclusions, due to model misspecification (Harrison & Rutström 
2009, 146).  
The Weibull component, in the mixture model of exponential and Weibull discounting, 
on the other hand can be reduced to the exponential model. The parameter  is not significantly 
different from 1 at the 5 percent level of significance (p-value =0.06).  
The previous tests on specific parameters revealed that only the hyperbolic and the quasi-
hyperbolic component in the mixture models differed significantly from exponential discounting. 
Single parameter tests cannot be performed for the mixture of exponential and hyperbolic 
discounting, due to the non-nested nature of the two models. However, a simple test on the 
mixture parameter  reveals that, although exponential discounting is less prevalent, its 
probability is significantly different from zero (p-value = <0.001). This supports the 
hypothesized presence of both DGPs. Of course, the same procedure also works when mixture 
models are applied to cases, in which one could choose between models by running a single 
parameter test. The parameter  in the mixture of exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
is also significantly different from zero (p-value = <0.001).  
To summarize, of the mixture models considered, only the mixture of exponential and 
hyperbolic and the mixture of exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting are reasonably 
supported by the data from treatments T0, T1, and T3. These models suggests there are indeed 
two decision making modes present in the data, as hypothesized by dual process models: 
“patient” and “deliberate” reasoning, as epitomized by exponential discounting, and “impulsive” 
choice behavior, as described by hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Note that the 
significance of the quasi-hyperbolic component in the mixture with exponential discounting does 
not necessarily support the presence of visceral arousal as the main reason for impulsivity. Apart 
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from alternative explanations (e.g. the quasi-hyperbolic specifications is particularly suitable to 
capture an initially high level of implied discount rates), visceral arousal is simply not plausible 
for a wide range of impulsive choice behavior. For these reasons, the test of the bundling 
hypothesis will focus on the marginal effect of the bundling treatments on the mixture 
probability  in the mixture of exponential and hyperbolic discounting. One can interpret it as 
support for the hypothesis, if the estimated effect is found to be significantly positive. In 
addition, it may be of interest to check how robust a possible effect on  is in the alternative 
mixture of exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting.   
Before the attention can focus on the finding evidence for reward bundling, one must take 
one additional factor into consideration. Section 3.3 discussed that many researchers claim the 
existence of a magnitude effect, i.e. that people exhibit more patient behavior as rewards get 
larger. It appears that the presence of a magnitude effect in the experimental data is well 
supported by the descriptive results in Figures 9 and 20 and Table 5, as well as by the structural 
estimations presented in Tables 11 and 15. The structural analysis will now attempt a final 
assessment whether a genuine magnitude effect is present, before the discussion moves on to 
reward bundling. To accomplish this, the data from treatment T2 are included in the analysis.  
Treatment T2 modifies the baseline treatment T0, by using principal amounts that are 
tripled. Table 20 presents the effect of the principal amounts on the discounting parameters from 







Table 20: Treatment T2 – Marginal Effects of the Magnitude of the Principal on the 
Discounting Parameters in the Exponential and Hyperbolic Discounting Models  
 
Parameter 















A. Exponential        
δ $900.00 (base category) 0.360 0.157 0.022 0.051 0.668 36% 36% 
 $300.00 0.910 0.275 0.001 0.371 1.449 127% 127% 
 $180.00 1.275 0.425 0.003 0.442 2.108 163% 163% 
 $90.00 2.470 0.777 0.001 0.946 3.993 283% 283% 
 $30.00 7.131 3.135 0.023 0.986 13.276 749% 749% 
         
B. Hyperbolic        
K $900.00 (base category) 0.311 0.119 0.009 0.078 0.543 36% 21% 
 $300.00 0.526 0.064 <0.001 0.401 0.651 131% 19% 
 $180.00 0.684 0.075 <0.001 0.536 0.831 170% 43% 
 $90.00 1.089 0.105 <0.001 0.882 1.295 304% 52% 
 $30.00 1.994 0.190 <0.001 1.622 2.366 895% 66% 
                  
 
In the case of exponential discounting the estimated annualized discount rate  with the 
highest principal amount of $900 is 36%. This value remains constant, of course, regardless of 
the horizon. The remaining rows of panel A in Table 20 estimate the value of  relative to the 
base category of $900. All estimates are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level of 
significance. The estimated marginal effect increases, as the magnitude of the principal 
decreases. A principal of $300 results in marginal effect that increases the value of  by 91 
percentage points, resulting in an annualized discount rate of 127% for all horizons. The 
marginal effect, relative to the base category, increases to 7.13, when the principal is lowered to 
$30, and the resulting constant discount rate is 749%. 
If hyperbolic discounting is assumed, panel B of Table 20 shows that  takes an 
estimated value of 0.31 for the base category of $900. The discount rates implied by this estimate 
range from 36% with a horizon of 1 day to 21% with a horizon of 5 years. The other rows exhibit 
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the marginal effects, relative to the base category, when the principal is lowered. All estimates 
are significantly different from zero at all conventional levels of significance. When the principal 
is lowered from $900 to $300, the estimate of  increases by 0.53: This resulting value of =
0.84 implies an annualized discount rate that ranges from 131% with a horizon of 1 day to 19% 
with a horizon of 5 years. The lowest principal in treatment T2 of $30 results in  increasing by 
1.99, relative to the base category. The new value of = 2.31 implies discount rates from 895% 
with a horizon of 1 day to 66% with a horizon of 5 years.  
Similarly to treatment T0, the data from treatment T2 clearly suggest an effect of the 
magnitude of the principal on the discounting parameters. It is instructive to compare the 
estimated parameters from both treatments in greater detail. If the higher principals in treatment 
T2 result in inferred discounting parameters that are significantly lower than those inferred from 
T0 choices, this would strongly support the presence of a magnitude effect. Table 21 presents 
this comparison. 
Table 21: Treatments T0 and T2 – Exponential and Hyperbolic 
Discounting Parameters  
 
Parameter Point Estimate Standard Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval 
A. Treatment T0      
δ 2.120 0.335 <0.001 1.464 2.777 
K 1.189 0.117 <0.001 0.960 1.419 
      
B. Treatment T2      
δ 1.129 0.221 <0.001 0.696 1.562 
K 0.778 0.110 <0.001 0.563 0.994 
            
 
All estimates are significantly different from zero. The results in panel A have already been 
presented in Tables 9 and 12. They are included again to facilitate the comparison. A first look at 
the equivalent results in panel B of Table 21 suggest that the parameters inferred from the 
choices in treatment T2 are much lower. Indeed, a formal test confirms that the null-hypothesis 
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of equal  estimates in treatments T0 and T2 can clearly be rejected (p-value = 0.009). Similarly, 
a formal test of the null hypothesis that the hyperbolic discounting parameter  is equal in both 
treatments can also be rejected with high confidence (both p-value = 0.007).  
As detailed in subsection 2.2.4, behavior that is consistent with a magnitude effect may 
actually not be a response to the magnitude of rewards. Instead, it may be the result of rounding 
behavior. Given the theoretical reasons for this argument, rounding cannot plausibly explain the 
difference in discounting behavior between the choices in treatments T0 and T2. The purpose of 
rounding is to lower the cognitive burden of comparing similar amounts. However, only small 
principals result in similar LL amounts, when the annualized interest rates are applied. The large 
principals in treatment T2 lead to dissimilar LL amounts. Comparing SS and LL amounts should, 
therefore, not pose particular difficulties for subjects, and no rounding is needed to simplify the 
task. One can conclude that the increased patience that occurs with higher principals is the result 
of a genuine magnitude effect, as already suggested by the descriptive probit model that 
investigated the marginal effect of SCALE (Figure 19 and Table 5). The presence of a magnitude 
effect has important consequences for the subsequent analysis of the bundling data. One must be 
able to distinguish possible reactions to the magnitude of the principal from responses to multiple 
decision pairs. 
The analysis can now proceed and take all data into consideration. A mixture model, 
assuming the co-existence of exponential and hyperbolic discounting, is applied to the data from 






Table 22: Bundling treatments – Structural Estimation of Mixture Model  
of Exponential and Hyperbolic Discounting  
 
Parameter Point Estimate Standard Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval 
E  0.445 0.033 <0.001 0.381 0.509 
2H  0.555 0.033 <0.001 0.491 0.619 
r 0.665 0.014 <0.001 0.637 0.692 
η 0.913 0.030 <0.001 0.854 0.971 
 0.625 0.026 <0.001 0.574 0.676 
δ 0.246 0.037 <0.001 0.173 0.319 
K 1.624 0.108 <0.001 1.413 1.835 
μ 0.140 0.006 <0.001 0.127 0.152 
ν_E 0.535 0.064 <0.001 0.409 0.662 
ν_H2 0.223 0.016 <0.001 0.192 0.253 
            
 
 
All estimates are statistically highly significant, in the sense of being different from zero. The 
respective estimates of the discounting parameters of the exponential and hyperbolic model,  
and , are 0.25 and 1.62, respectively. These values are comparatively close to the equivalent 
estimates found with only the control data, in panel A of Table 19. The discount rates, implied by 
this estimated value of  are presented in Table 23. 
Table 23: Bundling treatments – Discount Rates for Several Horizons Implied  
by the Hyperbolic Discounting Parameter K 
 
Horizon Point Estimate Standard Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval 
1 day 4.056 0.542 <0.001 2.994 5.119 
2 days 4.038 0.538 <0.001 2.984 5.092 
3 days 4.020 0.534 <0.001 2.974 5.066 
4 days 4.003 0.529 <0.001 2.965 5.040 
5 days 3.985 0.525 <0.001 2.956 5.014 
6 days 3.968 0.521 <0.001 2.946 4.989 
7 days 3.950 0.517 <0.001 2.937 4.964 
2 weeks 3.814 0.486 <0.001 2.863 4.766 
1 month 3.587 0.435 <0.001 2.734 4.440 
2 months 3.210 0.357 <0.001 2.511 3.909 
3 months 2.909 0.299 <0.001 2.322 3.495 
6 months 2.284 0.195 <0.001 1.901 2.666 
1 year  1.624 0.108 <0.001 1.413 1.835 
2 years 1.061 0.052 <0.001 0.959 1.164 
5 years 0.556 0.018 <0.001 0.520 0.592 




The annualized discount rates, implied by the estimate of  range from 406% for a horizon of 1 
day to 56% for horizon of 5 years.  
Of particular interest is the value of  of 0.45 in Table 22. This means that about 45% of 
all choices are consistent with exponential discounting, whereas 55% of the choices are 
consistent with hyperbolic discounting. This probability of exponential discounting is higher in 
all treatments, compared to the 39.5% in the control treatments, which are displayed of Panel A 
of Table 19. This difference suggests some tentative support for the bundling hypothesis. 
However, in order to decide whether the presentation with multiple decisions is truly responsible 
for the observed increase in the probability of exponential discounting, one must examine which 
factors actually affect the mixture parameters.  
The analysis of all data must be extended by including estimating the mixture model of 
exponential and hyperbolic, while controlling for the full set of demographic and treatment 
covariates discussed so far. Of particular interest is the effect of BUNDLED on the probability of 
exponential discounting. A comparison of the probability of exponential discounting in the 




Figure 27: Total Effect of Bundling on the Probability of Exponential Discounting in 
mixture of Exponential and Hyperbolic Discounting 
 
Figure 27 shows that a low probability of exponential discounting is clearly more likely in the 
control treatments than in the bundling treatments. A higher probability of exponential 
discounting becomes more likely in the bundling treatments. This is additional tentative support 
for the bundling hypothesis, but it is still not sufficient. The reason is that Figure 27 illustrates 
the total effect of bundling. In order to evaluate the pure effect of BUNDLED, one must estimate 
the marginal effect, holding all treatment and demographic covariates.  
Table 24 presents the marginal effects of several characteristics of decision makers and 
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Table 24: Bundling treatments – Marginal Effects of Demographic and Treatment 
Covariates on Core Parameters in Mixture Model of Exponential and Hyperbolic  









       
r FEMALE 0.017 0.031 0.590 -0.044 0.077 
 BLACK 0.003 0.031 0.936 -0.059 0.064 
 ASIAN -0.006 0.049 0.900 -0.103 0.091 
 GPAHI -0.005 0.030 0.873 -0.064 0.054 
 BUSINESS -0.024 0.043 0.576 -0.109 0.061 
η FEMALE 0.099 0.071 0.164 -0.040 0.238 
 BLACK -0.098 0.086 0.255 -0.266 0.070 
 ASIAN -0.127 0.097 0.190 -0.316 0.063 
 GPAHI -0.053 0.065 0.411 -0.180 0.074 
 BUSINESS -0.067 0.077 0.387 -0.218 0.084 
 FEMALE -0.044 0.049 0.360 -0.140 0.051 
 BLACK 0.097 0.067 0.152 -0.035 0.229 
 ASIAN 0.161 0.096 0.092 -0.027 0.349 
 GPAHI -0.012 0.053 0.818 -0.116 0.091 
 BUSINESS -0.067 0.066 0.315 -0.197 0.063 
δ BUNDLED 0.165 0.088 0.060 -0.007 0.337 
 FEMALE 0.139 0.090 0.122 -0.037 0.315 
 BLACK -0.022 0.061 0.717 -0.142 0.097 
 ASIAN 0.008 0.075 0.914 -0.140 0.156 
 GPAHI -0.064 0.061 0.296 -0.184 0.056 
 BUSINESS 0.009 0.040 0.825 -0.069 0.087 
K BUNDLED 0.322 0.156 0.038 0.017 0.627 
 FEMALE -0.030 0.197 0.879 -0.416 0.356 
 BLACK 0.017 0.214 0.938 -0.403 0.436 
 ASIAN -0.095 0.298 0.749 -0.679 0.489 
 GPAHI -0.120 0.179 0.502 -0.471 0.231 
 BUSINESS 0.014 0.213 0.947 -0.404 0.432 
E  BUNDLED 0.307 0.130 0.019 0.051 0.562 
 FEMALE -0.014 0.090 0.875 -0.191 0.163 
 BLACK -0.075 0.092 0.419 -0.255 0.106 
 ASIAN 0.211 0.161 0.189 -0.104 0.526 
 GPAHI -0.045 0.087 0.606 -0.214 0.125 
 BUSINESS 0.121 0.087 0.163 -0.049 0.291 
 FED 0.006 0.003 0.071 -0.001 0.013 
 SCALE 0.080 0.054 0.135 -0.025 0.185 
 FORCED -0.330 0.084 <0.001 -0.494 -0.166 
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 SECOND  -0.235 0.092 0.011 -0.416 -0.054 
 THIRD -0.368 0.137 0.007 -0.637 -0.099 
 $10.00 -0.453 0.163 0.005 -0.774 -0.133 
 $30.00 -0.392 0.125 0.002 -0.636 -0.147 
 $60.00 -0.279 0.076 <0.001 -0.428 -0.129 
 $100.00 -0.302 0.082 <0.001 -0.464 -0.141 
              
 
Most importantly, the results indicate a positive marginal effect of BUNDLED on the 
probability of exponential discounting. Table 24 shows a 31 percentage point increase in the 
choices that are consistent with exponential discounting, compared to the choices that are better 
characterized by hyperbolic discounting, as the effect of introducing bundling treatments. The 
effect is statistically significant in the sense of being different from zero (p-value = 0.02). This is 
strong support for the reward bundling hypothesis.  
Lower positive effects of BUNDLED on discounting parameters  and  are also found. 
However, only the effect of BUNDLED on  is statistically different from zero at the 5 percent 
level. A test of the joint hypothesis that the effect of BUNDLED on the parameters, , and  is 
zero can be rejected with high confidence (p-value =0.005).18 The lack of individually significant 
effects of the demographic characteristics on the core parameters is confirmed when all data are 
considered. 
Somewhat surprising is the finding of a negative effect of FORCED on the probability of 
exponential discounting. Table 24 shows that FORCED decreases the probability of exponential 
discounting by 33 percentage points, an effect that is significantly different from zero. The 
constraint, imposed by the first decision on the remaining decisions in treatments T5 and T7, 
                                               
18 These key results essentially hold when a mixture of exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting is used instead. 
In this case, BUNDLED increases the probability of choices consistent with exponential discounting by 30 
percentage points. This strong marginal effect is significantly different from zero (two-sided p-value = 0.019). The 
joint significance of BUNDLED on parameters, , , , and  is also significantly different from zero at the 5 
percent level of significance (p-value = 0.048). 
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could function as a pre-commitment device to support impulse control. In this case, one would 
expect that FORCED increases the probability of exponential discounting. However, the actual 
result lends additional support to the notion that the increase in the fraction of exponential 
choices, resulting from the inclusion of bundling treatments, is indeed the consequence of reward 
bundling. Reward bundling in human subjects is a psychological process prompted by the 
presentation of each decision as part of a series of comparable decisions. If reward bundling is 
truly responsible for the increase in choices that are consistent with exponential discounting, then 
one would expect this increase to occur in all tasks with multiple decisions. This is indeed 
exactly what the data reveal. A possible separate effect from pre-commitment due to an 
experimentally induced constraint of the FORCED condition must not be confused with the 
genuine bundling effect. 
No statistically significant effect of SCALE on the mixture parameter  is found. This is 
additional support for reward bundling, since it rules out that the observed increase in 
exponential discounting is merely the result of the bundling treatments multiplying the payouts. 
The negative effects of SECOND and THIRD, on the other hand, are significantly different from 
zero. This is consistent with the finding from the descriptive probit models that the positive 
effect of including the bundling treatments is limited to the first choices.  
Strong magnitude effects from the value of the principal on the mixture parameter  are 
found. They indicate that the probability of exponential discounting decreases when the highest 







Reward bundling has long been recognized as a possible process behind impulse control. 
Choice patterns consistent with this hypothesis have repeatedly been found with animal subjects 
(Anslie 1974, 1975; Ainslie & Monterosso 2003). However, no attempt has been made to test for 
the bundling phenomenon with human subjects, in a way that satisfies the methodological 
standards of experimental economics.  
The experiment reported in this chapter closes this gap. It presented undergraduate 
subjects with a series of experimental treatments. Each treatment condition varied important 
aspects of the choice task which might affect the patience that subjects display when choosing 
between time dated rewards. This procedure allowed the identification of subjects discounting 
behavior and controlling for several factors, other than the number of decisions, which affect 
their observable choices.   
The resulting data are analyzed using descriptive and structural econometric procedures 
which are well-established in the binary choice literature. Descriptive models include local 
polynomial regression and probit models which relate the tendency to display more patient 
choice behavior to several task characteristics. The key aspect of the decision situation is the 
presence of the bundling condition, where each individual decision is presented as part of a series 
of comparable decisions with different payout dates. The emphasis of the econometric 
investigation is placed on a comprehensive structural analysis.   
Full-information maximum likelihood estimation is employed to estimate several 
common functional forms that have emerged from the literature on discounting behavior 
(Andersen et.al 2014). Recent findings that inferred discount rates are highly sensitive to the 
curvature of the utility functions and must, therefore, be jointly estimated with risk attitudes are 
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taken into consideration (Anderson et.al. 2008). The analysis does, once again, confirm this 
sensitivity and the importance of joint estimation for an accurate assessment of discount rates.  
A restrictive declaration that one and only one discounting model outperforms all 
competing accounts is usually an oversimplification, which may not do justice to the complexity 
of human decision making. Finite mixture models can provide valuable insights into what 
aspects of the choice situation affect the relative support of one theory over another. In the 
present context they allow evaluating when more patient and deliberate choice behavior, 
exemplified by exponential discounting, becomes more likely than impulsive behavior, described 
by a hyperbolic discounting specification. This analytical framework offers a natural way to test 
whether the subjects’ behavior is consistent with reward bundling. 
The results offer strong support for the reward bundling hypothesis. Descriptive and 
structural methods alike find that the tendency to exhibit more patient choice behavior increases 
drastically when each decision is presented as part of a series of time dated decisions. Other 
factors that may explain this observation, such as scale effects or imposing “forced” links of 
individual decisions, are carefully controlled for. 
The presence of a significant magnitude effect is found in the data. This result is 
noteworthy, given that the findings of magnitude effects that are frequently asserted in the 
literature, can often be explained by rounding operations that subjects may employ to ease the 
cognitive burden of the choice task. The magnitude effect found in the present data is robust to 
this objection, since the high principals employed do not result in later amounts that are very 
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A. Instructions: Treatment T0 
B_T0 
 
Sooner versus Later Payments 
 
In this task you will make a number of choices between receiving an amount of money on a 
“sooner” date or a different amount of money on a “later” date.  The sooner date will always be 
today, while the later date will be some weeks from today. An example of a decision screen is shown 
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This screen shows seven decisions.  Each decision is presented on a different row.  All 
decisions have the same format. For the purpose of explaining this task, assume for the moment 
that today is January 1, 2012. In the calendar, today’s date is enclosed in a black circle. Let’s look at 
the first decision in the example above (the one on the first decision row).  The sooner choice pays 
$100 today, January 1, 2012 in the example, and the later choice pays $109.59 in twenty-eight days 
from today.  You choose between these two options by clicking the button under the option you 
prefer. 
 
We will present you with ten of these decision screens, with each screen having seven 
choices for you to make.  You must make all seven choices on each decision screen before moving 
to the next decision screen.  While on a single decision screen, the only difference between decisions 
is that the dollar amounts of the future payment will change.  However, different decision screens 
will have different dollar amounts and future payment dates. So, you should make sure to pay 
attention to both the changing dollar amounts and changing dates as you make your decisions. 
 
After you have worked through all of the decisions, we will select one of your ten decision 
screens by rolling a 10-sided die. Then we will roll a 10-sided die again, until a number between 1 
and 7 comes up, to pick one decision row on that screen. When you make your choices you will not 
know which decision will be selected for payment. You should therefore treat each decision as if it 
might actually count for payment. 
 
Once the decision screen and row are selected, we will look at the specific choice you made 
and the payout for that choice. If the payout is smaller (less than $100), you will actually be paid this 
amount. However, if the payout is larger ($100 or greater), you will roll a 10-sided die to determine 
whether or not you are actually paid this amount. If you roll a 1, you will actually be paid the 
amount, and on the date that you chose to receive it. If you roll a number other than 1, you will earn 
nothing in this task. This roll will be at the end of the experiment, and in private, when you are being 
paid. 
 
For instance, suppose the decision screen in the above example was selected and you 
preferred the sooner date in the first four rows and the later date in the last three rows, as shown 
above.  You would then roll a 10-sided die, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, to select the 
row. Suppose the outcome was 5 and the fifth row is selected, where you preferred a payment of 
$123.01 in twenty-eight days. Since this payment is $100 or greater, you would roll the 10-sided die 
again, at the end of the experiment. If the outcome of your die-roll is 1, you will be paid $123.01 in 
twenty-eight days. However, if the outcome is 3, or anything other than 1, you will get nothing. 
 
You will receive the money on the date stated in your preferred option. We will pay you 
using PayPal, which is an online payment service. We will explain more about PayPal in a few 
minutes. If you receive some money to be paid in the future you will also receive a written 
confirmation from Professor Harrison which guarantees that the money is to be paid to you on that 
date. 
 
 The money you receive from these choices is in addition to the show-up fee of $5, which is 









Sooner versus Later Payments 
 
In this task you will make a number of choices between receiving an amount of money on a 
“sooner” date or a different amount of money on a “later” date.  The sooner date will always be 
tomorrow, while the later date will be some weeks from today. An example of a decision screen is 
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This screen shows seven decisions.  Each decision is presented on a different row.  All 
decisions have the same format. For the purpose of explaining this task, assume for the moment 
that today is January 1, 2012. In the calendar, today’s date is enclosed in a black circle. Let’s look at 
the first decision in the example above (the one on the first decision row).  The sooner choice pays 
$100 tomorrow, January 2, 2012 in the example, and the later choice pays $109.59 in twenty-nine 
days from today. You choose between these two options by clicking the button under the option 
you prefer. 
 
We will present you with ten of these decision screens, with each screen having seven 
choices for you to make.  You must make all seven choices on each decision screen before moving 
to the next decision screen.  While on a single decision screen, the only difference between decisions 
is that the dollar amounts of the future payment will change.  However, different decision screens 
will have different dollar amounts and future payment dates. So, you should make sure to pay 
attention to both the changing dollar amounts and changing dates as you make your decisions. 
 
After you have worked through all of the decisions, we will select one of your ten decision 
screens by rolling a 10-sided die. Then we will roll a 10-sided die again, until a number between 1 
and 7 comes up, to pick one decision row on that screen. When you make your choices you will not 
know which decision will be selected for payment. You should therefore treat each decision as if it 
might actually count for payment. 
 
Once the decision screen and row are selected, we will look at the specific choice you made 
and the payout for that choice. If the payout is smaller (less than $100), you will actually be paid this 
amount. However, if the payout is larger ($100 or greater), you will roll a 10-sided die to determine 
whether or not you are actually paid this amount. If you roll a 1, you will actually be paid the 
amount, and on the date that you chose to receive it. If you roll a number other than 1, you will earn 
nothing in this task. This roll will be at the end of the experiment, and in private, when you are being 
paid. 
 
For instance, suppose the decision screen in the above example was selected and you 
preferred the sooner date in the first four rows and the later date in the last three rows, as shown 
above.  You would then roll a 10-sided die, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, to select the 
row. Suppose the outcome was 5 and the fifth row is selected, where you preferred a payment of 
$123.01 in twenty-nine days. Since this payment is $100 or greater, you would roll the 10-sided die 
again, at the end of the experiment. If the outcome of your die-roll is 1, you will be paid $123.01 in 
twenty-nine days. However, if the outcome is 3, or anything other than 1, you will get nothing. 
 
You will receive the money on the date stated in your preferred option. We will pay you 
using PayPal, which is an online payment service. We will explain more about PayPal in a few 
minutes. If you receive some money to be paid in the future you will also receive a written 
confirmation from Professor Harrison which guarantees that the money is to be paid to you on that 
date. 
 
 The money you receive from these choices is in addition to the show-up fee of $5, which is 









Sooner versus Later Payments 
 
In this task you will make a number of choices between receiving an amount of money on a 
“sooner” date or a different amount of money on a “later” date.  The sooner date will always be 
today, while the later date will be some weeks from today. An example of a decision screen is shown 
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This screen shows seven decisions.  Each decision is presented on a different row.  All 
decisions have the same format. For the purpose of explaining this task, assume for the moment 
that today is January 1, 2012. In the calendar, today’s date is enclosed in a black circle. Let’s look at 
the first decision in the example above (the one on the first decision row).  The sooner choice pays 
$300 today, January 1, 2012 in the example, and the later choice pays $328.77 in twenty-eight days 
from today.  You choose between these two options by clicking the button under the option you 
prefer. 
 
We will present you with ten of these decision screens, with each screen having seven 
choices for you to make.  You must make all seven choices on each decision screen before moving 
to the next decision screen.  While on a single decision screen, the only difference between decisions 
is that the dollar amounts of the future payment will change.  However, different decision screens 
will have different dollar amounts and future payment dates. So, you should make sure to pay 
attention to both the changing dollar amounts and changing dates as you make your decisions. 
 
After you have worked through all of the decisions, we will select one of your ten decision 
screens by rolling a 10-sided die. Then we will roll a 10-sided die again, until a number between 1 
and 7 comes up, to pick one decision row on that screen. When you make your choices you will not 
know which decision will be selected for payment. You should therefore treat each decision as if it 
might actually count for payment. 
 
Once the decision screen and row are selected, we will look at the specific choice you made 
and the payout for that choice. If the payout is smaller (less than $300), you will actually be paid this 
amount. However, if the payout is larger ($300 or greater), you will roll a 10-sided die to determine 
whether or not you are actually paid this amount. If you roll a 1, you will actually be paid the 
amount, and on the date that you chose to receive it. If you roll a number other than 1, you will earn 
nothing in this task. This roll will be at the end of the experiment, and in private, when you are being 
paid. 
 
For instance, suppose the decision screen in the above example was selected and you 
preferred the sooner date in the first four rows and the later date in the last three rows, as shown 
above.  You would then roll a 10-sided die, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, to select the 
row. Suppose the outcome was 5 and the fifth row is selected, where you preferred a payment of 
$369.04 in twenty-eight days. Since this payment is $300 or greater, you would roll the 10-sided die 
again, at the end of the experiment. If the outcome of your die-roll is 1, you will be paid $369.04 in 
twenty-eight days. However, if the outcome is 3, or anything other than 1, you will get nothing. 
 
You will receive the money on the date stated in your preferred option. We will pay you 
using PayPal, which is an online payment service. We will explain more about PayPal in a few 
minutes. If you receive some money to be paid in the future you will also receive a written 
confirmation from Professor Harrison which guarantees that the money is to be paid to you on that 
date. 
 
 The money you receive from these choices is in addition to the show-up fee of $5, which is 









Sooner versus Later Payments 
 
In this task you will make a number of choices between receiving an amount of money on a 
“sooner” date or a different amount of money on a “later” date.  The sooner date will be some 
weeks from today, while the later date will be even more weeks from today. An example of a 
decision screen is shown below. The dates and amounts in your task will differ. You will make all 


























This screen shows seven decisions.  Each decision is presented on a different row.  All 
decisions have the same format. For the purpose of explaining this task, assume for the moment 
that today is January 1, 2012. In the calendar, today’s date is enclosed in a black circle. Let’s look at 
the first decision in the example above (the one on the first decision row).  The sooner choice pays 
$100 in thirty-five days from today, where “today” is January 1, 2012 in the example, and the later 
choice pays $109.59 in sixty-three days from today.  You choose between these two options by 
clicking the button under the option you prefer. 
 
We will present you with ten of these decision screens, with each screen having seven 
choices for you to make.  You must make all seven choices on each decision screen before moving 
to the next decision screen.  While on a single decision screen, the only difference between decisions 
is that the dollar amounts of the future payment will change.  However, different decision screens 
will have different dollar amounts and future payment dates. So, you should make sure to pay 
attention to both the changing dollar amounts and changing dates as you make your decisions. 
 
After you have worked through all of the decisions, we will select one of your ten decision 
screens by rolling a 10-sided die. Then we will roll a 10-sided die again, until a number between 1 
and 7 comes up, to pick one decision row on that screen. When you make your choices you will not 
know which decision will be selected for payment. You should therefore treat each decision as if it 
might actually count for payment. 
 
Once the decision screen and row are selected, we will look at the specific choice you made 
and the payout for that choice. If the payout is smaller (less than $100), you will actually be paid this 
amount. However, if the payout is larger ($100 or greater), you will roll a 10-sided die to determine 
whether or not you are actually paid this amount. If you roll a 1, you will actually be paid the 
amount, and on the date that you chose to receive it. If you roll a number other than 1, you will earn 
nothing in this task. This roll will be at the end of the experiment, and in private, when you are being 
paid. 
 
For instance, suppose the decision screen in the above example was selected and you 
preferred the sooner date in the first four rows and the later date in the last three rows, as shown 
above.  You would then roll a 10-sided die, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, to select the 
row. Suppose the outcome was 5 and the fifth row is selected, where you preferred a payment of 
$123.01 in sixty-three days. Since this payment is $100 or greater, you would roll the 10-sided die 
again, at the end of the experiment. If the outcome of your die-roll is 1, you will be paid $123.01 in 
sixty-three days. However, if the outcome is 3, or anything other than 1, you will get nothing. 
 
You will receive the money on the date stated in your preferred option. We will pay you 
using PayPal, which is an online payment service. We will explain more about PayPal in a few 
minutes. If you receive some money to be paid in the future you will also receive a written 
confirmation from Professor Harrison which guarantees that the money is to be paid to you on that 
date. 
 
 The money you receive from these choices is in addition to the show-up fee of $5, which is 









Sooner versus Later Payments 
 
In this task you will make a number of choices between receiving an amount of money on a 
“sooner” date or a different amount of money on a “later” date.  You will be presented with a series 
of decision pairs arranged in seven rows per decision screen. Each decision consists of a smaller 
amount that will be paid sooner and a larger amount that will be paid at a later date. The two pairs in 
a row involve the same amounts but different dates. An example of a decision screen is shown 






















,I . . I I .. I 
Sun Mon Tue \'led Thu Fri Sat Sun Mon Tue \'led Thu Fri Sat Sun Mc.n Tue \'led Thu Fri Sat Sun Mon Tue \'led Thu Fri Sat 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 
])] 2 3 4 5 6 7 • 6 7 8 9 10 11 • 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 26 27 28 29 25 25 27 28 29 30 31 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
]!] 30 31 29 30 
Sunday. Jaruary 01. 2012 Sunday. January 29. 2012 
(Today) (28 days f....., today) 
~00.00 OR $10 9.59 in 28 days AND OR 
[ Select J I Select I 
~.00 OR $m .51 in 28 days AND OR 
[ Select J I Select I 
100.00~ OR $113.42 in 28 days AND OR I SelectJ I Select I 
ti~.OOj~ OR $115.34 in 28 day~ AND OR iSeleet] I Select I 
$ 100.00 today 
OR ~W . Dli!!. 28 AND $100.00 in 35 days OR I Select I I Select J I Select I 
$ 100.00 today 
OR rsijijr~~~ AND $100.00 in 35 days OR I Select J I Select I 
$ 100.00 today 
OR ~a(U!l.~m AND $100.00 in 35 days OR I Select I I Select J I Select I 
I Conf irm I I Cancel I 
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This screen shows seven pairs of independent decisions.  Each decision pair is presented on 
a different row.  All decision pairs have the same format. For the purpose of explaining this task, 
assume for the moment that today is January 1, 2012.  In the calendar, today’s date is enclosed in a 
black circle. Let’s look at the first decision pair in the example above (the one on the first decision 
row).  In the first decision, the sooner choice pays $100 today, January 1, 2012 in the example, and 
the later choice pays $109.59 in twenty-eight days from today.  The second decision in this row 
offers the choice between $100 in thirty-five days or $109.59 in sixty-three days from today.  
 
If you choose the sooner option for one decision in a pair, you are free to choose the sooner 
or later option for the other decision in that pair. And if you choose the later option for one 
decision in a pair, you are free to choose the sooner or later option for the other decision in that 
pair. In other words, it is possible to choose the sooner option in one decision and the later option 
in the other decision of the same pair, to choose the later option in one decision and the sooner 
option the other decision of the same pair, or to choose the same option in each decision of the 
same pair. You choose by clicking the button under the alternative you prefer. 
 
The above screen example shows a situation in which someone chose the same options in 

















We will present you with ten of these decision screens, with each screen displaying seven 
decision pairs and fourteen choices for you to make.  You must make all fourteen choices on each 
decision screen before moving to the next decision screen.  While on a single decision screen, the 
only difference between decision pairs is that the dollar amounts of the future payment will change. 
However, pairs on different decision screens will have different dollar amounts and future payment 
dates.  So, you should make sure to pay attention to both the changing dollar amounts and changing 
dates as you make your decisions. 
 
After you have worked through all of the decisions, we will select one of your ten decision 
screens by rolling a 10-sided die. Then we will roll a 10-sided die again, until a number between 1 
and 7 comes up, to pick one decision row on that screen. This means you will be paid for both 
choices that you made in that pair. When you make your choices you will not know which decision 
pair will be selected for payment. You should therefore treat each decision as if it might actually 
count for payment. 
 
Once the decision screen and row are selected, we will look at the specific choices you made 
and the payouts for those choices. If the individual payouts in the selected decision row are smaller 
(less than $100), you will actually be paid both amounts. However, if the individual payouts in the 
selected decision row are larger ($100 or greater), you will roll a 10-sided die to determine whether 
or not you are actually paid these amounts. If you roll a 1, you will actually be paid the amounts, and 
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on the dates that you chose to receive them. If you roll a number other than 1, you will earn nothing 
in this task. This roll will be at the end of the experiment, and in private, when you are being paid. 
 
For instance, suppose the decision screen in the first screen example was selected and you 
preferred the sooner date in the first four rows and the later date in the last three rows, as shown 
above.  You would then roll a 10-sided die, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, to select the 
row. Suppose the outcome was 5 and the fifth row is selected. In this row you preferred a payment 
of $123.01 in twenty-eight days in the first decision and $123.01 in sixty-three days in the second 
decision. Since this payment is $100 or greater, you would roll the 10-sided die again, at the end of 
the experiment. If the outcome of your die-roll is 1, you will be paid $123.01 in twenty-eight days 
and another $123.01 in sixty-three days. However, if the outcome is 3, or anything other than 1, you 
will get nothing. 
 
You will receive the money on the date stated in your preferred option. We will pay you 
using PayPal, which is an online payment service. We will explain more about PayPal in a few 
minutes. If you receive some money to be paid in the future you will also receive a written 
confirmation from Professor Harrison which guarantees that the money is to be paid to you on that 
date. 
 
 The money you receive from these choices is in addition to the show-up fee of $5, which is 

















F. Instructions: Treatment T5 
B_T5 
Sooner versus Later Payments 
 
In this task you will make a number of choices between receiving an amount of money on a 
“sooner” date or a different amount of money on a “later” date.  You will be presented with a 
series of decision pairs arranged in seven rows per decision screen. Each decision consists of a 
smaller amount that will be paid sooner and a larger amount that will be paid at a later date. The 
two pairs in a row involve the same amounts but different dates. An example of a decision 
screen is shown below. The dates and amounts in your task will differ. You will make all 
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Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun Mon Tue \<Jed Thu Fri Sat Sun Mon Tue \<Jed Thu Fri Sat Sun Mon Tue \<Jed Thu Fri Sat 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 
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]!] 30 31 29 30 
Sunday. Janmry 01. 2012 Sunday. Janmry 29. 2012 
(Today) (28 days from today) 
[l!OO.OOt 
OR 
$109.59 in 28 days AND OR I Select I I Select I 
(UOO.OOt 
OR 
$111.51 in 28 days AND OR I Select I I Select I 
~OO.OOt OR $113.42 in 28 days AND OR I Select I I Select I 
ii!OO ] OR $115.34 in 28 days AND OR I Select J I Select I 
$100.00 today 
OR ~I jlt.ZS.Jipy~ AND $100.00 in 35 days OR I Select I I Select J I Select J 
$100.00 today 
OR r.sut(i!i:~s AND $100.00 in 35 days OR I Select I I Select J I Select J 
$100.00 today 
OR (f.138.~Jli:~§)ml AND $100.00 in 35 days OR I Select I I Select J I Select J 
I Confirm I I Cancel I 
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This screen shows seven pairs of tied-together decisions. Each decision pair is presented on a 
different row.  All decision pairs have the same format. For the purpose of explaining this task, 
assume for the moment that today is January 1, 2012. In the calendar, today’s date is enclosed in 
a black circle. Let’s look at the first decision pair in the example above (the one on the first 
decision row).  The first sooner choice pays $100 today, January 1, 2012 in the example, and the 
first later choice pays $109.59 in twenty-eight days from today.  The second sooner choice pays 
$100 in thirty-five days from today and the second later choice pays $109.59 in sixty-three days 
from today.  
 
If you choose the sooner option for one decision in a pair, you are also choosing the sooner 
option for the other decision in that pair. In other words, it is not possible to choose the sooner 
option in one decision and the later option in the other decision of the same pair. If you select 
the sooner options in one pair, you are free to select the later options in any other pair. You 
choose by clicking the button under the alternative you prefer. 
 
We will present you with ten of these decision screens, with each screen displaying seven choices 
for you to make. You must make all seven choices on each decision screen before moving to the 
next decision screen. While on a single decision screen, the only difference between decision 
pairs is that the dollar amounts of the future payment will change.  However, pairs on different 
decision screens will have different dollar amounts and future payment dates.  So, you should 
make sure to pay attention to both the changing dollar amounts and changing dates as you make 
your decisions. 
 
After you have worked through all of the decisions, we will select one of your ten decision 
screens by rolling a 10-sided die. Then we will roll a 10-sided die again, until a number between 1 
and 7 comes up, to pick one decision row on that screen. This means you will be paid for both of 
the choices in that pair, which you made at the same time.  When you make your choices you will not 
know which decision pair will be selected for payment. You should therefore treat each decision 
as if it might actually count for payment. 
 
Once the decision screen and row are selected, we will look at the specific choice you made and 
the resulting payouts. If the individual payouts in the selected decision row are smaller (less than 
$100), you will actually be paid both amounts. However, if the individual payouts in the selected 
decision row are larger ($100 or greater), you will roll a 10-sided die to determine whether or not 
you are actually paid these amounts. If you roll a 1, you will actually be paid the amounts, and on 
the dates that you chose to receive them. If you roll a number other than 1, you will earn 
nothing in this task. This roll will be at the end of the experiment, and in private, when you are 
being paid. 
 
For instance, suppose the decision screen in the above example was selected and you preferred 
the sooner date in the first four rows and the later date in the last three rows, as shown above.  
You would then roll a 10-sided die, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, to select the row. 
Suppose the outcome was 5 and the fifth row is selected. In this row you preferred a payment of 
$123.01 in twenty-eight days in the first decision and, consequently, $123.01 in sixty-three days 
in the second decision.  Since this payment is $100 or greater, you would roll the 10-sided die 
again, at the end of the experiment. If the outcome of your die-roll is 1, you will be paid $123.01 
in twenty-eight days and another $123.01 in sixty-three days. However, if the outcome is 3, or 





You will receive the money on the date stated in your preferred option. We will pay you using 
PayPal, which is an online payment service. We will explain more about PayPal in a few minutes. 
If you receive some money to be paid in the future you will also receive a written confirmation 
from Professor Harrison which guarantees that the money is to be paid to you on that date. 
 
 The money you receive from these choices is in addition to the show-up fee of $5, which is 






















G. Instructions: Treatment T6 
B_T6 
 
Sooner versus Later Payments 
 
In this task you will make a number of choices between receiving an amount of money on a 
“sooner” date or a different amount of money on a “later” date.  You will be presented with a 
series of decision triples arranged in seven rows per decision screen. Each decision consists of a 
smaller amount that will be paid sooner and a larger amount that will be paid at a later date. The 
three triples in a row involve the same amounts but different dates. An example of a decision 
screen is shown below. The dates and amounts in your task will differ. You will make all 































,I r, .' , I I . ' I 
Sun Mon Tue \•led Thu Fri Sat Sun Mon Tc'e Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun Mon Tc'e Wed Thu Fri Sat 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 
:01 2 3 4 5 6 7 • 6 7 8 9 10 11 • 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 26 27 28 29 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
J[l 30 31 29 30 
Sunday. J......,.. 29. Z012 Sunday. March ll. 2012 Sunday. April 08. 2012 
(28 days from loday) (70 days from loday) (98 days from loday) 
$109.59 in 28 days 
I s.lect I [Selut ) 
$ 100.00 in 70days 
I Select ] OR 
$109.59 in 98days 
I s.1ect I 
OR 
$111.51 in 28 days ANI> $llL51 in63 days $ 100.00 in 70 days OR 
$1ll.51 in98days 
I s.lect I I s.lect J 1 Select 1 ( Select J I s.lect I 
$1!3.42 in 28 days 
I Sel«t I [Selut ) 
$ ll3.42 in 63 days 
1 Select I 
$ 100.00 in 70days 
( Select ] 
OR 
$ll3A2 in98days 
I s.1ect 1 
$115.34 in 28 days ANI> $ll5.34 in63 days $100.00 in 70days OR 
$115.34 in 98 days 
I s.lect I I Select ] 1 Select 1 I Seled ] I s.1 ... -1 I 
$ 100.00 today 
1 Select 1 
Jl123.01 in 28 
( Select ) 
ANI> $100.00 in 35days 
1 Select 1 
OR I Select ] 
ANI> $ 100.00 in 70days 
1 Select 1 
$ 100.00 1oday [~13Q.68 in 28 ANI> $100.00 in 35days $ 100.00 in 70days OR $ 130.68 in 98 dc!Ys 1 s.lect 1 I s.~ect J 1 Select 1 I s.lect I 1 Select 1 I s.t..t I 
$100.00 today 
1 Select 1 
Jl138.36 in ~day 
( Select ) 
ANI> $100.00 in 35 days 
1 Select 1 
OR I Select ] 
ANI> $100.00 in 70days 
1 Select 1 
$ 138.36 in 98days 
I s.t..t J 
I Coofirm I I c.mc.l I 
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This screen shows seven triples of independent decisions.  Each decision triple is presented on a 
different row.  All decision triples have the same format. For the purpose of explaining this task, 
assume for the moment that today is January 1, 2012. In the calendar, today’s date is enclosed in 
a black circle. Let’s look at the first decision triple in the example above (the one on the first 
decision row).  In the first decision, the sooner choice pays $100 today, January 1, 2012 in the 
example, and the later choice pays $109.59 in twenty-eight days from today.  The second 
decision in this row offers the choice between $100 in thirty-five days or $109.59 in sixty-three 
days from today. The third decision in this row offers the choice between $100 in seventy days 
or $109.59 in ninety-eight days from today.  
 
We will present you with ten of these decision screens, with each screen displaying seven 
decision triples and twenty-one choices for you to make. You must make all twenty-one choices 
on each decision screen before moving to the next decision screen.  While on a single decision 
screen, the only difference between decision triples is that the dollar amounts of the future 
payment will change. However, triples on different decision screens will have different dollar 
amounts and future payment dates.  So, you should make sure to pay attention to both the 
changing dollar amounts and changing dates as you make your decisions. 
 
If you choose the sooner option for one decision in a triple, you are free to choose the sooner or 
later option for the other two decisions in that triple. And if you choose the later option for one 
decision in a triple, you are free to choose the sooner or later option for the other two decisions 
in that triple. In other words, it is possible to choose the sooner option in one decision and the 
later option in any of the other two decisions of the same triple, to choose the later option in 
one decision and the sooner option in any of the other two decisions of the same triple, or to 
choose the same option in each decision of the same triple. You choose by clicking the button 
under the alternative you prefer. 
 
The above screen example shows a situation in which someone chose the same options in each 











After you have worked through all of the decisions, we will select one of your ten decision 
screens by rolling a 10-sided die. Then we will roll a 10-sided die again, until a number between 1 
and 7 comes up, to pick one decision row on that screen. This means you will be paid for all 
three choices that you made in that triple. When you make your choices you will not know 
which decision triple will be selected for payment. You should therefore treat each decision as if 




Once the decision screen and row are selected, we will look at the specific choices you made and 
the payouts for those choices. If the individual payouts in the selected decision row are smaller 
(less than $100), you will actually be paid all three amounts. However, if the individual payouts in 
the selected decision row are larger ($100 or greater), you will roll a 10-sided die to determine 
whether or not you are actually paid these amounts. If you roll a 1, you will actually be paid the 
amounts, and on the dates that you chose to receive them. If you roll a number other than 1, 
you will earn nothing in this task. This roll will be at the end of the experiment, and in private, 
when you are being paid. 
 
For instance, suppose the decision screen in the first screen example was selected and you 
preferred the sooner date in the first four rows and the later date in the last three rows, as shown 
above.  You would then roll a 10-sided die, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, to select 
the row. Suppose the outcome was 5 and the fifth row is selected. In this row you preferred a 
payment of $123.01 in twenty-eight days in the first decision, $123.01 in sixty-three days in the 
second decision, and $123.01 in ninety-eight days in the third decision. Since this payment is 
$100 or greater, you would roll the 10-sided die again, at the end of the experiment. If the 
outcome of your die-roll is 1, you will be paid $123.01 in twenty-eight days, $123.01 in sixty-
three days, and another $123.01. However, if the outcome is 3, or anything other than 1, you will 
get nothing. 
 
You will receive the money on the date stated in your preferred option. We will pay you using 
PayPal, which is an online payment service. We will explain more about PayPal in a few minutes. 
If you receive some money to be paid in the future you will also receive a written confirmation 
from Professor Harrison which guarantees that the money is to be paid to you on that date. 
 
 The money you receive from these choices is in addition to the show-up fee of $5, which is 












H. Instructions: Treatment T7 
B_T7 
 
Sooner versus Later Payments 
 
In this task you will make a number of choices between receiving an amount of money on a 
“sooner” date or a different amount of money on a “later” date.  You will be presented with a 
series of decision triples arranged in seven rows per decision screen. Each decision consists of a 
smaller amount that will be paid sooner and a larger amount that will be paid at a later date. The 
three triples in a row involve the same amounts but different dates. An example of a decision 
screen is shown below. The dates and amounts in your task will differ. You will make all 
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I][) 30 31 29 30 
Sunday. J...-y 01. 2012 Sunday. More~ ll, 2012 Sunday. April 08, 2012 
(Today) (70 days from today) (98 days from today) 
t~lOO.OOiiidiiYI OR $ 109.59 in 28days ANI> ·~ 
$ 109.59 in63 days ANI> $ 100.00 in 70 days OR 
$ 109.59 in98 days 
I Select ] 1 Select 1 I Select l I Select I I Scl•d I 1 s.1ect 1 
w.ooiiJiiil OR $ l!L51 in 28days ANt> ·~ $ l!L51 in 63 days AN1> OR $ 111.51 in98days 
I Select I 1 s.lect 1 ( s..tect l I S.led I 1 s.lect 1 
~~lOO.OOiiidiiYI OR $ 113.42 in 28 days ANI> ·~ 
$ ll3A2 in63 days ANI> $ 100.00 in 70 days OR 
$ 113.42 in 98 days 
I Select ] 1 s.lect 1 I Select l 1 s.lect 1 ( Select ) 1 s.1ect 1 
OR 
$ 115.34 in 28 days ANt> ·~ 
$ ll5.34 in63 days AN1> $ 100.00 in 70 days OR 
$ 115.34 in98 days 
1 s.lect 1 ( s..tect l I S.led I I s.~ect I 1 s.lect 1 
$ 100.00 today 
OR 
(f123.01Jn 28diiYS ANI> $100.00 in 35 days ·~ ANI> 
$ 100.00 in 70days 
OR 
1 s.lect I I s.1.d I I s.lect I [ Select J 1 s.lect 1 
$ 100.00 today 
OR 
($130.68 in 28 ANt> $ 100.00 in35days ·~ AN1> $ 100.00 in 70days OR $ 130.68 in 98 days 
1 s.1ect 1 I s.~ect I I S.led I [ Select I 1 s.lect 1 I Select I 
$ 100.00 today 
OR 
[1138.36 in 2§ ANI> $100.00 in 35 days ·~ ANI> 
$ 100.00 in 70days 
OR 
$ 138.36 in98days 
1 s.lect I I s.1.d I I s.lect I [ Select J 1 s.1ect 1 I s.1ect I 
I Confirm I I C4ncel I 
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This screen shows seven triples of tied-together decisions.  Each decision triple is presented on a 
different row.  All decision triples have the same format. For the purpose of explaining this task, 
assume for the moment that today is January 1, 2012. In the calendar, today’s date is enclosed in 
a black circle. Let’s look at the first decision triple in the example above (the one on the first 
decision row).  In the first decision, the sooner choice pays $100 today, January 1, 2012 in the 
example, and the later choice pays $109.59 in twenty-eight days from today.  The second 
decision in this row offers the choice between $100 in thirty-five days or $109.59 in sixty-three 
days from today. The third decision in this row offers the choice between $100 in seventy days 
or $109.59 in ninety-eight days from today.  
 
If you choose the sooner option for one decision in a triple, you are also choosing the sooner 
option for the other two decisions in that triple. In other words, it is not possible to choose the 
sooner option in one decision and the later option in the other decisions of the same triple. If 
you select the sooner options in one triple, you are free to select the later options in any other 
triple. You choose by clicking the button under the alternative you prefer. 
 
We will present you with ten of these decision screens, with each screen displaying seven choices 
for you to make. You must make all seven choices on each decision screen before moving to the 
next decision screen. While on a single decision screen, the only difference between decision 
triples is that the dollar amounts of the future payment will change.  However, triples on 
different decision screens will have different dollar amounts and future payment dates.  So, you 
should make sure to pay attention to both the changing dollar amounts and changing dates as 
you make your decisions. 
 
After you have worked through all of the decisions, we will select one of your ten decision 
screens by rolling a 10-sided die. Then we will roll a 10-sided die again, until a number between 1 
and 7 comes up, to pick one decision row on that screen. This means you will be paid for all 
three choices in that triple, which you made at the same time.  When you make your choices you will 
not know which decision triple will be selected for payment. You should therefore treat each 
decision as if it might actually count for payment. 
 
Once the decision screen and row are selected, we will look at the specific choices you made and 
the resulting payouts. If the individual payouts in the selected decision row are smaller (less than 
$100), you will actually be paid all three amounts. However, if the individual payouts in the 
selected decision row are larger ($100 or greater), you will roll a 10-sided die to determine 
whether or not you are actually paid these amounts. If you roll a 1, you will actually be paid the 
amounts, and on the dates that you chose to receive them. If you roll a number other than 1, 
you will earn nothing in this task. This roll will be at the end of the experiment, and in private, 
when you are being paid. 
 
For instance, suppose the decision screen in the above example was selected and you preferred 
the sooner date in the first four rows and the later date in the last three rows, as shown above.  
You would then roll a 10-sided die, until a number between 1 and 7 comes up, to select the row. 
Suppose the outcome was 5 and the fifth row is selected. In this row you preferred a payment of 
$123.01 in twenty-eight days in the first decision and, consequently, $123.01 in sixty-three days 
in the second decision, and $123.01 in ninety-eight days in the third decision. Since this payment 
is $100 or greater, you would roll the 10-sided die again, at the end of the experiment. If the 
outcome of your die-roll is 1, you will be paid $123.01 in twenty-eight days, $123.01 in sixty-
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three days, and another $123.01. However, if the outcome is 3, or anything other than 1, you will 
get nothing. 
 
You will receive the money on the date stated in your preferred option. We will pay you using 
PayPal, which is an online payment service. We will explain more about PayPal in a few minutes. 
If you receive some money to be paid in the future you will also receive a written confirmation 
from Professor Harrison which guarantees that the money is to be paid to you on that date. 
 
 The money you receive from these choices is in addition to the show-up fee of $5, which is 
paid out at the end of the experiment as cash.  
 
 
